741.5/1–3151: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom of State1
4197. Dept pass ECA/W and Defense. This is joint Embassy–ECA message. New British arms program is about size earlier indicated to Embassy (Embtel 3651 December 27 [29] et al2) but its phasing [Page 912] is slower than we had expected.3 It appears to be an effort which in size does not fall too short of what might reasonably be expected from British at this time. Fact that government did not condition accomplishment program upon US financial aid but only upon availability materials and equipment, particularly machine tools, and refrained from previous strong emphasis on minimizing adverse economic impact which suggested business-as-usual approach, are encouraging indications.
Estimated expenditure British FY 1950/51 on military production pounds 250,000,000. Attlee’s remarks indicate that expenditure on military production alone expected to be more than pounds 500,000,000 in Britain following year and pounds 1,000 million third year. About 8 percent of British GNP will be devoted to military effort in calendar 1951. Magnitude and phasing of program when converted to US FY’s are close enough to military program assumed in blue book to make blue book analysis of economic impact (see Toeca R/150 January 19) relevant.4 Attlee’s reference to measures which government will make to provide sufficient resources for program and which will be spelled out by Chancellor in forthcoming budget statement suggests that belt will be tightened to extent necessary.
We believe US official public reaction to British program should not be unfavorable as program represents big and sincere effort by British. However, we also believe that US official comment should not be one of unrestrained enthusiasm conveying impression that British have undertaken maximum possible effort. What is now required we believe is carefully worded US statement indicating gratification at demonstration of firm intentions by British, and willingness to undergo continued austerity, while at same time avoiding creating impression that program automatically fulfills British part of effort which may be required. That kind of statement would tend to shape generally favorable public reaction to program, and, at same time, convey veiled implication that new British program is not the end of story and that further “bite” may be forthcoming. We believe British program represents, in a sense, a compromise between Cabinet members who would have liked an even larger effort and those desiring much smaller one. Attlee succeeded [Page 913] in striking nice balance. US official comments should be made with that in mind. Views of Embassy service attachés follow:
Air Attaché: 10,000 Class G RAF reserves to receive 15 days active duty are technical control and reporting people. RAF expects to give some 10 to 12 days training in existing control and report units. Intake will be spread through summer. All 20 of Royal Auxiliary squadrons to include 2,300 officers and men will get great benefit from three months continuous training. Plan not firm as to time, but all will probably not be active simultaneously. These squadrons to be commanded by regular RAF officer and have two other regulars assigned. Also about one third maintenance crews are regulars.
From large pool reserve flying instructors 200 to be called back. Attempt to be made to get them to volunteer for two to eight year contract. Remaining vacancies to be filled by compulsory recall for 18 months.
1,000 reserve pilots to be recalled for three months jet training have been getting only week-end training in very light aircraft.
Army Attaché: British Army now consists of equivalent of nine divisions plus one Gurkha Division. Only six divisions could be fully combat-equipped and sustained in field. Remaining four divisions could be equipped at peace-time scales in many items, but war reserves would be inadequate to sustain them in active operations. New British rearmament program would provide equipment for total of twelve divisions with fairly adequate reserve stocks for active operations.
Accelerated program, therefore will place Army in much better state of readiness as regards essential equipment for both active Army and first contingent of territorial Army. While War Office program calls for completing “as much as possible” of the three year plan by 1 April 1952, many long lead-time items will not be completed in sufficient quantities until end of 1952 or later.
In proposals to Cabinet, Army had asked for recall of Class Z reservists for periods of up to three months with active Army. Plan was designed to provide units in Germany, in Middle East, and in strategic reserve units in the UK with manpower sufficient to bring them to or near full war strength. Cabinet refusal to approve recalls for periods longer than 15 days makes impossible assignment to units outside UK. Thus active Army elements in Germany and Middle East will continue below full war strength.
It will be possible to recall reservists to duty with certain reserve Army units and it is probable they will also be recalled for duty with active Army units in the UK. Program of recall of Z reservists for 15 days will do little more than exercise mobilization machinery for those units involved and permit bringing reservists personnel record up to date. Training value for this short period will be negligible.
Slim, chief Imperial General Staff, and other high military authorities reportedly greatly disappointed over government’s failure require three months training reservists. We believe they will continue efforts to persuade government to their viewpoint.
[Page 914]It is to be noted that one primary difference between present US troop program and that approved by Cabinet for British forces is that no units of territorial Army are being called into active service for more than their ordinary two weeks summer training, whereas US National Guard divisions (nearest equivalent to territorial Army) are being recalled for indefinite period of federal service. Furthermore, British program does not create any additional active Army unite except a relatively few logistical and headquarters units.
Naval Attaché: RN obtained exactly what Admiralty asked for. Increases in personnel meet requirements for reactivation following ships now in reserve: 1 light carrier, 2 large minelayers, 12 destroyers, 4 frigates, 16 minesweepers.
These will all be in commission and with assigned operational units by end this year except DDS which will be in commission by end 1952. Increased funds designed to permit acceleration conversion and modernization programs build up supplies and enhance readiness reserve fleet. Data on effect on building program and on strengthening fleet air arm not available yet but not believed significant.
- Repeated to Paris for OSR, Rome, Brussels, Stockholm, Copenhagen, The Hague, and Frankfurt.↩
- Document 416.↩
- On January 29, in a statement to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Attlee had outlined the extent of the British rearmament program. For text of his statement, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 483, cols. 579–587. A copy of the statement was transmitted to Secretary Acheson by Ambassador Franks on the evening of January 29 together with a letter in which the Ambassador stressed that the success of the program depended on assistance from the United States in securing adequate supplies of machine tools and raw materials. (Memorandum by Barnes, January 30, 741.5–MAP/1–3051)↩
- Neither the Blue Book on the United Kingdom nor Toeca R/150 is printed.↩