Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 368

611.52/3–651: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Webb) to the Embassy in Spain ¹

secret

Washington, March 6, 1951—7 p.m.

578. Nature Brit and Fr replies in resp conversations reported Deptel 4286 Paris Feb 16, London 3796, Madrid 511,² indicates needless apprehension re US position and lack of clear understanding distinction between immediate and ultimate objectives US policy. As explained reftel and infotel Feb 6 1 a. m.² US policy toward Spain has been modified because of changed world situation and necessity utilize Spain’s military potentialities and strategic position. Our immediate objective is to seek acquisition and utilization air and naval bases in Spain in interest common def against Commie aggression, and in due course to develop their military potentialities.

Utilization Spain militarily can be based on either bilateral or multilateral concept. Spans have always indicated desire for purely bilateral cooperation with US and have derided ability NATO provide effective defense. Any arrangements we may work out with Spain in coming months will naturally be negotiated bilaterally but we strongly desire avoid concept special US-Span relationship because: 1) it wld tend confirm fears Western Eur we intend base real line of def on Pyrenees; 2) we do not believe any bilateral arrangement we eld avoid def of Spain, as opposed def Western Eur from becoming major Span contention. Furthermore since US policy Western Eur based on coop in common def, we believe it is essential our whole approach question using Spain militarily shld be based on bringing Spain closer to coop in common def with our allies. We believe Span thinking shld be oriented in this direction and away from more narrow concept of def of Spain which wld be strengthened by purely bilateral US-Span approach to def problems.

Ultimately therefore some relationship must be established between Spain and NATO, Span participation, but this subject will definitely not be raised at this time. We realize question Span relationship to NATO matter concern to all NAT countries, particularly to Brit and Fr. As we indicated in our conversations with Brit and Fr Embs here that is future problem which we intend work out in close consultation with them.

We realize immediate objective use Spain in common def also matter concern particularly to Brit and Fr and we intend continue consult with them on this question. However, before productive conversations possible, further info needed re Span intentions coop in common def against Commie aggression. While we shall therefore proceed through Amb Griffis to undertake exploratory soundings with Spans, we intend consult further with Brit and Fr, when his reports reed, before determining future course of action. Def now giving urgent study our military desiderata in Spain. Later we can consult with Brit and Fr and discuss desirability raising subj in Standing Group.

We will speak to Brit and Fr Embs along foregoing lines and suggest you similarly seek to reassure FonOff.

Madrid for Amb:

In view comments Embs London and Paris and MacArthur and in order provide time work out this problem with Brit and Fr, suggest without prejudice such further modifications as you may wish propose (urtel 718 Feb 23³): 1) you avoid in your discussions with Franco any ref to ultimate Span participation NATO; and 2) you modify your approach to avoid assurances re US willingness assist development closer relations between Spain and Western Eur nations. We recognize Franco’s present attitude re NATO and common def undoubtedly due in part realization difficulties impeding Spain’s acceptance NATO due Western Eur polit objections to Spain. He can obviously be expected indicate impracticality working toward participation common def due relations between Western Eur nations and Spain. In order encourage Span coop on multilateral rather than bilateral basis we must consequently be prepared at some time to indicate our willingness contribute in appropriate fashion to development closer relations between Spain and its Western Eur neighbors. However, we agree with Embs London and Paris assurances on this point shld be avoided, at least for present. If subject arises believe you can cover it by indicating this is matter involving many countries and Spain is not without responsibility in efforts improve relations. Emphasis shld be kept on ascertaining role Franco envisages for Spain in common def against Commie aggression, having in mind US policy this regard multilateral and not bilateral.⁴

Webb

1. Drafted by Dunham; cleared by Perkins, Matthews, and Bonbright; and repeated to London for Achilles and to Paris for MacArthur.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Ambassador Griffis reported in telegram 718 that he would propose no modifications to his existing instructions until such time as he had presented his credentials to Franco. Griffis added that he planned to raise no policy questions, but would “let Franco do the talking.” (611.52/2–2351)
4. In a subsequent telegram, Acting Secretary of State Webb informed the Embassies in the United Kingdom and France that the Department had given the “fullest consideration” to the British view that further discussions should take place with them before taking up negotiations with Spain and to the French view that no negotiations with Spain take place at all. However, Webb continued, it was the view of the Department that preliminary discussions with Franco be initiated in fulfillment of the “basic policy decisions” embodied in NSC 72/4 (Document 359). The Department of State was “well aware from representations made here that both Brit and Fr will be displeased that we have not postponed even further our instrs to Amb Griffis to sound out Span Govt.” Nonetheless, the Department of State was convinced that further discussions with the British and French as this time would lead to stalemate and therefore the United States was going ahead with its plans for preliminary conversations with Franco. (Telegram 4040 to London, repeated to Paris, 752.5/3–651) That same day, the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Homer Byington, reviewed the latest developments in Spanish-American relations with Counselor Burrows of the British Embassy. On March 7, the Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Elim O’Shaughnessy, met for a similar conversation with Christian de Margerie, the Counselor of the French Embassy. Memoranda of conversations with Burrows and de Margerie are in file 752.00/3–1551.