752.5/3–851: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State 1
4823. Young, head of Western Department to whom substance of first four paragraphs of Deptel 40392 was communicated March 7 stated that in spite of assurances that Ambassador Griffis conversation would be exploratory HMG regarded such a step with grave concern. Young continued that unilateral approach by US, however secret, would have serious consequences; (1) It was regarded as practically certain that Spaniards would soon let it be known that US had made unilateral approach, and (2) our united front towards Spain would be destroyed. He added matter was such “top level” one that it was likely Foreign Secretary or Minister of State would wish to discuss with Ambassador.
My concern is that because of absorption with immediate objective of acquiring bases et cetera as set forth in section 1 of NSC 72/43 we risk prejudicing achievement of ultimate objective of obtaining Spanish participation in common defense of west and in NAT as described in Section 2. Furthermore no matter how tentative approach may be fact that US proceeds unilaterally in face of unresolved objections of British and French does in effect constitute “substantive action”.
Effects of such unilateral action both on Spaniards and on our allies may well make achievement ultimate objectives more difficult. First, in case of Spaniards once they know US attaches sufficient importance to acquiring bases in Spain to proceed alone without UK and French support they will be in strong position to resist change from bilateral to multilateral relationship. Unilateral approach if it achieves nothing else will demonstrate conclusively to the feasibility of bilateral arrangements and to that extent will increase immeasurably difficulty of obtaining contribution from Spain to common defense of west Europe and of persuading Spain of advantages of entering into closer co-operation in common defense with our allies. If we become involved in bilateral arrangements which paragraph 2 of Deptel 4039 indicates we intend negotiating with Spain in coming months what inducement will we have to persuade Spaniards to shift from bilateral basis which they [Page 806] prefer to multilateral basis which they deride. Second, if we proceed unilaterally now without agreement with our allies especially France and UK we are undoubtedly making it most difficult to win their voluntary co-operation in achieving our long-term aim of establishment of some relationship between Spain and NATO. Once rift in our united front is publicly known it will be increasingly difficult for British Government and presumably French Government also to reverse position and support our policy.
In view of reasons for changing US policy, our conviction of necessity of utilization Spain’s military potentialities and of our intention to consult later with British and French before determining future course of action (Deptel 4039 March 6) I believe we would gain much more by full consultation now with French and British, particularly on military aspects of problem either in standing group or elsewhere, prior to any unilateral approach by us than we could possibly lose by postponement of approach to Franco, made without concurrence of France and UK.