752.00/4–2451
The Ambassador in Spain (Griffis) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: May I impose on your busy life to give you a brief summary of the situation in Spain as I see it after slightly over two months of work and study here:
- (1)
- Generalissimo Franco, despite the Barcelona strike,1 appears to be firmly in control of the country.
- (2)
- The only development, outside of his death or serious illness, which could possibly change this control would be economic, that is, the actual lack of foodstuffs or the further spiralling of prices which would raise the cost of the basic elements of life, such as wheat and rice, beyond the true purchasing power of the masses, and thus throw the Army into the scale against him.
- (3)
- The only existing power which would have any possibility of upsetting Franco would be the Army whose leaders are afraid or unwilling to upset the military dictatorship of which they are a part. There is always the possibility of a move by Franco to restore the Monarchy to save himself.
- (4)
- Franco is hard-working, has a thorough knowledge of the Spanish political and economic situations, and is more astute politically than any of his opposition.
- (5)
- There is substantially no freedom in Spain either political or economic as affecting labor: nor is there freedom of press or assembly. There is evidence of recent improvement in the freedom of the almost microscopic number of Spanish Protestants, Jews and Moslems as to the practice of their religions.
- (6)
- The Spanish Army, Air Force and Navy are and would be substantially impotent in modern warfare under their present conditions of equipment. Any talk of their defending the Pyrenees with their present equipment is absurd.
- (7)
- The great economic danger period for Spain is between this date and next autumn when the flour and rice from the present crop will become available. The crop shows signs of being the best [Page 815] in recent years, but it is not definitely certain that a period of actual national starvation will not develop before it is harvested and processed.
- (8)
- Spain is willing to fight, willing to send troops beyond the Pyrenees, anxious to make a bilateral agreement with the United States if properly armed, and/or would even reluctantly consent to join NATO, despite her old suspicions of England and France, but she must have arms.
- (9)
- As the long-time enemy of everything communistic, neither the Spanish Government nor its people are able to understand the discrimination against them so far as American aid, either economic or military, is concerned.
- (10)
- The American trend in favor of aid to Spain which seemed to be rising when I came here, now seems to us here to have waned or to have been lost in the greater problems of the East and Northern Europe.
- (11)
- Spain is nobody’s child.
When I left Washington I had high hopes of a prompt military agreement with the NATO countries in favor of Spain or, failing that, prompt bilateral military assistance to Spain. It is my personal belief that both the British and French Embassies here believe that Spain should be aided, but they become extremely holy about Spain when confronted with their own fears that there will not be enough arms to go around. Both admit that the politicians of England and France are afraid to face the issue pending the probable two national elections.
Surely we must act and act promptly to aid Spain even in a small way, both from a military and an economic point of view. How can we afford to disregard the tremendous possibilities of manpower here which might be made available with the expenditure of a relatively small amount of American money?
Furthermore, we desperately need a military mission here at once, whether or not it is nominated as a mission. The military here have the most fragmentary knowledge of the Spanish topography, transportation routes, defense points, or anything else. We should have at least 50 more officers here studying the possibilities of transportation rehabilitation, airfields, and lines of defense. I assume that I am inhibited from presenting these ideas direct to my old friends in the Pentagon. I deeply hope that I may find in you, or in one of your able nominees, a voice in Washington which would be a crusading voice for these ideas. Here in Spain it is later than you think. If the United States Government wants starvation and a trend towards communism in Spain, they are going to get it very quickly with their present indecision. If they want a militarily impotent Spain, they have it now.
[Page 816]My incorrigible sense of humor in the midst of this tragedy makes me ask your indulgence in closing this letter by quoting a jest that is sweeping the country:
“A Frenchman asked a Spaniard:
‘How much time do you think it would take the Russians to arrive at the Rhine?’
‘Six days.’
‘And at the Pyrenees?’
‘Six days.’
‘And at Gibraltar?’
‘Six weeks.’
‘And why the difference?’
‘Because of the roads.’”
This is a cry for help for an orphan but able child who, on a very small diet, could be made lusty and strong in the defense of the world.
With high regards,
Sincerely yours,
- Throughout the first half of 1951 Spain was faced with a worsening economic crisis centering around rising prices and an inability of workers to buy a satisfactory minimum of basic foodstuffs. In reaction, workers in the Barcelona area engaged in passive work stoppages early in April and some unrest consequently developed among workers and students in other parts of Spain in subsequent weeks and then subsided.↩