Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 312

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Conversations with the Italian Prime Minister

United States Minutes of Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi’s Second Formal Meeting With the Secretary of State, Department of State, September 25, 1951, 9:30 a.m.¹

Washington, September 25, 1951, 9:30 a.m.

top secret

Present

United States	Italy
Mr. Perkins	Amb. Zoppi
Mr. McGhee	Minister Janelli
Mr. Hickerson	Mr. Luciolli
Amb. Dunn	Mr. Catalano
Mr. Allison	Mr. Venturini
Mr. Byington	Mr. Sensi
Mr. Greene	Mr. Panza
Mr. Wallons
Mr. McClurkin
Mr. Mangano
Mr. White
Mr. Manfull
Miss Kirkpatrick

Resumption of Peace With Japan

Minister Janelli, after noting Italian participation in the war against Japan, commented on the continuing Italian desire to normalize relations with Japan. He pointed out that the problem had been held in suspense for some time and that, when revived in 1951, the negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty were hurried because of other pressing political events. He felt that in view of this haste the Department’s promise to consult Italy on the Japanese Peace Treaty had not been fulfilled completely and that Italy had not had sufficient time to put forward its suggestions. Therefore, the Italian Government now suggested that further efforts be made to provide for:

(a) An exchange of notes between the Italian and Japanese Governments, extending the provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty to Italy; and,

(b) The indemnification of Italian nationals for damages suffered during the period between the Italian armistice and the end of war with Japan.

In connection with point (a), Minister Janelli said that the exchange of notes with Japan had not been achieved because the Japanese Government had presented counterproposals in which no reference was made to the Japanese Peace Treaty or to the damages suffered by Italian nationals. He stressed the adverse effect of this situation on Italian public opinion and pointed out that, while Italy was at war for only a relatively short time with Japan, the damages suffered by Italians were not less severe than those of most of the other allied powers. He said that Italian shipping suffered during the war and Italian nationals received after September 8, 1943, the same treatment accorded to nationals of the allied powers. He observed that Italy should receive at least the same treatment as Portugal in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty. Minister Janelli also said that he understood that it is our position that Japanese assets in Italy are covered by Article 16 of the Japanese Treaty. While there are few if any Japanese assets in Italy, and the problem is thus not of large practical importance, the Italian Government had hoped that in recognition of Italy’s status as cobelligerent with the Allies and of Italy’s declaration of war on Japan, Article 16 might be interpreted so as not to include Italy among the countries covered by it. Minister Janelli urged the United States Government to intervene with the Japanese in an effort to effect an exchange of notes which would extend to Italy the general provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Mr. Allison replied that there were two aspects to the problem:

(a) the political problem of ending the state of war between Italy and Japan on a basis mutually satisfactory to both countries, a problem which he thought could be worked out satisfactorily; and

(b) the practical problem of the amount and distribution of Japanese assets available under Article 16 of the Japanese Peace Treaty. In connection with the latter he recounted that Article 16 had been developed relatively late in the negotiations on the Japanese Peace Treaty and was in effect a compromise. He noted that the majority of the countries desired to divide Japanese assets located in neutral countries, while the United States Government had maintained that such assets should be returned to Japan. The United States position at that time was based on the following considerations:

(a) The allied powers had not agreed and gave little prospect of agreeing on the proper proportion of assets to be given each country involved;

(b) The Japanese economy would benefit from the retention of the assets; and

(c) The amount of assets involved was relatively small.

Since the countries were at odds, the United States had endeavored to solve this problem by proposing that these limited funds, estimated roughly at $20 million after deduction of expenses for servicing the properties involved, be used by the ICRC for humanitarian purposes.

Mr. Allison said that the Department fully realized the problem the Italian Government faced and was sympathetic to its position. However, the United States Government faced not only the problem of Italian opinion but also that of Japanese public opinion and felt that it was necessary to strike a balance between the two. He expressed the view that it would be possible to work out a mutually satisfactory solution.

With respect to the Italian-Japanese exchange of notes, Mr. Allison said that the Department’s position was that: (a) if the latest formula suggested by the Japanese were acceptable to Italy, we would hope that Italy and Japan would go forward with the exchange on that basis; or, (b) if this formula were not acceptable to Italy then the United States Government would urge the Japanese to effect an exchange of notes on the basis of the original drafts. In the meantime he hoped that the Italian Government would not lead Italian public opinion to expect any significant amount of indemnification for damages.

Minister Janelli observed that the material indemnification was not of great significance but rather the moral and political principle involved. He said he would like to urge the United States Government to press Japan to accept the original draft notes. Mr. Allison assured him that the Department was prepared to do this and had already sent a message to Tokyo containing the substance of the United States position. Ambassador Zoppi said that prior to his departure from Rome a message had been despatched to the Italian representative in Tokyo instructing him to continue his effort to reach agreement with the Japanese Government on this subject. In closing, Mr. Allison pointed out that there was evidently a slight misunderstanding with respect to the treatment accorded Portugal in relation to the Japanese Peace Treaty, since the solution for Portugal was practically identical to that proposed for Italy.

Administration of the Internal Security Act

Minister Janelli outlined the Italian position along the following lines: The Internal Security Act has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Italians to come to the United States since it denied entry to those Italians who were members of a totalitarian party. Since the totalitarian party has existed in Italy for about twenty-two years it is difficult to find any person who at some time or another has not been a member of a “totalitarian party.” While the recent amendment to the Internal Security Act has relieved the situation somewhat, Italians desiring to come to the United States are still subject to long, complicated and sometimes humiliating investigations. In some cases the consular officers appear to have been given such narrow discretion in administering the law that the Italian people feel there is little possibility of review once a determination has been made in their case. The United States laws and regulations now in force seem to go beyond the spirit and the letter of the United States-Italy Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1948, although United States citizens may still enter Italy freely and without investigation under this Treaty. There are two particular aspects of the problem which the Italian Government would like to call to the attention of the Department at this time: (a) discrimination against Italians who have permanent residence in the United States and who experience delays and difficulty in getting reentry permits before returning to Italy for official or personal reasons; and (b) similar delays experienced by Italian businessmen who are here as treaty-traders (with Section 3/6 visas) and who are reluctant to leave the United States without assurance that their visas will be reissued and whose business connections have accordingly suffered.

Mr. Perkins replied that as far as the Department is concerned we were obligated to carry out the provisions of the Internal Security Act, although we desire some changes in the law. At the present time we are endeavoring to obtain a uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of the Internal Security Act by the officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Displaced Persons Commission along the lines that judicial notice be taken that the rank and file of the members of the Fascist Party and its subsidiary or affiliated groups were involuntary members of the party. This interpretation, of course, would not include the leaders of the various parties or organizations who must be considered as voluntary members of these parties. We are hopeful of establishing a uniform interpretation but are not sure that it will be possible in the immediate future. We are more hopeful that a bill pending before the Congress revising our immigration laws will be enacted. If so, its passage will simplify the problem faced by Italy and other countries, since the definition of “totalitarian party” will cover only those parties which advocate or have advocated the establishment of totalitarianism in the United States. After emphasizing the duty of the United States Executive Branch to administer the laws in accordance with the intent of Congress, Mr. Perkins said that the Department would continue its efforts in connection with the Internal Security Act and a bill now pending in Congress. Ambassador Dunn observed that the consular officers were doing their best to ease the situation but unfortunately procedures required by law consume considerable time.

Minister Janelli inquired whether, pending passage of the new bill, it would be possible to ease the new situation with respect to Italians having permanent residence or Italian treaty-traders in this country with regard to their reentry into the United States. He observed that in a sense this was a more important problem than that confronting an Italian national applying for his first visa to the United States. Mr. Perkins said that the question concerning the reentry of Italians into the United States had not been brought up in this form previously and that the Department would investigate the situation to see what could be done.

Germany and the European Defense Force

Ambassador Zoppi said that Italy from the beginning had agreed to the inclusion of Germany in the North Atlantic Community and the creation of a European Defense Force, While Italy does not under-estimate the difficulties involved in the creation of the European Defense Force, Italy hopes to find some solution regarding Germany which would permit German participation in European defense.

Mr. Perkins said that the Department believes that the time element is of extreme importance in this matter. Referring to Prime Minister De Gasperi’s remarks of yesterday, he stressed the great urgency in working out a new contractual relationship with Germany and the problems relating to the creation of European Defense Force. He added that we must think not only in terms of a French problem but also of the German attitude on this question. In view of the problems posed by this timetable, the Department believes that faster progress could be made if the European countries could put aside temporarily some of the broad financial problems which must eventually be solved in connection with the European Defense Force, although certain financial problems, such as those relating to infrastructure, could be tackled at this time. Ambassador Zoppi said that the views expressed by Mr. Perkins coincided with the Italian views on the current situation.

Spain

Minister Janelli stated that the Italian Government on several occasions had expressed the opinion that to provide adequately for Western defense it was necessary to integrate all of the aspects of the defense problem. Therefore, in the long run Spain could not be ignored in considering Western defense. Moreover, while the United States Government was undoubtedly aware of the opposition voiced in connection with its recent approaches to the Spanish Government, such opposition has not been widespread in Italy. This does not mean that if steps toward the integration of Spain with the Western community were now pushed there would be no opposition to such moves on the part of certain requests of the Italian people or Government. The Italian Government believes, therefore, that the United States should proceed with the utmost care in its handling of the Spanish problem. Minister Janelli further felt that constant encouragement to Spain to evolve to some form of democracy would greatly facilitate Western efforts to integrate Spain in the Western defense effort. He said that the above views constituted the general attitude of the Italian Government on the Spanish question.

Turning to the Mediterranean area in general, Minister Janelli stated that the Italian Government desired to follow closely all developments. He said the Italian Government would be gratified if the United States would keep Italy informed, as the United States had done in the case of the British and French, on significant developments and expressed the view that in the past Italy had not been as fully informed as was desirable.

Mr. Perkins said that we agreed completely on the necessity of handling the Spanish question with the utmost care and on encouraging the evolution of Spain toward adoption of more democratic institutions. He observed that the principal objections to Spain at present were directed toward Franco and not toward the Spanish people. While the United States favors and would welcome a change which would ease the present political situation, we could derive only slight encouragement from the recent internal measures taken by Franco. Regarding the nature of the United States objectives and the nature of the recent conversations with Spanish authorities, Mr. Perkins said that conversations were promised on recognition of the strategic geographic position of Spain for the common defense of the North Atlantic area. He emphasized that Admiral Sherman’s talks with Franco were only general in nature and that Franco merely indicated interest in Sherman’s exposition. They had discussed the United States desire to acquire certain rights and privileges in Spain, including the use of anchorages in Spain and Spanish territories, the right to land aircraft on Spanish airfields, and to overfly Spain. He emphasized that the establishment of United States shore installations or bases was not involved in these discussions. Mr. Perkins said that a United States technical mission is now in Spain surveying the improvements necessary for air and maritime facilities to meet United States requirements. This military team has no power to negotiate, but merely to report to the United States Government. He said the United States awaited their report in the hope of acquiring use of Spanish facilities, and expressed the view that some economic assistance to Spain might be necessary for this purpose. Ambassador Zoppi said that the Italian Embassy here would follow up on these questions with the Department.

Problems Relating to the Near and Middle East

Minister Janelli said that two points should be borne in mind in connection with what he called the deteriorating situation in the Near and Middle East:

(a) the contrasts among the different countries in the Near and Middle East would make it extremely difficult to integrate the countries bordering on the Mediterranean into NATO activity, and

(b) the substantial and growing distrust of the West evident in these countries.

He expressed the view that we should not think solely in terms of military measures which should be taken in these countries since such measures are impossible unless the people will go along with them. Therefore, he conceived of the first task for the Western powers as one of attenuating the existing contrasts and distrust in order to render possible future cooperation in the military field. He believed that the Italian Government could help in this process because the Arab world realizes that Italy is no longer interested in territorial aggrandizement and because Italy is not directly concerned with the majority of specific issues in the area. The Arab countries, he believed, should be given the impression that the West is interested in their welfare and considers them equals. In this regard, he felt the U.S. and Italy should coordinate their policies toward these countries and endeavor to give the impression of non-interference in their internal affairs and of not blocking their development toward autonomy or independence. He felt that Italy had followed this line since the war and had obtained Arab friendship which could be used now in the interest of common defense. He urged the U.S. to inform Italy of developments in the area as we saw them and to instruct U.S. representatives at the various posts to keep in touch with their Italian colleagues and to follow a common line insofar as possible.

Ambassador Zoppi said that it seems that the Middle East policies of some governments are still based on the principle of divide-and-rule. He said that this approach is out of date and that, in face of a common danger, an effort should be made to bring the Middle East countries together.

After expressing gratification over the solution of the Italian colonies problem, Mr. McGhee made the following points:

(a) The U.S. is relatively new in its direct interest and involvement in the Middle East. Unfortunately because of the Palestine problem and other factors, the U.S. has borne much criticism in certain of the countries.

(b) In connection with our policy of containing Communism, the U.S. has continued to send aid to Greece and Turkey. Turkey has proved to be a bastion in this area and a major deterrent to Soviet designs there.

(c) While the U.S. desires to obtain the greatest possible measure of political and military cooperation from the Middle Eastern countries, we are concerned over the increase of neutralism in the Arab world. The problem is primarily political and not military, since the ability of these countries in the military field is not substantial.

(d) Palestine presents a major problem in combating neutralism and assuring a defense in depth in the event of war. Although UN efforts to date to solve the Palestine problem have been unsuccessful, we do have some hope of making further progress by means of further progress in the refugee problem. In this connection the U.S. Government has decided that its contribution to the UNRWA for the next year will be $50 million. The U.S. would welcome an Italian contribution if Italy were in the position to make one. Another aspect of Israeli-Arab relations concerned the meetings of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in Paris. These meetings show little promise of success at this stage but will be continued in an effort to reach agreement.

(e) The U.S. has adopted a more positive policy to overcome neutralism in the area and to provide for military cooperation. An important aspect of this policy is our recent requests for authorization to: (1) transfer arms under certain conditions to Arab countries; and (2) provide $175 million in economic assistance to the area. It is hoped that in the implementation of these programs we may be able to combat the feeling among the Arab countries of being left defenseless and to establish a basis for further political cooperation. Furthermore, we believe the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO should also help in this connection.

(f) The U.S. agrees on the necessity for emphasizing in its relations with these countries that such relations are on the basis of full equality.

Ambassador Zoppi expressed the view that these measures would help to combat the inferiority complex which characterizes these countries. However, care should be exercised in the implementation of policies since certain of these countries see in military cooperation a means of re-imposing colonialism on the area. Mr. McGhee agreed and added that any military arrangements which may be involved will be on the basis of equality. He pointed out that the problem of integrating Palestine into such arrangements would be extremely difficult, although we believe the Arab countries will cooperate with us as long as they do not have to cooperate directly with Israel. Mr. McGhee said that the U.S. would welcome Italian cooperation, observing that Italy is popular in the Middle East and that the majority of the countries have no fear that Italy will again become a colonial power. Ambassador Zoppi expressed the view that it would be desirable for the two governments to keep in close touch on these matters and to have instructions sent to the Italian and U.S. representatives in the area to exchange views and work closely together. Mr. McGhee concurred, adding that such a development would be most welcome.

Implementation of UN Resolutions on Libya and Eritrea

libya

Minister Janelli said that developments concerning the implementation of UNGA’s resolutions concerning Libya were in their last stages and that independence of Libya should be proclaimed soon. However, certain problems have arisen in connection with the implementation of the CA resolutions which Italy would like to discuss with the United States. Specifically, Italy has been informed of wide-spread Arab sentiment against actions being taken in Libya under the resolutions and that the Arab States intend to challenge the Libyan constitutional development program in the next session of the General Assembly and probably denounce the plan for putting present arrangements into effect. The Italian Government believes that the prospective attack can be headed off, and incidentally provide Egypt with a means of saving face, if provisions were made for recognizing Egypt’s special interest in Libya. This could be accomplished by transforming the technical, financial and economic committees (consisting of the UN Commission, US, UK, France, Italy and Egypt) into permanent bodies outside the UN, to study and advise the Libyan Government on economic plans and to coordinate assistance from other countries. Three purposes would be achieved by adoption of this proposal:

(a) Recognition of the special political interest of the five powers in Libya by giving these powers a function in helping and assisting Libya;

(b) Provide a basis for technical collaboration between Libya and the West since Libya will be a new state and its people are unskilled in Government; and

(c) Avoid the danger that the Arab States will repudiate all that has been done thus far in building the new Libyan State with the attendant repercussions internally in Libya and among the Arab States. If the United States agrees with, and will support Italy in these proposals, Italy would do its best to persuade the Arab countries to take a less rigid and uncompromising attitude on the way in which Libya’s constitutional development has been conducted.

Mr. Hickerson said that the United States was very satisfied with the progress made thus far in Libya and that the UN Commissioner and Council in Libya deserve high praise for their efforts. We also expect Egypt and some other Arab States to attack in the General Assembly what has been accomplished in Libya under previous UN resolutions but we are confident of the soundness of our position and hope that it will have the support of Italy. We maintain that the UN resolutions regarding Libya are being effectively implemented and this view will be expressed by the U.S. in the General Assembly. In particular, we believe that the Libyan National Assembly was constituted legally under the General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1949, and that a government established in accordance with the constitution approved by the National Assembly is a “duly constituted” government for an independent Libya. Whether elections should be held before or after Libya becomes independent is, in our opinion, a matter for the Libyans themselves to decide through their constituted authorities.

Mr. Hickerson stated that we are troubled over the Italian proposals to perpetuate the technical, economic and financial committees since this would be a derogation of Libyan sovereignty. We continue to maintain that the sovereignty of Libya must be respected after it becomes independent. To perpetuate any form of UN or international supervision after January 1, 1952, would, therefore be a derogation of sovereignty which no state could accept. To propose such supervision would probably cause repercussions against Italian as well as British and American interests in Libya. Therefore, we cannot agree with proposals to establish permanent international supervision of Libyan affairs. We believe that:

(1) An attempt to obtain recognition of the political interests of the five powers in Libya would boomerang. We have consistently told the Italian representatives that while we could support their legitimate economic interests in Libya we feel it would be a mistake for them to try to revive any special political position in that country. On the other hand, we understand that satisfactory arrangements have been made by Italian representatives in Libya regarding the status and protection of minorities. Furthermore, the disposition of Italian property in Libya was provided for by the UNGA last December in a resolution which is being carried out by a three-man UN Arbitral Tribunal now in Tripoli.

(2) Arab collaboration in the technical field can best be sought through direct negotiations with the governments concerned.

(3) In addition, we seriously doubt whether any concessions in the economic or technical field would satisfy the Egyptians whose opposition is based primarily on political grounds and on the desire of Azzam Pasha to control Libya. Any indication of a desire to compromise on our part would be taken as weakness by the Egyptians who would then demand much more. We doubt that an effective compromise could be reached with the Egyptians on this matter and, therefore, the US could not be a party to an approach to Egypt or the Arab States for such a compromise on these Libyan problems. Of course, we would not object to the Italian Government making such an approach on its own. However, we do not believe that international supervision in Libya will work.

Minister Janelli said they fully understood our position but according to their best information an Italian approach to Egypt has a good chance of success. Ambassador Zoppi explained that since Italy foresaw a difficult situation in the GA it would like to find some solution which would be mutually satisfactory to the Arab States and the Western Powers. He expressed the view that Italy and the other Western Powers might await future developments. Mr. Hickerson pointed out that we foresaw much opposition in the GA to the proposals for international supervision at the time that Libya’s independence is being established. Minister Janelli repeated that Italy was merely trying to avoid another point of friction with the Arab world in connection with its general views on the situation in the Near and Middle East.

Mr. McGhee expressed the view that Egypt was operating more in furtherance of its own selfish interests in this matter than as a spokesman for the other Arab nations. Furthermore, Italy could accomplish its legitimate objectives through the local authorities in Libya. Ambassador Zoppi agreed, saying that they had already negotiated satisfactory arrangements for Italians in Libya. Mr. Hickerson concurred in Mr. McGhee’s observation on Egyptian motives, adding that Libya would probably have achieved independence before the GA discussion of the Libyan item, and the Libyan constitution would already have entered into effect. He thought that would place us in a good situation, since this was in line with what the General Assembly had called for all along. Ambassador Zoppi observed in connection with the latter point that this situation was exactly what the Arab nations desired to prevent—a de facto situation in advance of GA discussions. He indicated that the Italian Government is not concerned about Italian interests per se, but only about the potential situation in the GA. He said Italy would not act alone on this but that the Western Powers should await future developments since there was ample time to consult further on this question.

eritrea

Minister Janelli expressed appreciation of US action and support on the Eritrea problem and, in particular, for facilitating the resumption of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. He felt that the situation in Eritrea was more encouraging, particularly after Brusasca’s visit. Italy is determined that its recently resumed relations with Ethiopia will be fruitful and is ready to consider means for promoting the political stability and defense of this area. However, Italy is concerned that in implementing the UN resolutions on Eritrea, Italy’s interests may be imperiled. Italy has noticed evidence of uncertainties and anxieties on this score among the Eritreans. While Italy wishes to see the UN resolution providing for federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia properly carried out, Italy understands that some attempts are being made to modify or even void this resolution. These attempts are not confined to Ethiopia. However, Italy is confident of US cooperation and support in seeking successful implementations of these UN decisions. US interest in such matters would be helpful, in the Italian view, for example with the British.

Mr. Hickerson stated that the US was gratified over the resumption of Italian-Ethiopian relations and that we desired to keep Ethiopia oriented toward the West. In this connection, he mentioned that Ethiopia had sent a battalion of troops to Korea, who were acquitting themselves well in battle. He said that the United States agreed that the federation resolution should be strictly observed and fully implemented. He emphasized that to date we have not received evidence that the resolution is not being observed and implemented. The UN Commissioner, Anze Matienzo, has proceeded slowly in his work, but he still has a year in which to accomplish the tasks entrusted to him by the General Assembly. While there will undoubtedly be difficulties we believe that, with good will and cooperation, they can be resolved. Mr. Hickerson inquired whether there were any further points that the Italian delegation desired to discuss. Minister Janelli replied that he wished to emphasize Italy’s deep concern over the necessity for full implementation of UN resolutions. Mr. Hickerson assured him that we were fully conscious of this concern and would continue to support full and strict implementation of the UN resolution. Mr. McGhee added that we were particularly pleased with the results of Brusasca’s visits to Addis Ababa and Asmara and we hoped that relations between Italy and Ethiopia would continue to improve.

1. According to the cover sheet, these minutes were circulated as IPM MIN–2 on October 1.