790.00/1–2951: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Gifford) to the Secretary of State
4178. In considering US–UK relations re Far East it seems important to make some assumptions re Communist objectives and probable tactics. Since end of war differences between US and UK over FE have varied both in quality and importance as international tensions have fluctuated and as each has made concessions to other’s position, but viewing post-war period as a whole we seem to have consistently drifted further and further apart. Differences during past week were so acute that public opinion in both countries apparently had become involved to extent which was making it doubly difficult for governments to ameliorate situation. Communists cannot fail to be conscious of this obvious progress in their admitted campaign to drive wedge between US and UK and probably tend to overestimate rather than underestimate it. This fact together with current CPG tactics indicate to us that Communist FE strategy for present is to exploit their advantage and by equivocation, ambiguity and change of pace attempt to follow up this success rather than precipitate situation (for instance, by attack on Hong Kong) which they certainly realize would speedily unite West even if not West and Asia.
Although we now seem to be getting together on US resolution it remains true that recent conversations have been unfruitful in resolving fundamental differences. A British Cabinet Minister has stated privately, for instance, that “Slessor might just as well not have gone to Washington” because he felt he received no helpful information either re current military developments and prospects or re our basic policy plans. We feel, however, that in good conscience we should continue attempts to reconcile our positions. Furthermore we do not despair of some success as we feel British position is neither willful nor capricious but rather founded on sincerely and widely held opinions, even though such opinions may be of doubtful validity. It should therefore theoretically be possible by [Page 904] patient examination of each other’s views to reach much greater degree of mutual understanding.
It appears to us that British distrust of our FE policies and actions stems from two basic reactions. First, they have a feeling that although neither one of us sees clearly very far ahead, we push ahead with ill-considered haste and impatience, while murkiness of future induces in them caution and desire to proceed on assumption war can be avoided as long as this can be done without seriously prejudicing strength of our position in case war actually does eventuate. Second, they feel we underestimate strictly Asian forces and factors which help Bolsheviks to utilize FE situation successfully to further their own ends.
In light of above we would answer questions final paragraph Deptel 3558, January 27:1
- 1.
- Primary British concern is to find effective FE policy on which both US and UK can agree, and which will avoid split between West and Asia (especially India), will preserve UN, and will avoid world war. Neither UN nor principle of collective security can, in their view, be salvaged by an imposition of sanctions, which would be ineffective and might lead to spread of hostilities. Although US and UK are at one in their basic strategy in opposition to communism, it is US tactics re FE which cause concern to British and arouse maximum distrust among Asian nations. US intransigence re CPG is forcing China into sole reliance on Soviet and is consolidating views of China and Russia. British feel US political and military leadership in Asia as personified by SCAP has not inspired confidence. There is general belief government has little or no control over his actions and there is even some fear SCAP may be developing calculated long-term world war against communism through aggressive action in China as the weaker of the two major Communist nations. In British view regardless of whether or not this is in fact SCAP’s strategy, too early or too rigid application of sanctions may lead to general war. If US wishes to take risk of general application of sanctions then it is essential that it have warm support of majority of nations concerned. Oriental nations have healthy fear Sino-Soviet imperialism and realize in last analysis necessity US support in order hold this imperialism in check but they do not wish to force show-down unless absolutely necessary.
- 2.
- In British view, one situation for which UN was not created and cannot cope with is falling out among major powers. There is fear in government circles US attempts substitute procedural stratagems and devices in order hide this fundamental fact will lead to break-up of UN. In attempt preserve UN they have in mind long-range objectives in FE and elsewhere.
- 3.
- UK concessions are primarily made in order to buy time and to insure widest possible support in event more drastic action necessary. British regard UN forum as object lesson to Asiatics. UN concessions will have been justified if, within reasonable limits [Page 905] they can be carried to point where average intelligent Asiatic could be convinced that responsibility for any open break is entirely and unavoidably due to Chinese action and that Chinese imperialism is the enemy of Asia.
- 4.
- There is suspicion US is attempting to make of UN a US club and it is feared that there may develop a tendency for neutral nations unsympathetic with US viewpoint to drift away from UN and to form their own clubs with resultant re-establishment of a balance of power. British extremely uncertain as to how their policy will work out in practice nor do they think we know how ours will work out in practice. They have had no clear statement from us as to our estimate of the future. Therefore they think it wise to move slowly and cautiously.
- 5.
- British are very unhappy over meager results to date of their China policy. It had until recently been primary British goal to assume Chinese neutrality in event of world conflict. Events now have forced them to conclusion even this hope may no longer be valid. British procrastination in UN now is partly to gain time to build up strength. If, as anticipated, Chinese recalcitrance and Chinese pressure on British continue to develop, serious consideration must be given to withdrawal of recognition. Such a step however will only be taken as a last resort.
In addition to above, British FE policy is subject substantial domestic pressure. Parties jockeying for position in next election with Conservatives tending support US position primarily on basis of danger implicit in US–UK break. In Labor view Conservatives never had constructive policy for FE while Labor poses as champion of India and other new Asiatic nations carved from British Empire. Labor violently anti-Chiang and anti-MacArthur. Leftwing minority now making FE a political issue and, in reaffirming its FE position, Labor is making bid for retaining Left-wing support, thus permitting it more strongly to support agreed US–UK policies elsewhere. We agree with Department that discussions in the sense of personal messages from the President to Attlee may make British vote our way in individual instances, and this is useful device. This, however, would not help in healing basic breach. We have impression this can only be done by patient examination each other’s basic approaches, and it was with this thought in mind we suggested in Embtel 40222 possibility of Jessup or Rusk visiting London.