663.001/10–351
Memorandum of Conversation, by Edgar P. Allen of the Office of Western European Affairs1
Subject: Austrian Treaty
| Participants: | Mr. Kenneth Jamieson, British Embassy |
| Mr. Pierre Francfort, French Embassy | |
| Mr. Colladay, WE | |
| Mr. Rutter, WE | |
| Mr. Allen, WE |
In response to our inquiry, Messrs. Jamieson and Francfort each stated that they had no further information to provide concerning the views of their respective foreign offices on the U.S. proposal for an abbreviated text of the Austrian Treaty. The contents of the Department’s telegram (1788 to London, 1941 to Paris, 837 to Vienna, Oct. 2),2 outlining the Department’s proposals on procedure and tactics were then summarized for the information of Messrs. Jamieson and Francfort.
A discussion then took place along the same general lines of the conference of September 27 with Mr. Jamieson.3 Mr. Jamieson indicated surprise that the Department should have recommended a date as early as October 15 for the proposed meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies, stating that his Government would prefer that the meeting be postponed until after the Trieste issue has been settled. In reply, it was stated that this government is of the opinion that the proposed meeting should be held at the earliest feasible date with a view to maintaining continued diplomatic pressure on [Page 1147] the Soviets, without a time lag which might detract from the effectiveness of our proposal. Our position is that we admit no connection between Trieste and the Austrian Treaty issue; that our present propaganda position with respect to Trieste is certainly no worse than it has been in the past; and that, assuming the Trieste issue were settled to the satisfaction of the West, the Soviets would either (1) find reason for renewed propaganda on Trieste, or (2) adopt some other extraneous issue as a reason for blocking the treaty as they have in the past used the issues of demilitarization, denazification, Article 48 bis, etc. We expressed the hope, therefore, that there could be tripartite agreement after consultation with Gruber on an early date for the next meeting of the Treaty Deputies.
Mr. Jamieson was informed (at a point in the meeting at which Mr. Francfort was not present) that Caccia’s report concerning Gruber’s views on the abbreviated text apparently resulted from some misunderstanding based on conversations prior to the receipt by Gruber of details concerning the U.S. proposal and that this misunderstanding was clarified in a conversation between Gruber and Caccia on October 2. We have no reason to believe that the Austrian Government will not concur in this Government’s proposal for an abbreviated text.
Messrs. Jamieson and Francfort were informed that the Department is prepared to furnish a preliminary draft of a proposed White Paper on the Austrian Treaty which could be used as a basis for tripartite consideration in order to assure adequate publicity for the Austrian Treaty issue following tripartite agreement on the program.
In reply to Mr. Francfort’s inquiry the view was expressed that there must necessarily be tripartite agreement on the entire program prior to the meeting of the Treaty Deputies.
During the discussion of British fears that the Western powers may be laying themselves open to a Soviet accusation that they have in effect scrapped the old draft treaty the view was expressed that: (1) Western tactics would have to be carefully planned in order to avoid any direct statement that we are or are not scrapping the old draft treaty, and (2) the Western position should be made clear in the proposed White Paper as well as at the next meeting of the Treaty Deputies that the West has been consistently ready to conclude the Treaty on the basis of the old draft but that it has been unable to do so solely because of Soviet unwillingness to conclude the Treaty.
It was agreed by all concerned that should active negotiation of the old draft treaty be undertaken at the next Treaty Deputies’ meeting, prior tripartite agreement would be required as to the tactics [Page 1148] to be pursued and the extent to which the Western powers would be prepared to accept Soviet versions of the five unagreed articles. It was stated in this connection that the U.S. Government is not prepared to accept the Soviet versions of all the unagreed articles inasmuch as, aside from being undesirable under present circumstances, such action on our part might well lead to a refusal by the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty.