Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 425

London Embassy files, lot 59F59, 350 Britain–Commonwealth

The Attaché in the United Kingdom ( Tibbetts) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret   priority
No. 3527

London, January 29, 1951.

Subject: Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

The recently concluded conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, which was held in London January 4–13, again focussed attention on the Commonwealth as an institution as well as upon the position of the various Commonwealth nations on the world today.² From the British point of view the continuance and strengthening of the Commonwealth is a major tenet of their foreign policy. Both Labor and Conservatives vie with each other in praise of the Commonwealth and its value not only to the United Kingdom but to the world. The adherence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon has in British eyes made the Commonwealth particularly important as “a bridge between the east and the west,” a frequently repeated phrase, and the United Kingdom unquestionably takes the Commonwealth as an institution more seriously than any of the other members except possibly New Zealand which dearly cherishes the British tie.

British officials state that the aim of the British Government in calling the conference was to ensure that in any future war with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom would have the support of the entire Commonwealth. Secondary aims were (1) to convince the new Asian dominions, notably India, that their views were being given full consideration by the British Government and that the “Asian voice would not be overlooked” in the working out of policy in the present international crisis, (2) to encourage the Common-wealth countries to strengthen their defenses against aggression and (3) to strengthen the Commonwealth links through the traditional means of informal discussion, personal contacts, audiences with the King, etc., etc. Small staffs accompanied the Prime Ministers and the Commonwealth Relations Office has repeatedly emphasized that the meetings were of necessity general discussions seeking clarification of principles rather than the working out of details.

In fact, however, on the issue of China–Korea a common Commonwealth position was formulated, i.e. the revision of the principles of the UN Cease-fire Committee for presentation to the UN as the basis for action. When the conference opened, after the customary exchange of amenities, the Prime Ministers moved almost immediately into discussion of the question of China-Korea. It is not possible to trace in detail the discussions on this question on the information available but the following points seem of importance.

a. All Commonwealth Prime Ministers were gravely concerned over the possibility of a full scale war in the Far East as the result of the Chinese intervention in Korea.

b. The United Kingdom and India had specific proposals to present for possible negotiations on the subject. (Embtel 3827 January 10.³)

c. The fear of all Prime Ministers present that open warfare with the Chinese Communists might be precipitated by the force of events led all Prime Ministers to support moves for delay in Lake Success discussions of this subject and to consider a new approach to the subject.

d. At that time no Prime Minister was prepared to urge UN action against China along the lines of the United States communication of January 4⁴ since it was believed that an attempt at a new approach must be made before consideration could be given a condemnatory resolution against the Chinese Communists or the imposition of sanctions.

e. All Prime Ministers believed that every effort possible should be made to get the United States and the Chinese Communist Government to enter negotiations. There was a general desire to explore with the United States the full consequences of UN action against the Chinese Communists before any such action was taken. The US contention that it would be impossible to consider negotiations without a cease-fire was accepted by the Prime Ministers.

f. The initiative in working out this agreed Commonwealth new approach on the China-Korea issue was taken by the United Kingdom and India with Canada, because of Pearson’s presence on the Ceasefire Committee, also playing a leading role. (Pearson’s views on the matter largely decided the final Canadian position.) Australia was the strongest supporter of the United States position as expressed in the US communication of January 4 but Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, was absent a good part of the time with influenza …. Holland of New Zealand also inclined to the United States view …. The agreed final position therefore would appear to a considerable extent to represent the point of view of those Commonwealth countries which believe most keenly in the necessity of attempting continued negotiations with the Chinese Communists on Far Eastern questions. The working out of an agreed Commonwealth policy on this issue, in the Embassy’s opinion, came about primarily as a result of the intense pressure of events in the Far East plus the fact that two of the Prime Ministers present had concrete proposals, similar in many respects, to put forward for consideration.

On other major questions of less immediate urgency there was no attempt on the part of the Prime Ministers to work out an agreed Commonwealth policy, and the United Kingdom appeared to be content to let the discussions follow their natural course. For the purposes of convenience, these discussions (Embtels 3775, 3821, 3868⁵) are summarized below.

a. Japan. There was general agreement that a peace settlement with Japan should be concluded as early as possible but no attempt was made to discuss details. All Prime Ministers felt that both the USSR and the Chinese Communist Government must be invited to attend any discussions held on the question of a Japanese peace treaty, along with all other participants in the war against Japan, but if the USSR and the CPG refused to attend, a peace conference should be held anyway. There was general agreement—and few suggestions—on the necessity of strengthening the Japanese economy and also general recognition that it would be futile to attempt to bind the Japanese tightly with “paper controls.” Considerable skepticism was expressed as to the genuineness of Japan’s conversion to democracy and concern was felt by all Prime Ministers at the increasingly critical situation within Japan.

The re-armament of Japan was opposed principally by Australia and India. Australia’s objections were vigorous, mainly, according to British officials, because of Australian public opinion on the question. India’s objections were based on Nehru’s conviction that the re-armament of Japan would provoke the attack which the west hoped to prevent. In Nehru’s opinion the position on the rearmament of Japan should be as stated in the Japanese constitution.

b. Europe. Only one session was devoted to European questions and there was little discussion of European matters. Canada and the United Kingdom outlined their plans and commitments under NATO but the other Prime Ministers took little direct interest. Nehru’s remarks on German re-armament (Embtel 3868) were in accord with his remarks on Japan, i.e. would re-arming Germany not provoke a Russian attack, but he raised this point as a question only. The consensus was that a peace treaty with Germany should be concluded and that German re-armament should be permitted.

c. Middle East. As outlined in Embtel 3821, the discussion on Middle Eastern questions was general in nature with few specific problems considered in any detail. The “Old Dominions” defense discussions with the UK were held in what the British considered a highly satisfactory atmosphere, but short term prospects of additional Commonwealth forces for the Middle East did not appear promising. Over a longer term, however, it was considered that the Australian, New Zealand, South African and possibly Southern Rhodesian contribution to the Middle East could strengthen the position in that area.

As reported in Embtel 3883 of January 12,⁶ the United Kingdom, as a follow-up to these talks, has proposed a meeting of the Defense Ministers of the “Old Dominions” to consider Middle Eastern Defense matters further. This meeting will probably take place in London in March this year, at which time the United Kingdom intends to propose the formation of a permanent committee composed of representatives of the Defense Ministers whose function it will be to keep the area’s defense problems under continuous review and to serve as a channel through which the UK can pass important information bearing on military matters.

Two other Middle Eastern problems were given passing attention: (1) There was common agreement on the need for economic development in the area; and (2) the United Kingdom took advantage of the occasion to emphasize the need for contributions to the United Nations for Palestine Refugees.

d. Raw Materials. The Commonwealth countries acquiesced in the United Kingdom position that there should be a three country steering committee on raw material questions, much to the relief of the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth Liaison Committee in London is to be enlarged sufficiently to make possible the full exchange of views and information on this subject.

e. Kashmir. There is no information available to the Embassy on these conversations other than that contained in Embtels 3966 and 4092.⁷

f. Commonwealth Secretariat. Despite a certain amount of advance speculation in Australia about the establishment of a Commonwealth Secretariat to make easier the presentation of a “united front” on matters of common concern, the question of a Secretariat was not formally raised at any meeting, since, according to Commonwealth Relations Office officials, Menzies of Australia is not really convinced that such a Secretariat would be worth while although Spender, his Foreign Minister, is. Local Canadian sources have informed the Embassy that Canada was prepared to resist the idea of a Commonwealth Secretariat on the grounds that American public opinion would suspect a Commonwealth attempt “to gang up” on the United States.

The declaration of the Prime Ministers published at the end of the conference⁸ contained one point which was featured by the British press, i.e. “In all our discussions we have made it clear to each other, as we now do to the world, that as Commonwealth Prime Ministers we would welcome any feasible arrangement for a frank exchange of views with Stalin or Mao Tse-tung. We should, in the name of common humanity, make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other’s hearts and minds.” In the press conference held at the time the declaration was made public, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Patrick Gordon-Walker, said that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers had not intended that statement to imply a separate Commonwealth approach to either Mao Tse-tung or Stalin; what was intended was the endorsement in general terms of the principle of further talks, in the case of the USSR, through the latest exchange on a possible meeting of the Foreign Ministers, in the case of the Chinese Communists, the UN’s cease-fire principles. In the answer to a Parliamentary question on January 23, this interpretation of the Prime Ministers’ declaration was reaffirmed.⁹

In assessing the Commonwealth’s approach to the international situation British officials have reiterated that all Commonwealth Prime Ministers were fully aware of the threat posed by the USSR to the West but that no serious attempt was made to assign “priorities” to areas of danger. The general view of all was that there was an immediate crisis in the Far East as a result of the Chinese intervention in Korea but that Europe remained equally vital. According to the CRO, a “theoretical balance of urgency” was maintained but in fact the greater part of the Prime Ministers’ attention centered on the Far Eastern issues. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are the Dominions which the UK has always found “most responsive” to the necessity of keeping the defense of Europe paramount in the Commonwealth’s thinking, but tacitly if not formally the other Commonwealth countries are inclined to consider European problems the primary concern of the United Kingdom.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

If the basic aim of the United Kingdom in calling the conference was, in fact, to ensure that all nations of the Commonwealth would stand by the United Kingdom in any future war with the USSR, the conference would not appear to have accomplished a great deal. Before the conference was called the United Kingdom already knew that it could count on Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Southern Rhodesia, and probably South Africa, but India’s (and to lesser extent Pakistan and Ceylon) probable position in any such future war was and apparently remains an unknown quantity. Apart from the vague phrase in the final communiqué to the effect that so long as the threat of aggression continues each Commonwealth country will strengthen its defenses, there was no all-Commonwealth decision to prepare to resist aggression, and concrete defense plans were made only between the British and the “old” Dominions. Possibly the British feel that the Commonwealth efforts to work out an acceptable solution to the China-Korea problem will convince Nehru that the United Kingdom’s desire for peace equals his own, but the benefits of such intangibles are difficult to evaluate.

In securing an agreed Commonwealth position on an immediate and urgent concrete problem, the British did secure, at least temporarily, a broader basis of support for efforts to delay hasty UN condemnation of Communist China’s intervention in Korea. As much as possible the British will attempt to keep the majority of the Commonwealth on their side in this issue and the Commonwealth’s action at the conference provides a useful precedent. Nevertheless, the problem of maintaining a close relationship with the United States is more important for the British than maintaining the Commonwealth loyalties, and the British fully recognize that no development would more seriously disturb the “Old Dominions,” which are a majority of the Commonwealth, than the appearance of a serious cleavage between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Margaret Joy Tibbetts

1. Copies sent also to Ottawa, New Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Wellington, Pretoria, and Canberra.
2. The conference met at 10 Downing Street. Attending for the United Kingdom were Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Patrick Gordon Walker, and their advisers; for the rest of the Commonwealth, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies of Australia, Prime Minister Sidney Holland of New Zealand, Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake of Ceylon, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent of Canada, Prime Minister Sir Godfrey Huggins of Southern Rhodesia, Minister of Interior T. E. Donges of South Africa. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan, and their principal Ministers and civil servants.
3. See the first footnote 1, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 48.
4. Presumably a reference to the U.S. position set forth in circular telegram 334, January 3, ibid., p. 7.
5. None printed. Telegram 3775, January 6, reported on the discussion of the international situation and Korea at the conference; telegram 3821, January 10, reported further discussion on Korea and on Japan, the Middle East, New Guinea, and raw materials; telegram 3868, January 12, reported further discussion on raw materials and the discussion on Europe. (741.022/1–651, 1–1151 and 1–1251)
6. Not printed.
7. For telegram 3966, see vol. vi, Part 2, p. 1706; telegram 4092 is not printed.
8. For text of the Prime Ministers’ Declaration, see Folliot, Documents on International Affairs, 1951, pp. 98-100.
9. For text of Prime Minister Attlee’s answer, see Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 483, cols. 38-42.