790.5/8–1251: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State
613. Immediately prior receipt here Deptel 499 of August 101 containing Dept’s proposed text security bilateral and subsequent receipt Deptel2 stating text being sent, Romulo submitted to me his second proposed text.3
In talk with Romulo yesterday morning and later talk with Quirino and Romulo last evening both urged that as much as is possible of fol language or substance of fol language of second be worked into preamble.
“Recalling with mutual pride the unique relationship of enduring sympathy and common ideals which brought their two peoples together to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war.
“Desiring to declare publicly their common determination to defend themselves against armed attack and to assist each other in case of such an attack from whatever source or direction it may come”.
And same treatment of fol in Article 4.
“Article 4
“The parties agree that an armed attack against either of them shall be considered an armed attack against both of them, and consequently, they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will assist the other party so attacked by taking forthwith individually and jointly with other party such action as it seems necessary, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression”.
And similar treatment of fol language in Article 8.
“Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area and the development by the United Nations of a more effective means to maintain internatl peace and security, the parties, individually and jointly through the procedure mentioned in Article 7 will maintain the closest understanding and cooperation with states, regional organizations associations of states or other authorities in the Pacific area in a position to further the purposes of the treaty and to contribute to the security of that area.”
Their objective is to obtain something a little different from Australian New Zealand pact which will give some special recognition to special relationship which we so frequently emphasize and more particularly to Phil loyalty to us during last war and will also give recognition if possible to Quirino sponsorship of SE Asia Union. Failure to grant any of these concessions will not in my opinion produce many [Page 247] serious consequences but in view of job Quirino with Romulo’s support did on Friday4 in forcing fifteen man comite to accept reparations clause5 and in view of his expressed appreciation to me last evening of Dulles’ and Dept’s patient consideration Phil requests for revisions in face trying emotionalism of press and public here, I suggest that Dept put what frosting it can on his cake and also to further ease gen Phil disappointment when failure to get cash reparations becomes known. Press here is generally being helpful and beginning build up of all-importance of Phil security.
Quirino has asked me inform Dept of his desire to personally sign security bilateral with Pres Truman in San Francisco. Although this wld enhance his political prestige I see no objection to this inasmuch as barring Quirino’s death it is almost inevitable that he will again be candidate two years from now and inevitably win with result that he and his henchmen will be in power for at least another six years.
As Quirino has during past months worn down dissidents within his own Liberal Party and infiltrated to some extent into opposition he has shown new ability to exert power of his office and make decisions as was demonstrated on Friday with fifteen man comite.