Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 536

663.001/3–1251: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

top secret

Washington, March 12, 1951—8 p.m.

4751. For Jessup. Fol is Dept’s position for Aust Treaty to replace conclusions in RPTS D–3/le, Jan 23:²

“4. Recommendations on US policy position.

1. To discuss with Brit and Fr series of progressive steps which might be taken to obtain conclusion Treaty, namely:

(a) to adopt Sov version Art 48 bis and West versions Arts 16, 27, 42, and 48;

(b) to adopt Sov versions Arts 48 bis and 16 and West versions Arts 27, 42, and 48;

(c) to adopt West versions Art 27 and para 9 Art 42, and Sov versions rest of Art 42 and Arts 48 bis, 16 and 48; or

(d) to accept Sov versions all five arts. This last proposal wld be justified as last resort if it wld obtain immed and final agreement to Treaty.

These steps may have to be modified in light Brit and Fr positions either on specific arts or concluding Treaty at this time.

2. Any Sov effort reopen agreed arts, such as proposed amendment Art 9, shld be rejected.

3. Any Sov effort link settlement Aust Treaty with other questions, such as Trieste or Ger, shld be rejected.

4. No agreement shld be reached which does not take into acct necessity that Aust security forces will, prior to withdrawal West occupation forces from Aust, be reasonably adequate to maintain internal security.”

You may wish to discuss with Brit and Fr method of negot in Ministerial mtgs. As we see it negots by Mins may (1) be limited to securing agreement on directive to CFM Treaty Deputies to resume active negot of unagreed arts with view to concluding Treaty; (2) embrace substantive agreement on unagreed issues, including directive to Treaty Deputies to conclude Treaty on agreed basis; or (3) include complete action by Mins on remaining unagreed issues of Treaty.

First course least desirable in as much as it wld provide no assurance negots wld not again be stalemated in Deputies’ mtgs. Second course, which wld provide substantive agreement on Ministerial level but leave details to be worked out by experts in Deputies’ negots, favored as matter of tactics. Third course wld unnecessarily consume time of FonMins with respect to details which cld best be handled by Treaty Deputies who are organized and equipped to complete final drafting of Treaty. Any of foregoing courses of action shld be accepted, however, if Sov attitude indicates likelihood that it will lead to early conclusion of Treaty.

Webb

1. Drafted by Williamson and cleared with Perkins and the Department of Defense Repeated to London, Vienna, Moscow, and Frankfurt for Reber.
2. Document 525. These revisions were recommended to the Secretary of State in a memorandum from Perkins on March 10. The memorandum, drafted by Williamson, informed the Secretary that these revisions were being made in light of suggestions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Austrian Government. (663.001/3–1051)