Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.00/12–2651: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

secret

Paris, December 26, 1951—7 p. m.

3796. Deptel 3563, Dec. 18.¹

1. In light of domestic official and public opinion Fr policy in regard to Indochina war is rapidly moving toward a crisis. Two years ago no Fr govt wld have survived a proposal that Indochina be voluntarily abandoned. Today Emb feeling is that while such a decision wld be generally greeted by Fr public with a sense of emotional relief, yet we do not believe that Fr govt for variety of reasons wld propose such a course of action in the near future. Majority of Fr wld probably agree that France cannot continue this burden even at present tempo for more than another few months. Increasing awareness of expenditure and mil casualty figures is everywhere apparent. There is almost universal recognition that the metropole’s security is adversely affected in an increasing degree by this distant adventure in an area which will never again be an asset to France.

2. Among considerations which wld cause Fr Govt to avoid for as long as possible any proposal much less decision to withdraw voluntarily from Indochina except under circumstances of forced mil evacuation are:

a. Admission of failure of policy which has cost so much in men and money;

b. Humiliation to natl pride and loss of prestige abroad;

c. Logistical problem of evacuating under mil and guerrilla pressure Fr Union troops, Fr civilians and such loyal Vietnamese as practical to include in such evacuation;

d. Almost certain massacre or oppression of incalculable number of Fr Union nationals left behind;

e. Voluntary nature of act which wld strike at very roots of Fr Union concept and particularly constitutional commitment (Art 62) to defend union, with inevitable repercussions of gravest sort in rest of union, particularly Fr North Africa;

f. Terrific impetus to Commie prestige and propaganda both in France and Fr overseas territories. Parliamentary reactions to balancing above considerations against those in favor of withdrawal are so unpredictable as to cause grave crisis whether govt emerged intact or not. (In this connection, as well as for gen background purposes, Dept may care to review Embtels 4633 Dec 1, 1949, 620 Feb 7, 746 Feb 16, 837 Feb. 23 [22], 840 Feb 22, and 860, Feb. 23, 1950).²

3. Gaullists would certainly at this time reject abandonment thesis. Rank and file of Socialist Party wld probably prefer some internatl disposition of problem, but Socialist leaders have thus far generally supported present govt position altho many individual Socialists have always favored withdrawal. Mendes–France (Radical-Socialist) for some time represented voice in wilderness, but his thesis of complete abandonment is obviously one that has gained increasing number of adherents. Monnet says that Fr cannot make her proper contribution to defense in the west while supporting any major mil establishment in Indochina. Under existing circumstance she favors complete withdrawal regardless of consequence. Devinat (influential Radical-Socialist and former min) has told us in effect: “We cannot continue in IC as at present. Mendes–France is absolutely right and there is no escaping his logic. The only question is how and when the change be made to one of the three fol courses of action: (a) problem to be internationalized; (b) France to receive massive additional financial aid and US equipment and troops; (c) France to pull out”.³ Raymond Aron⁴ is also pessimistic about continuance effort there that he has ref rained from publishing his views.

4. Difficulties of prob confronting Fr in its effort to rearm in Eur while maintaining Fr Union forces in Indochina are causing increasing uneasiness, which is reflected in many ways. Editorial and other newspaper comment on this subj is widespread (Newspaper comment embodied in a fol tel). One consideration which plays part in present thinking is possibility successful conclusion Korean armistice negots which Fr believe might unleash Chi Commie troops for use against Indochina.

5. While campaign of press comment re Indochina may in some cases spring from special inspirations, it nonetheless both reflects and encourages popular reaction and govt uneasiness North African and metropolitan forces have been depleted to meet Fr needs in Indochina. Govt has frequently pointed out that Fr officers and non-commissioned officers presently in Indochina are sufficient to form cadre for ten divisions in Eur. Budgetary aspects of problem in terms of Fr expenditures in Indochina have previously been reported in detail in Embtels and will be discussed further in separate cable.

6. As indicated in increasing volume of press comment, and in conversations we have had with various govts, polit and newspaper personalities, Fr public has come to point where it considers, as has long been govt’s position repeatedly presented to Wash, that Fr effort in Indochina represents no longer purely natl interest and responsibility, but rather interests of all free nations. While realizing importance of present US assistance in Indochina, they think that question shld be squarely faced by all whether Indochina operations shld not be considered part of western effort rather than primarily Fr responsibility.

7. Fr govt also apparently sees no end in sight to hostilities in Indochina. Perhaps particularly for that reason we have statement such as Pleven made to Natl Assembly Nov 16 re possibility contacts with China, and ref in communiqué issued at conclusion High Council Fr Union Nov 30 re possibility internatl conf for purpose ending fon intervention SEA.

8. It is quite obvious that the nature of the struggle in Indochina has radically altered during the past two years. The Fr effort immed after the liberation was designed purely to protect France’s empire, and public and private interests in Indochina. With the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and the increasing assistance with which the Chi have been furnishing the VM in both training and materials, the war has taken on the aspects of a struggle against the expansion of Commie imperialism. The VM has been converted from a largely nationalistic group to a completely Commie dominated mil and terroristic organization of growing resources and possibilities.

9. Altho, thanks largely to Fr initiative, some progress has been made, the polit sitn in Vietnam continues unsatisfactory. Fr has granted the Assoc States a very considerable measure of autonomy—probably more than they are able to handle. A beginning has been made in the creation of a Natl Viet Army. Yet it seems quite clear that there has not yet been created an anti-Commie nationalist native force which is able alone to meet the VM successfully, even in local engagements. A withdrawal of the Fr Union forces either now or within the next two years wld produce a definitive collapse of the present Assoc States polit organization and its replacement by a Commie state. Very large numbers of influential natives are on the fence. There is, on our side of the fence, a minimum of native politico-mil dynamism.

10. Altho Gen De Lattre has stated that in the absence of an invasion by large forces of Chinese volunteers or regulars he can clean sitn up in 12 to 18 months. I believe this is whistling in the wind. As long as the Viet-Minh continue to be trained, reformed, supplied and able to seek sanctuary in China, no annihilation of VM forces seems possible.

11. The Fr Union army has already lost 35,000 killed, of whom 800 deaths, as of July 4, 1951, represented St Cyr graduates. About two-thirds of their most competent non-coms and perhaps one-half of their officers are stationed there, as well as the cream in quality and the preponderance in quantity of their professional troops.

12. Altho Fr have complained bitterly of delays in matériel shipments to Indochina, De Lattre has recognized that had it not been for US contributions of those and items which have been delivered, Fr cld not have contained some of VM attacks in 1951. If Chi shld enter conflict only with jets they cld sweep Fr Air Force as now equipped from the skies. Fr ascribe much of their success this year to unchallenged air operations.

13. The Fr and the Brit are urging us to hold staff conversations on the sitn in SEA. Pleven’s note (Embtel 3765, Dec 22) last Saturday again raised this issue. We will be hearing from Churchill on same subj next month. There is no doubt that the most satisfactory result of these conversations from the Fr point of view wld be the recognition of the internatl character of the Indochina war and the resultant decision that the burden being borne by France shld be shared by others to a greater degree than at present. While a commitment of Amer armed forces under present conditions has never yet been officially requested by the Fr, they have already urged us to make greater contributions in money and materials.

14. We may soon be presented with a definite either/or situation: Either we increase our present aid to Indochina to a very considerable extent and make certain definite commitments as to what we will do in the event of a Chi invasion, or the Fr will be compelled to reexamine their entire policy in the area.

15. The issue is not entirely or even primarily whether the Fr will continue their effort at the now existing level. The present level will not be high enough if, even without an actual invasion, the Chi further step up their assistance to the VM. The Fr are becoming increasingly sensitive to the possibility of a sitn in which the Fr govt might be confronted either with the necessity for rapid withdrawal or a military disaster. In the circumstances we must decide whether we wish to go much further than we have heretofore in the direction of a multilateral approach to the problem.

16. If we agree in principle to a multilateral approach, it wld seem that we must immed engage in tripartite conversations, not only at the mil but also at the polit level. Amongst other considerations, we might, for instance, wish to reach a tripartite decision as to the accuracy of present Fr estimates of the mil and polit sitn, and the wisdom of existing plans to deal with them.

17. To conclude, I believe that the snowball has started to form, and public sentiment for withdrawal, in the absence of adoption of some course of action envisaging either internationalization of Indochina problem or Fr receipt of massive additional aid, will gain steadily and perhaps at accelerated rate. It wld be incorrect to assume that Fr Govt is trying merely to horse trade or bargain with US. It is responding slowly and unwillingly to pressures far stronger than party positions. Consequently, Emb recommends that US re-examine problem in the light of these changing circumstances prior to a final precipitation of these mixed elements in order avoid risk of a sitn threatening the security of all SEA and entailing grave polit and mil repercussions elsewhere.

Dept pass Saigon; sent Dept 3796, rptd info Saigon 220, London unnumbered.

Bruce

1. In telegram 3606, December 17, Ambassador Bruce reported on discussions with Premier Pleven concerning the French military budget. Pleven had said that he could not see how France could satisfy its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its commitments in Indochina within the budgetary resources available to it. Bruce further reported that Pleven “felt that despite his many efforts and those of other French visitors to US to explain magnitude of problems involved in Indochinese war that they had been unsuccessful in convincing our officials of tragic situation, financially and otherwise, in which France found itself because of this operation. Indeed, the situation was becoming even more serious. In one day last week French Union Forces had lost 1000 men and had expended six weeks’ ammunition in an engagement that had lasted only three days. Very same Viet Minh regiments which had been badly mauled a few months ago had again appeared, brought up to full strength, completely equipped, well-officered, and in good fighting spirit. Undoubtedly this indicated a replenishment of troops, possibly including Chinese, and certainly furnishing by Chinese Communists of full equipment replacements. Current intelligence reports from Indochina indicate that Chinese Commies are preparing for greater and more active participation in that area.”

   Moreover, Pleven had stated that Jean Monnet, Commissioner General of the French National Planning Commission and a leading proponent of Western European cooperation, had become convinced that the drain imposed on France by the war in Indochina precluded an adequate defense posture in Europe. (740.5/12–1751) The full text of telegram 3606 is scheduled for publication in volume iv.

   In telegram 3563, December 18, the Department of State requested the Embassy’s evaluation of this apparent growing movement within the French Government to consider withdrawal from Indochina (740.5/12–1751).

2. All the telegrams under reference are printed. For texts, see Foreign Relations 1949, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 101 and ibid., 1950, vol. vi, pp. 722, 734, 739, 742, and 743.
3. The French National Assembly debated the Indochina question on December 28 and 29 in the course of consideration of military credits for the Associated States. Premier Pleven and Minister for the Associated States Letourneau delivered statements defending the position of the government. However, former Premier Edouard Daladier urged that the issue of the war be placed before the United Nations with a view to obtaining a cease-fire and an internationally supervised plebiscite. The National Assembly endorsed existing government policy on December 29 by approving the military credits by a vote of 510 to 109. Only the Communist members were in opposition. For the record of these deliberations, see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1951, Débats, pp. 10048–10116, passim.
4. Prominent French intellectual and journalist.