Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

790.5/12–2251: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State

top secret priority

Saigon, December 22, 1951—4 p. m.

1264. London’s 2764 to Dept; 1285 to Paris, Dec. 17.¹ We welcome Paris and London initiatives for tripartite talks on [political?] problems and urgency for US-UK-French exploratory talks in immed future. Russo-Chinese Commie ambition to acquire by one means or another Vietnam and SEA can hardly be doubted. Only question is if and when Chinese Commie air or ground units will be required and there evidence (see Deptel 835, Dec 20)² that such development may not be long delayed. Prudence requires preparations and consultation on polit no less than mil front.

Case for exploratory tripartite talks does not rest only on possibility Chinese Commie invasion; they needed in any event. Coordination of British program in Malaya, French effort IC, US aid throughout area, various forms assistance being extended to Burmese and Thai, cld all be considerable if proved and without necessity of committing govts involved. Area intelligence exchanges and targets cld be appreciably more systematized than at present. Attitudes toward Chinese Nationalist guerrillas might be made more precise now that British thinking proceeding toward greater realism in their appreciation necessity containing Chinese Commies. Capabilities native govts in area require reassessment, perhaps politically even more than militarily.

Shld invasion occur, speed of response will be as essential as it was in Korea. Polit tactics will be facilitated if prior exploration polit strategy has taken place. Will appeal be taken to UN, under what terms, and for what ends? What will be course tripartite or individual action pending UN decisions? What may we expect of neighboring govts in interim and subsequently? Shld consideration be given to joint or individual statement warning Chinese Commies against consequences further aggression? Such declaration might possibly have useful cautionary effect and be of further value in preparing world opinion for future UN action. These all urgent questions which need sounding now.

Case for these talks seems wholly persuasive. I hope that favorable consideration will be given to them on highest level as matter of urgency, and that problem will be given initial discussion during Churchill’s visit.³ Legation wld be pleased to submit its views re specific agenda for tripartite talks if Dept desires.

Sent Dept 1264, rptd info Paris 489, London 16.

Heath

1. Ante, p. 123.
2. Same as telegram 3613 to Paris, p. 563.
3. British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill met with President Truman in Washington on January 7–8, 1952, for discussions on a wide range of subjects of mutual interest. Information on the background of the Churchill visit is scheduled for publication in volume iv.