No. 576

663.001/11–151: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State 1

secret

2586. As instructed Deptel 2431, Oct 25 (to London 2181, Vienna 1054, Moscow 296, Frankfurt unn2), we have pressed Fr anew re Austrian treaty strategy and have carried matter to higher level. In conversations with De Margerie and at great length with Seydoux, Emb officers again most earnestly put forward Dept’s position [Page 1166] re abbreviated treaty. While these sessions were valuable in yielding further clarification of positions and indication of extent Fr willingness to come along with us at some later time, they brought out again very clearly that Fr are opposed to introduction of abbreviated treaty either at or immed fol forthcoming mtg of deputies.

In third para of reftel, Dept described Fr position as consenting in principle to introduction of abbreviated draft, but without agreement on use to which it shld be put. As Dept will have observed, this is not in conformity with Fr aide-mémoire (Embtel 2388, Oct 24, rptd Vienna 68, London and Frankfurt unn, with which ref Deptel apparently crossed3); nor was there any indication in our most recent conversations that Fr mean introduction of new draft when they speak of possibility of threatening Soviets with withdrawal of earlier concessions.

Extent to which Fr are willing to go is to have diplomatic démarche to Soviets immed fol expected failure of forthcoming mtg, in which approach it wld be strongly implied, or perhaps even flatly stated, that we may withdraw our agreement on articles already settled if there is not in near future agreement on treaty as a whole. Fr wld probably perceive no objection to stating on such occasion that treaty as now drafted is no longer in keeping with Austria’s requirements, that in view of continued Soviet takings from Austria since 1949 it has become still less equitable and that primary purpose of settlement must be evacuation and fulfillment of Moscow declaration. But FonOff maintains that door must not be closed in the old treaty. It is convinced this wld be the case if abbreviated treaty were formally put forward.

Fr still hold, contrary to view advanced by us in accordance with instrs, that once abbreviated treaty is put forward Soviets will cease all negots either on old treaty or new one and that they will claim, with some plausibility, that by proposing patently unacceptable treaty document west had demonstrated it is no longer interested in quadripartite settlement of Austrian question. We wld thus be not only losing good deal of public opinion support for our position but also intangible but nevertheless important political benefits that reside in fact that negots are continuing and that, as at present, not much ground remains to be covered for final agreement to be achieved.

Shld be emphasized that in arguing as above, Fr are not motivated by belief that agreement on present treaty draft is likely in near future. Their appreciation of Soviet intentions re Austria appears [Page 1167] to accord entirely with that of Dept. They consider, however, that continued ritual of fruitless negots on the nearly agreed old treaty is factor of stability in Austria, and are basically in favor of continuing on present basis for fear of upsetting applecart. Despite Fr willingness to re-examine treaty strategy after next deputies’ mtg, and despite their willingness to “threaten” withdrawal of previous agreement as tactical measure, disagreement thus still appears to be basic.

As Seydoux put it, Fr consider that we wish to turn over new page with respect to Austria and they believe turning back to previous page will be impossible once this is done. He inquired politely whether we consider that world balance of power has sufficiently shifted in our favor for us to offer Soviets smaller inducement—in fact, no inducement at all—to get out of Austria. (There was no evidence Fr FonOff expects to have trouble obtaining ratification of present treaty if and when Soviets finally accept it.) Fr position thus appears to have evolved hardly at all and it seems to us most unlikely that it can be modified by further conversations with them until after deputies have met again.

Bruce
  1. Repeated to London, Vienna, and Frankfurt for Reber.
  2. Document 573.
  3. Telegram 2388 summarized the principal points of the French aide-mémoire which was delivered to the Embassy in Paris on October 24. (663.001/10–2451)