663.001/9–2851: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Austria 1
837. Fol recommendations for tripartite discussions procedure and tactics for Aust Treaty take into consideration Brit views as presented by Emb Sept 27 (memo pouched)2 and London’s 1565 Sept 283 and preliminary Fr view (Paris 1943 Oct 1).4
We consider Aust agreement on procedure is key point and agree with Brit that tripartite consultation be held with Gruber at early date. Principal objective is obtained Four-Power settlement restore Aust sovereignty and permit withdrawal occupation forces. In our opinion present draft Treaty cannot be concluded even with concessions to Sovs suggested by Brit FonOff.
We wld have extreme difficulty in obtaining ratification if complete concessions were made now to accept Sov text unagreed arts and if agreed arts were reopened for Sov amendment. Present punitive and outmoded draft Treaty no longer represents Aust’s status or requirements. Concessions in past to obtain agreement were made in vain hope that Sovs wld conclude Treaty as a whole. Therefore, we prefer abbreviated Treaty which represents a correct implementation of Moscow Declaration and contains all elements required for restoration Aust sovereignty, as well as for reasons outlined para three Deptel 1680 London, 1803 Paris, 780 Vienna.5 Abbreviated text is practical proposal which simplifies issues and makes possible extensive political and diplomatic pressure on Sovs. If Sovs modify policy in Central Europe, agreement on Aust might possibly precede other steps in larger areas. If they do not modify policy no Aust settlement can be reached in foreseeable future on [Page 1145] any basis. It shld be made clear to Gruber that our objective is a settlement and not merely propaganda. If settlement cannot be reached we wld seek maximum pol benefit from Sov long term refusal to conclude Treaty and West willingness withdraw occupation forces on basis agreed settlement. Our policy wld continue support Aust unity in spite occupation and preserve maximum authority Aust Govt.
Abbreviated text, therefore, designed to get best Aust settlement possible. Fol alternative plans proposed as basis tripartite discussions:
1. Invitation through usual channels for Deputies’ mtg London on Oct 15 or such other date recommended after consultation with Gruber. Action shld receive full publicity and perhaps be accompanied by simultaneous publication White Paper on previous negots. West Deputies wld present summary negots to date and outline issues preventing agreement. Abbreviated Treaty wld be proposed forthwith at this mtg. West proposal cld be based on grounds if agreement cannot be reached on present draft, disputed issues be omitted and settlement made on agreed arts in abbreviated text plus Art Six which can be justified by Sov control assets during interminable negots. To prevent risk that Sov Deputy wld drag out negots for another 258 mtgs and not present issue to Sov Govt in manner requiring definitive action text shld be transmitted to Moscow by diplomatic note.
Alternative 2. Deputies’ mtg on agreed date to negot on present draft. Sov Deputy shld be asked if he is prepared to conclude present draft and negot on this basis. In this event West might be forced to make substantive concessions if Sovs prepared to conclude present draft. Dept does not agree with Brit proposal that Sov version all unagreed arts be accepted or to reopen agreed arts in present draft or consider matters extraneous to Treaty. If this mtg does not elicit Sov willingness to conclude draft Treaty at early date West Deputies shld refer matter to govts for consideration. West shld then transmit abbreviated text to Sov Govt via Embs Moscow and give complete publicity including publication White Paper.
In either case West shld agree to transmit proposal to Sovs in effective manner designed to obtain Sov agreement on favorable settlement. We prefer alternative one for its emphasis on bare essentials for Aust settlement, its significant omission of unnecessary and outmoded articles, and issue it wld present to Sov Govt. We recognize difficulty of resuming negots on present draft if Sovs categorically refuse to discuss abbreviated Treaty. Alternative two less favored because it involves making new proposal immediately after failure to obtain acceptance old draft. In any event, both alternatives open us to charge by Sovs and possibly in Aust that action wld scrap present treaty and is for propaganda purposes with no hope of acceptance. Sovs by delaying tactics have already in effect [Page 1146] scrapped draft. Any sweeping proposal to break deadlock wld provoke similar charge but we consider it essential to maintain initiative in negots and to oppose Sov intransigence.
London and Paris shld discuss these alternatives with FonOff. Vienna shld attempt to obtain some definite view from Gruber on US proposals and indication of tactics which Aust Govt wld prefer. Our views in this respect are identical with those of Aust Govt in that we hope to obtain favorable Treaty soon as possible.
- Drafted by Williamson, Allen, and Rutter and cleared with Bonbright. Repeated to London and Paris and sent by pouch for information to Moscow and Frankfurt for Reber.↩
- The memorandum described British First Secretary Jamieson’s conference at the Department of State on September 27 during which he made known the British Foreign Office’s position on the abbreviated treaty. (663.001/9–2751) His statements largely reiterated the evaluation contained in telegram 1565 from London, Document 559.↩
- Ibid.↩
- In telegram 1943, Ambassador Bruce informed the Department of State that the French Foreign Ministry desired more information before it formulated its position. However, the Foreign Ministry did express concern along with the British that this procedure might result in the Soviet Government accusing the United States of “tearing up” the existing agreements on other articles of the treaty. (663.001/10–151)↩
- Document 558.↩