CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Conversations with the Italian Prime Minister
United States Minutes of Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi’s Meeting With President Truman, White House, September 25, 1951, noon1
Present
The President
Prime Minister De Gasperi
Also Present
| United States | Italy |
| The Secretary of State | Ambassador Tarchiani |
| Mr. Harriman | Ambassador Zoppi |
| Mr. Perkins | Dr. Canali |
| Ambassador Dunn | |
| Mr. Elsey | |
| Mr. Short | |
| Mr. Byington | |
| Mr. Greene |
The President asked the Secretary of State to open the meeting.
Mr. Acheson said that he and Prime Minister De Gasperi had had a satisfactory and useful talk the day before and would be having further talks later in the day and on the following day. He suggested that the Prime Minister bring up the questions that he would like to discuss.
The Prime Minister expressed his thanks for the opportunity he has had to exchange views with the Secretary of State both at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ottawa and in Washington. He commented on the identity of views he had found on the maintenance of peace and security. He referred to the necessity of psychological action to demonstrate that the North Atlantic Organization is more than a military alliance. He said that he believes Italy’s policies generally are completely in agreement with U.S. policies.
The Prime Minister continued that in this spirit he has spoken with the Secretary of State about the Trieste question. He said that it is not an internal Italian question or an internal Yugoslav question, [Page 700] but an international question and a common problem. It is also a question of the Atlantic Community; as long as the problem remains unsolved, the solidarity of the Atlantic Pact is not assured. He referred to two milestones in the history of the question since World War II: the establishment of the “Morgan Line” in 1945, and the March 20, 1948 Declaration between the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments in favor of the return of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy. He appealed to the President to exercise his authoritative influence in this difficult, but not insoluble, question. He said that if Tito is willing to move toward the Western nations, he thought that within the framework of the Three-Power Declaration Italy could renounce the Slav communities in Zone B. If Tito would agree to discuss Zone B from an ethnic point of view he would hope to reach a conclusion.
The Prime Minister emphasized the political importance of this matter. He said that frankly, without a satisfactory solution of it, he and his Government would have difficulty in getting continued support in Parliament for a joint defense effort, and he doubted whether any democratic government could. He continued that it is not a question of party; it is a genuinely national, popular question. If public opinion in Italy thinks that Italy’s friends and allies cannot save Trieste for Italy, there would be a dangerous trend toward neutralism in Italy.
The Prime Minister said that the results of the recent elections in Italy were good but not satisfying. They showed a stabilization of the Communist vote, but an increase in the vote for the extreme Right. He said that the coalition government of democratic parties which he heads is in danger of losing votes to the Left and to the Right. Parenthetically he observed that he hopes that the Liberal and Democratic Socialist Parties will rejoin the coalition in the next months.
The Prime Minister said that the next national election in Italy will be coming in eighteen months, and must result in a victory for democracy. In Italy this means “Americanism”, based on the friendship and support of America. It is for these reasons, the Prime Minister said, that Italy asks to be helped on the Trieste question, first in regard to Zone A of the Free Territory, in the sense that Italian legislation there be loyally applied, as is the rule for occupied areas; and second in regard to getting agreement with Tito on Zone B, which the March 20 declaration said should be returned to Italy but in which Italy is prepared to make ethnic concessions.
The Prime Minister said that a Trieste settlement must be reached or his whole struggle against Communism, with American assistance, would not be successful.
[Page 701]The President told the Prime Minister that we are sympathetic to his position on the Trieste question. We hope that the problem can be settled, and believe that it can be settled. He reminded the Prime Minister that the United States has only one objective: peace. As we work toward that objective, we want to see our friends prosper, and we have demonstrated, we seek no selfish gain. Referring to the Prime Minister’s remark that freedom in Europe means Americanism, the President said that he was glad to hear that because we believe in Americanism.
The President said that he hoped it would be possible to reach a solution of the Trieste question which would be satisfactory to the Prime Minister and remove this troublesome source of controversy. He said that as he recalled his reading of history there was a Trieste problem after World War I and it might be that if the problem were settled now there would be no World War III.
The President said that we want to make European unity so strong that it cannot be broken by our opponents. He said that we have no ulterior motive; we just want to make the world a safe place in which to live. He assured the Prime Minister that the United States wants to help in the Trieste problem and that he had been glad to hear the Prime Minister say that he could work it out.
The President said that here in North America the United States, a strong nation, is not feared by its neighbors. Our borders with Canada and Mexico are open and our citizens can go freely back and forth across them. The President said that he would like to see the same situation exist along the frontiers between Italy and Yugoslavia, Italy and France, France and Switzerland, and among nations of Central Europe. He said it is important in establishing a basis of freedom that people can come and go as they please.
The President said that the Prime Minister could be sure that he would find no obstacles put in his way by us in his efforts to achieve a settlement of the Trieste question.
The Prime Minister expressed his thanks for the President’s cordial remarks. He stated his desire to solve the question, which he said is not simply an Italian question but also a European question. Its solution would consolidate the defense of Europe and bring Italy to a position of moral leadership. If it can be resolved, the remaining problem of Communism in Italy will be largely economic.
The Prime Minister said that Trieste has curiously enough become a Communist problem. He said that the Cominform Communists want the Free Territory established, although Communists in Trieste itself are divided between pro-Tito and pro-Cominform factions. The Prime Minister said that he believes the Soviet Union wants to keep Trieste a point of dissension, and repeated that it [Page 702] must be settled. The Prime Minister said that he realized Tito will have difficulties in negotiating a settlement, and that Italy is ready to make concessions. He said that if Tito really wants to work the problem out, Italy is ready. He added that, if talks begin and do not reach a successful conclusion, the situation would be worse than if talks had never been started. He therefore asked the President to help by taking the initiative in presenting a formula for solution.
The Secretary of State said that, as the President had observed, the purposes of the U.S. are identical with those the Prime Minister had said were his. The Secretary of State said that this is the last unsolved territorial problem in Europe; as long as it is unsolved, it creates difficulties for Italy and for Yugoslavia and for the joint Western defense effort. He said that, as the Prime Minister had noted, if negotiations start and fail, the situation would be worse than if they had never started.
The Secretary of State said that during the morning he had had a talk with the Yugoslav Ambassador,2 and was convinced that the Yugoslav Government was ready to negotiate. He said that he told the Yugoslav Ambassador that the earlier views of the Yugoslav Government would not help reach a solution. The Secretary said the problem before the Yugoslavs is the same as that before the Italians. The problem is how to begin negotiations without compounding the difficulties; for example, the Yugoslav Ambassador noted how difficult statements regarding the “framework” of the March 20 declaration made matters for the Yugoslav Government, to which the Secretary replied that the Prime Minister had obviously had to make such a statement. The Secretary said that he thought the important thing is to begin the negotiations. He thought that by secret talks, without discussion about means, a solution could be reached.
The Prime Minister asked whether the Secretary thought that Tito could be persuaded to begin the negotiations in Rome.
The Secretary said that he thought it might be possible to speak to the new Yugoslav Ambassador to Rome, Mr. Velebit, who is now here in Washington, to see whether he could undertake negotiations.
Mr. Harriman said that, while he did not know Velebit’s views on this particular question, his experience has been that Velebit’s ideas are generally broader than those of others in the Yugoslav Government.
The President said that we ought to talk to Mr. Velebit.
[Page 703]The Secretary of State said that he thought the Yugoslavs are now more realistic than they have been for some time. He said that we can and will help, but we felt that we could not attempt to mediate in the question.
The President said that he felt the situation today is the same as it had been ever since the days of the Roman Empire. He said that the interest of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and France is the same as ours: to keep the peace. He said that this always will be so and that he was certain that if the Prime Minister talked to the Yugoslavs they could get a platform on which to move forward toward a settlement.
The Prime Minister said that it is not a question of prestige. He wanted to re-emphasize the danger of beginning negotiations without adequate preparations.
The Secretary of State said he agreed as to this danger.
The Prime Minister said that he anticipated that the public press would go off into speculation if negotiations got out. He said that he therefore wanted to find a place for the negotiations where complete secrecy could be maintained.
Ambassador Tarchiani said that he thought negotiations might succeed if they were well prepared. He thought the Yugoslavs might be urged to solve the question in the common interest and in their own interest. On this basis a solution could be reached and, as the Prime Minister had said, Italy is always ready to reach a human solution, that is, an ethnic solution.
The Secretary of State said that it might be useful for the President to see Mr. Velebit.
The President said that he would be glad to see him and that he would say to him exactly what he had said to the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister said that he had been concerned about the situation in Zone A of the Free Territory where there had been some incidents and misunderstandings arising out of actions of the Allied Military Government, such as the changes in the signs over shops of the Italian State Tobacco Monoply. He said these incidents and misunderstandings gave rise to the suspicion in Italy that the provisional Military Government was laying the basis for the establishment of a permanent government in a neutral free territory. He said that he hoped that the British and American authorities would apply existing Italian legislation in Zone A, especially since under the Peace Treaty, only the Governor, if he were appointed, could change the laws.
The Secretary of State said that this matter had been discussed and that he would look into it further. He said he thought AMG might now be too neutral rather than moving in the direction of returning Trieste to Italy.
[Page 704]The Prime Minister referred to the question of the Italian Peace Treaty.
The Secretary of State said that the President has approved what is being done and that the British and French Governments agree.
The President concurred and said that the action that had been planned would be done.
The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction.
The Prime Minister said that he would like to turn to the matter of Italian emigration. He said that the Italian Government is doing its best and will do even more to combat unemployment, which is one of the principal breeding grounds of Communism.
He said that Italy alone cannot absorb the 200,000 workers that are added to the labor force each year, let alone find jobs for the 2,000,000 who are now unemployed as a result of the war, of the lack of emigration facilities, and of the influx of refugees into Italy. He said that the problem can only be solved by extraordinary measures; for example, nothing is so productive of good results as an extraordinary program like the present DP program in the United States. The Italian Government’s object is to provide for emigration of Italians to a number of countries in the next few years, and he hoped that these countries would include the United States.
The Prime Minister expressed the hope that it would be possible to create international organizations, in which the United States would participate and help financially, to meet the problem. He suggested further that it might be possible to use Italian workmen in military construction projects, especially in the Mediterranean area. He also hoped that U.S. help would be available, as it has in some instances through ECA technical assistance, in stimulating migration within Europe.
The Secretary of State agreed that this problem was of the greatest importance and that he looked forward to discussing it in greater detail with the Prime Minister later in the day. He said that as far as Italian immigration into the U.S. is concerned, the President’s hands are tied by our immigration laws.
The President said that we will do our best but that the situation is difficult for him. He recalled that in 1945 he sent the chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees to Europe to study whether the U.S. could admit 400,000 refugees. Following their return the two committee chairmen finally were able to get a program through the Congress for 350,000 refugees in the face of strong opposition. The President said that we will study the Italian situation and want to help if we can. He said that a solution of the over-population problem is included in the Point Four Program. He [Page 705] said that there are no better people and no better workers than the Italians. The President said that fundamentally we are handicapped by opposition but that we will do what we can.
The Prime Minister asked whether there might be some prospect for arranging temporary immigration into the United States of skilled Italian laborers.
The President said that the situation on this aspect is just as bad as it is on the general aspect. He said that if progress is made in plans for underdeveloped areas of the world and in getting Italians settled there, the Italian problem would be solved.
Ambassador Zoppi said that there was also the question of establishing an international organization to deal with migration, which is of immediate urgency.
The President said that he had had a very impressive letter just a few days before from Queen Juliana of the Netherlands about the over-population problem and that he was entirely sympathetic to the problem.
The Secretary of State said that we are at work on the question of establishing an international organization and hoped soon to be able to make recommendations to the President.
The Prime Minister asked whether he should take up economic matters.
The Secretary of State said that he understood these matters were scheduled for discussion at the meeting later in the day with the Prime Minister and suggested that they be taken up then.
The Prime Minister expressed thanks for the opportunity to have this discussion with the President and said he hoped the United States would continue to contribute to the solution of the over-population problem. He referred to reports of favorable response in Congress to his address to the Congress the preceding day.
The President said that the Vice President had told him that all members of Congress had been pleased at the Prime Minister’s speech.
The President said that he did not want to cut the discussion short but that he understood that the Prime Minister was expected at a luncheon to be given by the National Press Club. He said that he had before him a draft of a communiqué that had been prepared about the conversation and that if it was satisfactory to the Prime Minister he would authorize Mr. Short to release it.
The Prime Minister said it was acceptable to him.
The President asked Mr. Short to release the communiqué to the Press.3