S/S–NSC files, lot 63D351, NSC 58 Series
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1
Subject: Third Progress Report on Implementation of NSC 58/2 entitled: “United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe”2
United States policy toward the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe was approved by the President on December 13, 1949 as NSC 58/2. It is requested that this “Third Progress Report”, as of May 8, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.
[Page 1258]Objectives of NSC 58/2
The basic long-term United States objective as set forth in NSC 58/2 is to further the development in Eastern Europe of independent, non-totalitarian and non-communist governments willing to accommodate themselves to and participate in the Free World Community. In view of the presence or threat of Soviet military power and the existence in the hands of the local communist authorities of overwhelming police power, it was at the time NSC 58/2 was drafted determined to be impracticable to proceed directly toward this objective. To have done so would have risked involving the United States and the USSR directly in a struggle for prestige, and would probably have provoked strong Soviet reaction at a time and in localities favorable to the display or exercise of overwhelming Soviet power. As a consequence, and in view of the then apparent effectiveness of “Titoism” as an ideological weapon with which to weaken USSR control over the satellite communist regimes, a more immediate and, it was believed, a more readily attainable objective was concluded to be non-Stalinist—even though communist—regimes as temporary administrations until such time as the United States basic objectives were realizable. It was reasoned that limited positive action to this end, as an expedient, would involve less risk of Soviet reaction of the character suggested.
Progress in Pursuit of Limited Objective Set Forth in NSC 58/2
In seeking to encourage the emergence of non-Stalinist groups within the several satellites, the United States has in a sense been pursuing a dual objective: to sustain the hope and morale of the democratic majorities and at the same time to take full advantage of actual and potential cleavages among the communist ruling groups in order to weaken the Soviet grip on the satellite governments and make it possible for the latter to be drawn out of the orbit of Soviet domination. While these two facets of our activities are incompatible one with the other unless phased in relation to time, at this stage the tactics serving both have been largely identical. These fall into three main categories: (A) propaganda, (B) economic, and (C) unconventional.
A. Propaganda
Efforts by the U.S. International Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE), mostly on the part of the Voice of America (VOA), toward the objectives of NSC 58/2 have continued with increasing vigor. VOA’s audience in the satellites continues large, according to our best estimates, despite an increase in Kremlin-sponsored jamming and other controls over radio listening. Indubitably these VOA efforts have contributed materially to maintaining the popular unwillingness to accept the Sovietization of the satellite nations. Furthermore, the publicity which VOA has been [Page 1259] able to give to the nationalist aspect of Tito’s deviation has undoubtedly encouraged “Titoism” among communists in the satellite nations. Moscow’s purges of these local administrations is a clear indication of its fear of these developments.
In addition to the above efforts of USIE, there is now in the planning stage a campaign for a further stepped up psychological offensive for application in the satellite nations. This blueprint for operations, which will result in an intensification and refinement of present efforts, will be closely integrated with the recently completed “Plan for a Psychological Offensive (USSR)”. This Plan for the satellites will serve not only as guidance for psychological operations in the present emergency, but also as a basis for the development of any full-fledged psychological warfare procedures which might eventually become necessary.
B. Economic
Since submission of the second progress report on May 26, 1950,3 a report on the economic means available to the US in pursuit of the objectives of NSC 58/2 was prepared in the Department of State and considered, revised and subsequently approved by the intelligence representatives of Defense, State and the CIA. This report (OIR No. 5227 of July 28, 19504) concludes that “neither restrictive measures nor the offer of Western economic assistance would in themselves cause the satellite countries to break away from the Soviet bloc”, but that “the economic weapons available to the West are chiefly important as auxiliaries in a coordinated program designed to cause defection by other means.”
At a meeting on August 3, 1950 of an interdepartmental working group, consisting of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce and Defense, the National Security Resources Board, the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency, the OIR report was approved with the observation that the terms of reference of the study were limited to the appraisal of the effects of economic measures acting independently. It was also pointed out that while it was agreed that the economic weapons available to the West might not accomplish the objective of weaning the satellites away from the Soviet bloc, the effective use of these weapons for attaining other objectives in the cold war should not be disregarded. The group also observed that individual economic measures, while serving one objective in the cold war, might well hinder the attainment of other objectives in this field. The approved report has been called to the attention of other agencies and groups concerned with other individual aspects of the problem as well as to those responsible for the formulation of an over-all coordinated program.
. . . . . . .
Policy Evaluation
No fundamental change in the Soviet-satellite relation has become discernible, nor has the general situation within the area altered. The satellites continue to be dominated by local security [Page 1260] and party organizations under the control of trusted Soviet agents, backed up by the presence or, as the case may be, by the threat, of Soviet military and police power. There has been a continuation and in cases an augmentation of the drastic purges which have liquidated doubtful elements and secured the pro-Kremlin regimes in power, and the Soviets and their local tools have been successful in warding off any trend in the satellite countries comparable to that which led Yugoslavia to its breaking with Moscow. Yugoslavia continues to be the butt of aggressive pressures on the part of both the USSR and the satellites, and tension has noticeably risen higher in the area.
Although this situation has called forth further United States efforts to buttress the independence of Yugoslavia, it has not altered United States interests in the general area nor required a revision of its basic objectives towards the satellites. However, the effectiveness with which the communist regimes have been able to thwart the development of effective Titoist groups must be weighed against the relative success reported by the implementing United States agency in regard to the support and encouragement of democratic, anti-communist elements. In consequence, it is apparent that a reappraisal is warranted of United States policies which rely heavily upon the creations of schismatic communist regimes as an interim measure.
The United States now finds itself directly engaging Soviet prestige in Korea, through military action under the aegis of the United Nations. A situation foreseen as a deterrent to direct United States action in furtherance of its basic objective vis-à-vis the satellites has thus in large measure already evolved as a result of circumstances in an entirely separate sphere. Inasmuch as the USSR is not itself openly engaged militarily in the Far East, the restraint on United States freedom of action in Eastern Europe is not entirely eliminated. However, United States policies and objectives in the satellite area may now be measured against the demonstrated willingness of the USSR to commit its satellites to military action under given circumstances.
Events since the winter of 1949 lead to the conclusion that the USSR will react as strongly to the prospect of the emergence of Titoist regimes in the satellite nations as it will to the direct threat of the creation of non-communist regimes. There would seem no apparent purpose to be served, therefore, in limiting United States policies to the promotion of schismatic communist regimes as an interim objective in the satellite area. In working directly toward the United States basic objective, however, the tactical use of Titoism, and of whatever Titoist elements may momentarily emerge under particular circumstances, should not be abandoned: …
[Page 1261]In the light of the foregoing, the Department of State is reviewing NSC 58/2 for the purpose of determining whether the policies set forth in it require reconsideration. Should the Department’s conclusions be that the policies require reassessment a further report containing proposed revisions will be submitted to the Council in the near future.
- The source text is one of the copies of the memorandum circulated to the National Security Council as a formal NSC Progress Report. A copy of the memorandum as signed by Webb and transmitted to Lay indicates that it was drafted by Marcy of EUR/EE and approved by Cloyce K. Huston and Higgs of EUR/EE and Deputy Assistant Secretary Bonbright. The brief memorandum from Perkins to Webb, May 14, requesting approval of the progress report, was drafted by Marcy and approved by Huston and Higgs and by Walter N. Walmsley of S/A and Deputy Under Secretary Matthews.↩
- Dated December 8, 1949, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, p. 42.↩
- For the report under reference, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 31.↩
- Not printed.↩