Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 427

611.41/1–3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff ( Nitze)

secret

[Washington,] January 31, 1951.

Subject: Consultations between the U.K. and the U.S.

Participants:

Sir Oliver Franks, Philip C. Jessup and Paul H. Nitze

We referred to the conversation which Sir Oliver Franks, Sir John Slessor and we had had at Averell Harriman’s home and to the meeting Mr. Jessup and I had had the next day with Sir John Slessor.¹ I then read the first two paragraphs of the memorandum of January 18 which was prepared for the Secretary to send to Mr. Lovett.² I pointed out that Sir John Slessor originally had had in mind something of a more formal and binding nature, but that this informal exploratory type of approach seemed to us to be wiser and that Sir John had agreed therewith. Sir Oliver said that he agreed that it was wiser.

I then went on to say that Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lovett had talked the matter over and that they had come to the conclusion that something along this line would be useful, but they felt that three additional points should be made clear:

1. That the meetings should not be held at stated intervals.

2. That we should not attempt to arrive at formal decisions or even tentative agreements; the meetings should be for the exchange of ideas only.

3. That no agreed minutes of the meetings should be attempted.

Sir Oliver said that he agreed in general, but wondered whether it might not be possible to have each side keep its own minutes and then exchange them so that misunderstandings could be avoided. Mr. Jessup said that he thought it would be wiser if each side dictated its own memorandum of conversation but that we not attempt to exchange or coordinate these memoranda.

Sir Oliver also suggested that, in order to preserve some degree of continuity, the person who was responsible for the arranging of meetings might check with each side at least once a month to see whether there were matters which would be appropriate for discussion. Mr. Jessup and I agreed that it might be advisable to have meetings as often as once a month in order to preserve some degree of continuity, but that we thought any checking should be a matter of internal procedure within either the State Department or his Embassy rather than an agreed procedure.

Mr. Jessup then asked whether it might not be wise to have some preliminary discussion of the matters which either side might wish to bring up at an initial meeting. Sir Oliver said that he thought that his government might wish to raise the subject of the decisions which may be facing us in the Far East following the passage of the resolution on Chinese aggression and the general improvement in the military situation. I suggested that we might wish to raise again some of the problems taken up at the last Tedder–Franks–Bradley–Jessup conversation.³

Sir Oliver then reviewed his understanding of the type of discussion which it is we have in mind and said that he was certain this would be acceptable to his government. He then asked whether we on our side were ready to proceed. We said that we thought there was general agreement on our side, that discussions of this type would be useful, but that no decision had yet been made as to who specifically would represent State and Defense.⁴

1. No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files.

2. The first two paragraphs read:

   “Sir John Slessor asked Phil Jessup and Paul Nitze whether it would be possible to work out an informal arrangement for more regular consultation between the U.S. and the U.K. on problems in the political-military field likely to be of importance to both countries. He recognized that such consultation should not be for the purpose of arriving at agreed positions binding on both countries, but he thought that each country might be able to arrive at sounder decisions if it were aware in advance of the tentative thinking of the other.

   “He said that Franks and Steel on the political side and Tedder on behalf of their JCS were kept fully informed of U.K. positions, and were given sufficient latitude to be in a position to handle the U.K. side of such consultations effectively. He thought that meetings might be arranged when either side thought they had something of importance to bring up. This might result in a meeting once a week or so. He asked whether we on the U.S. side would be willing to designate someone on behalf of State and someone on behalf of Defense and the JCS to at least try such an arrangement on an experimental basis.” (611.41/1–1851)

3. Presumably a reference to the so-called Bradley-Tedder talks at the end of October 1950; for documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1686 ff.

4. In memoranda dated February 7 and 9, Secretary Acheson and Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett designated Jessup and Nitze and General Bradley and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman to be the respective U.S. representatives. (611.41/2–751 and 2–951)

   The first of the informal political-military talks took place on March 1 with Yugoslavia as the subject of discussion; a second meeting took place on April 6 to discuss certain aspects of the Korean situation; three more meetings occurred on May 16 and 24 and June 19 with the subject of discussion a Middle East Command. For a memorandum of the discussion on Korea, see vol. vii, p. 307. Regarding the three meetings on a Middle East Command, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 479 and 522.