Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting January 29, 10:00 A M
Meeting with Mr. Yoshida
Ambassador Dulles said that he did not know how many assistants the Prime Minister would bring with him that afternoon and asked members of the Mission to hold themselves in readiness to be present if necessary.
Correlation of Mission Work with SCAP
Ambassador Dulles mentioned again his desire to identify General MacArthur as closely as possible with the work of the Mission, both because of what he can contribute and because of the political situation at home. General MacArthur must be one hundred percent behind [Page 823] the treaty. If he were to indicate that it did not exactly reflect his thinking or that he had been left out the treaty would be attacked by the Hearst–McCormick press and might be defeated in the Senate.
Ambassador Dulles accordingly suggested for consideration that he and the Prime Minister pay a “courtesy call” on General MacArthur after their first meeting. He said that he had talked with Ambassador Sebald who was skeptical of the proposal, fearing that it might give the Japanese or other Asiatics the impression that the authority of SCAP was being used to force unwelcome treaty terms on Japan. He thought that the Mission should use SCAP’s help sparingly.
Colonel Babcock was in favor of Ambassador Dulles’ proposal. He was sure that General MacArthur would handle the meeting so that the Prime Minister would realize that no pressure was being exerted. The time for such a call was after the first meeting. If made after a later meeting it might be thought that General MacArthur had in fact been brought in to exert pressure. General Magruder and Mr. Johnson agreed with Colonel Babcock, Mr. Johnson recommending that the call be a perfunctory one of only five or ten minutes. Ambassador Sebald said that if the power of the occupation was to be put behind everything the Mission did it would be hard to maintain the impression that the treaty had been negotiated between the Mission and the Japanese Government on a basis of equality.
Ambassador Dulles recalled that General MacArthur had expressed willingness to be brought in at any time and suggested that it might be wise to nail that down. It could be explained to the press afterward that the business talks had been here in Ambassador Sebald’s office and that the call on General MacArthur had been for the purpose of keeping him informed. He doubted whether a purely ceremonial call would have the effect Ambassador Sebald feared, while it would have the desired political effect at home. From then on the Mission would work directly with Mr. Yoshida; there might not be another call on General MacArthur for a week. It was decided that the idea of such a call should be put up to General MacArthur by Ambassador Sebald. If he approved, the call would be made, Mr. Yoshida having been previously notified, and if he did not the idea would be dropped. Mr. Johnson said that he would in any event strongly recommend against Ambassador Dulles’ calling on General MacArthur alone as that would appear almost to reduce Ambassador Dulles to the status of a go-between.
Ambassador Dulles’ Speech
Ambassador Dulles mentioned that his America–Japan Society speech1 had been approved by General MacArthur, who had pronounced [Page 824] it “eloquent and wise”, and that helpful suggestions by Mr. Johnson and Ambassador Sebald had been incorporated. A Japanese translation was to be prepared for release to the Japanese press. Ambassador Dulles expressed some objection to the idea, advanced by the Army, of a tape recording of the speech, but Mr. Johnson said there was probably no way to stop it.
Reception for Ambassador Dulles
Ambassador Sebald said that lists had been drawn up for four receptions at his house to enable leading Japanese to meet Ambassador Dulles. The entire Mission was invited should the various members be able to attend. It was decided that the first reception would be on Wednesday and the second on Saturday.
General Magruder said that the proposal for 50 percent pay-as-you-go after the treaty had been cabled to General MacArthur2 and that he had approved, but that it was evident from the conversation on Saturday that he had changed his mind. General Magruder said that State had held that it was psychologically desirable for Japan to make some contribution in recognition of the security our forces would be providing Japan. There was also the question of whether Congress would be willing to appropriate more than was necessary each year to close the gap in Japan’s balance of payments. General Magruder asked whether it would be advisable to wire Washington for instructions in the matter.
Ambassador Dulles said that the Mission should get the Japanese Government’s reaction to the general proposition of our stationing troops here after the treaty before getting Washington excited over the pay-as-you-go question. Probably nothing would be decided until the Mission returned and told Washington that the matter had to be handled in this way or that, after which all would fall into place. Ambassador Dulles thought there was much force in what General Mac-Arthur had said but that a position should not be determined until it was known whether an offer of partial or full pay-as-you-go would be necessary to secure acceptance of our over-all proposals by the Japanese. General Magruder said that a cable2 had been sent to Washington transmitting General MacArthur’s views and suggesting that Mr. Dodge hold up discussions of the question pending further word.
Mr. Rockefeller’s Work
Ambassador Dulles asked Mr. Rockefeller whether he planned to make any speeches and Mr. Rockefeller replied that he planned to [Page 825] discuss a possible speech before the America–Japan Cultural Society with Ambassador Sebald. In answer to Ambassador Dulles’ query whether Mr. Rockefeller’s activities were receiving publicity, Colonel Babcock said that they were, independently of the Mission’s other work. Mr. Rockefeller said that he planned to take a trip to Kyoto or elsewhere outside of Tokyo and Mr. Dulles suggested that a plane be secured for the purpose.