Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 311

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Conversations with the Italian Prime Minister

United States Minutes of Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi’s First Formal Meeting With the Secretary of State, Department of State, September 24, 1951, 4:30 p.m.¹

Washington, September 24, 1951, 4:30 p.m.

secret

Present

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)

Mr. De Gasperi (Italy)

Also Present

U.S.	Italy
Mr. Perkins	Mr. Janelli
Mr. Barrett	Amb. Tarchiani
Mr. Hickerson	Amb. Zoppi
Amb. Dunn	Mr. Venturini
Mr. Byington	Mr. Luciolli
Mr. White	Mr. Sensi
Mr. Green	Mr. Canali
Mr. Christensen	Mr. Panza
Miss Kirkpatrick

Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty

Copies of the UK-French-US draft Declaration on the Italian Peace Treaty, incorporating revisions previously suggested by the Italian representatives were distributed to those present.² The Prime Minister suggested avoiding the title “Tripartite Declaration”. The Secretary suggested that the title “Declaration of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the Italian Peace Treaty”, and this was agreed. Minister Janelli reviewed the changes in the original text which had been proposed by the Italian Government. The Prime Minister said that with the incorporation of these changes the draft was now acceptable to him. He noted, however, that he would have preferred that the reference to “the rights of third parties” in the fifth paragraph be deleted. The Secretary recalled that the suggestion that this phrase be deleted had been discussed and that the French were opposed to it. Minister Janelli said that another question was the interpretation of the word “individual” in the fifth paragraph, noting that this was difficult to translate into Italian. The Secretary explained that the phrase meant each country will negotiate bilaterally with Italy.

The Secretary said that there is another problem about issuance of the Declaration that he felt could be worked out. He said that it was his understanding that the Prime Minister would like to have the declaration issued Wednesday, which we would like to do. The French and British Embassies have agreed, subject to formal approval of their respective governments that this can be done if the Italian Government gives an assurance that the subsequent Italian note to the three governments will not depart from the substance of the draft which the Prime Minister has seen. Ambassador Zoppi said that the Italian Government could agree on the substance of the note but reserved the right to suggest revisions in the text. The Prime Minister said that the substance of the note and not the form was most important. He stressed the following points: (1) political reference to the equal rights of Italy with other nations must be stressed; (2) on the military aspect of the note, regarding removal of the restrictions upon Italy, should be given secondary place; (3) economic questions should be covered, as a matter of procedure, with reference to the conciliation commissions for settling claims against Italy. Minister Janelli emphasized in the latter connection that Japan was not forced to submit to such provisions in her peace treaty; further, in Italy foreign citizens under the peace treaty provisions can continue to put their claims before the Italian Government indefinitely. He also pointed out that Italy has domestic laws on the subject, such as are referred to in the Japanese Treaty. This aspect of the Italian Treaty is, he concluded, a limitation on Italian sovereignty. The Secretary said that if we go beyond the substance of the present draft of the note it will be necessary to go back to the British and French and reopen discussions with them and he expressed doubt that under these circumstances it would be possible to issue the Declaration by Wednesday. The Prime Minister asked if it would not be possible to put a time limit on the presentation of claims against Italy. Ambassador Zoppi suggested that a line might be added to the Declaration to the effect that this particular problem will be considered at a later time. Mr. Perkins said that it would be possible for the Italians to discuss this later on in connection with our reply to their note and said that discussions would not be foreclosed simply because a reference to this problem was omitted in the Declaration. He explained that what the British and French want to know is that if agreement cannot later be reached on additions to the draft note, the Italian Government will accept the substance of the present draft. The Prime Minister said that it was obvious that the United States and Italy must agree on essential questions but he asked why questions of procedure should be allowed to hinder us. He said he accepted the substance of the note in its present form, and suggested that it might be possible to get rapid clearance from the British and French on a change covering economic questions. The Secretary replied that he felt it important that the Declaration and the note contain those things which were really necessary and then if additional questions remain these can be brought up at a later date. The Prime Minister said he would be willing to leave the question except that he would not want later misunderstandings to arise. Ambassador Zoppi proposed that it be understood that the Italian Government would further discuss whether some formula could be included on economic matters; the Italian Government gives the assurance that if no acceptable formula is found, the Italian note will be substantially as in the present draft. On this basis it was agreed that the Declaration could be issued Wednesday, and that the Department would inform the British and French Embassies.³

Admission of Italy Into United Nations

Ambassador Zoppi recalled that the Prime Minister had submitted an Aide-Mémoire⁴ to the Secretary at Ottawa on the admission of Italy into the United Nations and he asked that the United States give favorable consideration to the proposals set forth in the Aide-Mémoire. The Secretary said that the United States is studying the matter and will continue to do so. However, we have grave doubts about the Italian proposals. The World Court has said that an application for membership in the United Nations cannot be voted upon by the General Assembly unless all permanent members of the Security Council have voted in the affirmative on the application. The World Court has also said that a permanent member should not veto an application for membership on extraneous grounds. If the Italian application for membership were to be reconsidered by the Security Council and the Soviet Union, without explaining its position, simply cast a negative vote, it would not have done anything contrary to the opinion of the World Court. However, if the Soviet Union explains the reason for its veto, this would be a different situation, and the Soviet Government might be in trouble. The Secretary reiterated that the United States would continue to study the problem. Mr. Hickerson said that after further consideration of the Aide-Mémoire the Department would discuss it with the Italian representatives in Washington and New York, and with other friendly governments. He emphasized that the United States would do everything in its power to secure membership for Italy in the United Nations. He cautioned against expecting too much along the lines of the suggestions set forth in the Aide-Mémoire. He pointed out that Italy is in a unique position since it is the only nation whose application for membership in the United Nations has been vetoed four times and is also in a unique position since Italy, as trust administrator in Somaliland is the only non-member administering authority. The Prime Minister said that so long as Italy is not in the UN, there is an additional moral restriction upon Italy. The counterbalance to the signature of the Peace Treaty was to have been Italy’s admission to the UN. The three-power Declaration on the Peace Treaty is desirable and necessary, but is not sufficient in itself to correct the moral position. The Secretary said that he thought this problem would be alleviated by the support of the great majority of the nations of the world for the action to be taken on the Treaty.

Psychological Action to Counter Totalitarian Propaganda

The Prime Minister said that as he had remarked in Ottawa, we should not underestimate Communist propaganda efforts, through such groups as the Partisans of Peace. They are well organized, he continued, and are capable of enormous inventions. He said that the Festival of Berlin was not entirely a fiasco.⁵ Despite the obstacles placed in the way of Italian youths, many of them had made their way through Austria and Germany to Berlin and had returned to their homes full of enthusiasm about all the talk of peace they had heard and about the chance to see the youths of France, Germany and other countries. The West has, however, not organized demonstrations like the one in Berlin. The West needs something positive for the youths of the Western world. We must avoid being on the defensive and putting all our emphasis on the military aspect of defense. We must speak instead of the reconstruction and unity of Europe and of democracy. The admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO makes our psychological task more difficult.⁶ We cannot work from the basis of fear of the Russians, especially as they can divert fear, leaving us with no basis at all. The Prime Minister suggested a Joint Committee under NATO might be established to coordinate more positive programs in the member countries; each would contribute and then implement the coordinated program at home according to individual national tastes. It is imperative that we capture the enthusiasm of the youths of our nations. The concepts of freedom, liberty, and democracy must be given a positive meaning and we must give to the Atlantic Pact a positive aim rather than one merely of defense. The Prime Minister said that, for example, if the United States in speaking of Germany says that it is willing to make concessions to the Bonn Government because we need their military contribution, that is bad. We must emphasize instead that in view of the threat of Russian domination we are giving Germany the right to free development and self-defense; this emphasis is psychologically sounder in Germany and also in France. He emphasized that the moves in Germany must be taken very rapidly since three or four months from now may be too late. The Prime Minister said he had spoken to M. Schuman about this problem, and recognized the latter’s difficulties. The Prime Minister admitted that it would be very difficult to establish a European Defense Force because of such questions as contributions to its budget and the constitutional questions faced by each country. He stressed, however, that Italy was in favor of a European army since it may offer the way toward a European federation. He said that he knew that Mr. Acheson was aware of how difficult the problem of a European army was but if we wait until agreement is reached on all problems an army will never be established. He concluded by saying that it was essential that action be taken within the next month and that, to start, the military side of the EDF, might well be put under General Eisenhower’s command.

The Secretary said that he agreed with the Prime Minister’s analysis of the problem, and had the impression that M. Schuman also agrees. He said that it was his belief that once the details of a European army and general principles regarding the financial and constitutional questions were worked out it would be possible to put the army under General Eisenhower’s command while details of the other institutions are being worked out. He expressed the belief that if we wait until all permanent institutions are actually created, there will be a long delay in creating an effective European army. He agreed that the NATO countries could not wait until all problems are settled before creating the army.

The Secretary also expressed agreement with the Prime Minister’s comments on the need for positive psychological action. He said that Mr. Barrett and his staff, who are working in the field of information, recognize that we must intensify our appeal to youth. While there are certain structural problems to be worked out, the means of achieving the objective are a technical matter. He suggested that there were three possible appeals that could stimulate enthusiasm among the youths of the free world as well as others. One way is through fostering closer political unity in Western Europe. The concept of European political institutions has always appealed to the youth of the nations. Second, we can foster the concept of an Atlantic community. He recalled that at Ottawa a group had been appointed to work on such non-military matters. Third, and beyond these first two steps, what is needed is a very large, specific program for peace. Instead of merely saying like the Russians that “we are for peace”, this program would provide something positive and could, in fact, appeal to the finest of European traditions. If we can successfully put substance into these ideas, we can, indeed, capture the imaginations of our youth and others who are not yet too old for enthusiasm for the new idea of an Atlantic community. He agreed with the Prime Minister that we had been concentrating so much on the military aspects of the joint effort that we had not done enough on the political aspects. He assured the Prime Minister that the United States would work closely with Italy, as well as all other NATO countries in developing positive programs in the NATO context. Mr. Barrett said that we have been heartened by the steps the Italian Government and others are taking and by the cooperation between the U.S. and Italy here and in Rome. He said that he was also heartened by the steps that the NATO information service is taking. He stressed, however, that anti-Communist propaganda and the pro-free world propaganda can best be handled in each country by the people of that country. He said that the Voice of America can speak for the United States in Italy but that the Italians themselves must carry the major share in combatting totalitarian propaganda in their homeland.

The Prime Minister turned to the acuteness of the situation in the Near East and Africa. He said that Italy supports the principle of autonomy for the Moslem peoples, within a few decades or even a few years. He said it is important that those peoples not think the NATO powers oppose their efforts to be autonomous. He referred to the difficulties that the British and French have encountered in this area and also emphasized the strength of Communist propaganda in the Near East. The Secretary said that we in general share his views. He said that the United States believes that one of the greatest dangers would be to allow the Soviet Union to become the champion of nationalism in this area, with the NATO countries in a posture of opposition. He said we had urged this view on the British and French. He noted, however, that the governments of the Near East countries are for the most part in the hands of incapable people and when the people encounter trouble they invariably attempt to take it out on foreigners rather than on their government. The Secretary said that the United States recognizes the problems that exist and have warned the British, for example, that it is futile to attempt to impose solutions upon these countries.

The Secretary and the Prime Minister then briefly discussed the question of what background information should be given the press following the meeting.

1. According to the cover sheet, these minutes were circulated as IPM MIN–1 on October 1.
2. Regarding the drafting of this declaration, see telegram Secto 20 from Ottawa, Document 307.
3. For the text of the declaration, see Document 317.
4. The Italian aide-mémoire is printed in vol. ii, p. 335.
5. For documentation concerning the Weltjugendspiel in Berlin during August 1, see vol. iii, Part 2, pp. 1987.
6. Italy spoke out clearly in its support of the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO both in meetings of the Council of Deputies in London in May and during the Seventh Session of the NAC in Ottawa in September.