Office of the Historian
No. 423

795.00/1–2751: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

secret   priority
Washington, January 27, 1951—5 p.m.

3558. Supplementing Deptel 35312 in reply urtel 40223 Secy intends having FE background discussion first of week with Franks. Possibility also being considered message President to Attlee same subject. These steps contemplated view increasing seriousness differing policies Far East highlighted past 48 hours by UK Cabinet decision oppose US Korean resolution if para 8 retained4 plus UK vote Cairo UPU seat Chinese Communists.

To this point in UN consideration Korean resolutions Dept be lieves most concessions to others viewpoint, insofar UK–US are concerned, have been made by US and that we cannot make more. Dept regards Brit stand with increasing concern because continued cleavage detrimental mainly to UK–US.

Prior taking either step para (1) above Dept desires to be as certain as possible exact motivations Brit policy which well covered urtel 4022 plus evaluation where Brit believe their policy will lead them, us, and free world generally.

We have in mind detailed questions such as (1) Is primary factor in Brit policy desire to avoid split between West and Asia, especially India; spread of Chi Com aggression in Southeast Asia, apprehension third world war, or what? (2) Are present Brit attitudes re recognition and UN actions expected to yield immediate benefits or lay foundation for long-range FE objectives? (3) How far must West go in concessions to CPG before Brit satisfied their policy has had fair trial? (4) Why have Brit made open issue with US on Chi Representation question as in vote in UPU and Jebbs speech 1st committee rather than following procedures which would avoid breaking Western unity this question?5 (5) Above all, how do they see [Page 903] their policy working out in practice? Emb views requested urgently. Discreet talks with FonOff not excluded.

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Raynor and cleared with Bonbright, Matthews, Rusk, and Johnson.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Document 420.↩
  4. Presumably this is a reference to the paragraph of the U.S. draft resolution, dated January 20, which called for the formation of a committee to consider what additional measures could be employed to meet Chinese aggression in Korea. For the full text of the U.S. draft resolution, see the editorial note, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 115.↩
  5. On January 25, Sir Gladwyn Jebb had expressed British agreement with the first five paragraphs of the U.S. draft resolution, but stated that the United Kingdom had grave doubts about further measures against Chinese Communists until Peiping’s intentions had been fully explored. For extensive documentation on the discussion of the U.S. draft resolution, including Jebb’s remarks before Committee I, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 117 ff.↩