752.00/5–151
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State 1
Subject: Policy toward Spain
Attached is a letter from General Marshall2 containing the Defense Department’s recommendation, on implementing NSC 72/4, that Admiral Carney “conduct initial military discussions of an exploratory nature with the Spanish military authorities” as soon as “the requisite political arrangements have been concluded.” This directive to Admiral Carney (attached)3 also, contains a list of US military requirements in Spain—extensive, long-term air and naval base rights.
General Marshall recognizes that proceeding bilaterally risks complications with the British and French and offers “the assistance of this department … in your consideration of such placating measures as may be required to satisfy the legitimate interests [Page 817] of our allies.” However, he does not favor exploratory discussions with the British and French military regarding the relation of Spain to the defense of Western Europe, as suggested in Mr. Matthews’ letter of March 16 to General Burns. Such discussions, he states “would be premature, and further, would delay Admiral Carney’s visit to Spain.”
This letter indicates a wide divergence of opinion between the State and Defense Departments concerning the tactics to be employed, and emphasizes the need for immediate consultations with the JCS to agree on the successive steps required to achieve the objectives of NSC 72/4.
Further discussions with the British and French are required; this is also the recommendation of our Embassies in London and Paris. As a result of our talks with the British and French pursuant to the provisions of NSC 72/4, both before and following Ambassador Griffis’ conversation with General Franco on March 14, we agreed to consult with them before proceeding further. It is our opinion, as stated in Mr. Matthews’ letter to General Burns, that discussions with the British and French, at the military level, concerning the strategic value of Spain and Spain’s potential role in the joint defense would increase understanding and receptiveness of the US position. The British have also indicated a desire for military discussions and, in view of reports from London, are evidently preparing for them. Therefore if we are not to split completely with them and the French over this issue, and thus endanger our more important NATO relationships, these consultations will be essential.
The attached reply, for your signature,4 therefore emphasizes that the requisite political arrangements referred to in General Marshall’s letter require that further discussions be held with the British and French military authorities before an approach is made to the Spanish Government. It also recommends that representatives of the Department consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to agree on the tactics and successive steps required to achieve the objectives of NSC 72/4 and the military requirements set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.