Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 310

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Conversations with the Italian Prime Minister

United States Minutes of Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi’s Private Meeting With the Secretary of State, Office of the Secretary of State, September 24, 1951, 3:30 p.m.¹

Washington, September 24, 1951, 3:30 p.m.

secret

Present

Mr. Acheson

Mr. De Gasperi

Also Present

U.S.	Italy
Mr. Perkins	Ambassador Tarchiani
Ambassador Dunn
Mr. Byinecton

Mr. De Gasperi referred to his conversation in Ottawa with Secretary Acheson concerning Trieste.² He touched briefly on the recent history with regard to the area, mentioning the indignation of Italian public opinion over the abandoning of all the Italian towns, even to Pola, under the provisional arrangements which began with the Morgan Line. The Prime Minister said that this question was so important to the Italian people that it would not be possible for his government or any other Italian government to come to a compromise which would not save the Italians now resident in Zone B. He pointed out that 180,000 Italians had been displaced under the Peace Treaty. The Italian people cannot forget this and they could not possibly consider the loss of additional Italians now when Italy is a member of the Atlantic Pact. He said it was not primarily a geographic problem but one of peoples. Psychologically, he compared its importance perhaps to that of Gibraltar to England. As far as any negotiations in Yugoslavia were concerned, he saw various possibilities within the boundary of a practical solution. All of these possibilities require the Declaration of March 20³ as a point of departure for negotiations. He did not insist on a formal statement of such a position but Tito must know this fact. In an ethnical solution Italy could renounce in Zone B the area populated by Slavs, but could never give up the area populated by Italians. He produced two maps of the Free Territory and outlined on them in a general way what he had in mind. This was approximately the northern half of Zone B to Yugoslavia, the coast and southern half to Italy and a small portion of the hinterland of Zone A to Yugoslavia.

The Prime Minister then spoke of the administration of Zone A. He expressed concern that the impression was going around Italy that the military authorities in command of Zone A were abandoning the policy set forth by the three Governments in the March 20 Declaration. Instead they were adopting a policy of neutrality with regard to Zone A. He said that it was his aim to obtain our support for an instruction to the military administration of Zone A that it should be guided in its policy by the spirit of the March 20 Declaration. He pointed out that since the Trieste provisions of the Peace Treaty had been pronounced unworkable the only legal and proper basis for administration of the Zone was on the basis of the old Italian legislation. He mentioned the issue of the jurisdiction of the Rome Court of Cassation and said that public agitation with regard to AMG’s refusal to accept that jurisdiction was greater than in the case of any other question under dispute.

Referring back to the question of an Italo-Yugoslav solution, the Prime Minister said that he had tried in July to converse with Tito and that the conversations had resulted in a negative conclusion.

Fortunately they were held in secrecy, as otherwise they might well have made the question more bitter than it is now.

The Prime Minister said that he acknowledged the need for greater emphasis on rearmament by the nations participating in the Atlantic Pact. He said that in leading the Italian people towards this objective the Trieste question represented a basic element in the picture since it would be impossible for them to understand that the Atlantic Pact did not also cover the Trieste question. He pointed out that the successful elections of 1948 had been based on that Declaration.

Referring back to the administration of Zone A, the Prime Minister pointed out that under the Morgan Agreement with Tito of June 11, 1945,⁴ which established Zone B, it had been stipulated that the military occupation should not affect the civilian administration. He said this had been violated by the Yugoslav Government which had immediately embarked on a program of communization in that area. At the moment of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the American and British Governments enunciated a series of principles to be followed by the commanders of the two zones of the Free Territory of Trieste pending the appointment of a Governor. The two governments had particularly emphasized that nothing should be done by the commanders which would conflict with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. With the Tripartite Declaration of March 20 there was introduced a completely new application to the problem of Trieste and it would have seemed logical with respect to Zone A that AMG would have conformed in its policy to the spirit of the Declaration. In other words, pending the general solution for Trieste, AMG should have allowed the local and central Italian authorities in Zone A to exercise the maximum possible administrative jurisdiction and other functions. Such a consideration was in fact contemplated also by the Treaty of Peace whose pertinent portions were to be interpreted in a broad, rather than restrictive, sense. Unfortunately exactly the opposite is taking place. The AMG is extending its functions to the disadvantage of the Italian offices and growing larger and larger. The Italian Government felt that the whole AMG administration should be regarded as a temporary and provisional one as envisaged by the March 20 Declaration and that the line of policy of the Allied Government should aim at the return of the Territory of Trieste to Italy. In that case it believed that it could find a juridical basis for the general rules of international law (Article 43 of the Hague Convention of 1907) regarding the legislation existing in occupied territories. Pending an ultimate solution of the Free Territory the Italian laws should continue to be enforced in the Territory according to the ordinary rules governing the administration of occupied territories in time of war. Article 10 of Annex VII of the Treaty of Peace provides that “Existing laws and regulations shall remain valid unless and until revoked or suspended by the Governor.” As the Governor has never been appointed and the Free Territory was never constitutionally established, it follows that the existing Italian laws and regulations cannot be revoked or suspended by the present provisional military administration. This is especially important in the matter of the administration of justice. The right of appeal as a fundamental right pertaining to every citizen in every democratic country, should therefore not be denied to the citizens of Trieste and the competence of the Court of Cassation in Rome should be recognized in the Free Territory.

Taking up the question of Italo-Yugoslav relations, the Prime Minister pointed out that they had in the past few years made some twenty or thirty agreements with Yugoslavia and in fact now had some five to six and one-half milliards of lire which were frozen in Yugoslavia. As regards any territorial settlement of Trieste they would be ready to consider economic concessions and such arrangements as, for instance, a Free Zone in the Trieste port itself which should serve as a natural outlet for the hinterland.

Referring back to negotiations between the Yugoslav Government and the Allied military authorities establishing the Morgan Line, he wondered whether a solution could not now be negotiated by the Allies with Yugoslavia to establish a new line which would include an ethnic zone in Zone B to be occupied by the Allied military authorities. The Secretary did not believe that any attempt at such an arrangement should be undertaken. The Prime Minister wished to reemphasize above everything else that it would be most dangerous for Italy to begin conversations with Yugoslavia if the Italians did not have in sight the conclusion which it would be possible to reach. Failure would make the situation much worse and jeopardize the internal position of the Italian Government. He recognized that it was in the interest of Italy to facilitate the strengthening of Yugoslavia and that it was of great importance to Europe as a whole that Yugoslavia should continue to exist independently of the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said that he realized the great importance which public opinion in both Yugoslavia and Italy attached to the question of Trieste. At this point the Prime Minister interpolated that his public opinion was different from that of Tito’s in that he had to maintain a dangerous balance, whereas Tito had no such problem. The Secretary continued by saying that the Free Territory of Trieste represented the last remaining unresolved territorial problem in Western Europe. It represented, as the Prime Minister had said, a constant danger subject to unforeseen incidents and provided the Soviet Union and the Cominform with an opportunity to stir up feelings against both Italy and Yugoslavia on the part of each other and also to incite the inhabitants of the Free Territory against both governments. The passing of time does not help and the Italian position would seem to become worse. There were the difficulties the Prime Minister had pointed out concerning the administration of both Zone A and Zone B, as well as the possibility of the growth of elements in the Territory who for various reasons might turn to an appeal for independence.

The Secretary pointed out that he had told the Yugoslav Ambassador that in his opinion there was no ideal solution. In his own search for a basic principle which could be supported both in Yugoslavia and in Italy, he could find only the ethnic principle. When the Yugoslav Ambassador had said to him that Yugoslavia would never give up any territory occupied by Yugoslav troops during the war, he had replied that such a position was hopeless if agreement with Italy were to be reached. He said that the Yugoslavs must center their minds upon the question of the people themselves. If the Italian and Yugoslav Governments could say that their people will not be placed under the rule of the other nation it would provide the only possible basis for general public acceptance in both countries. He recognized that it was hard to know where the demarcation line should be placed and that there was a difficult problem of how to begin negotiations. He said that preliminary and secret conversations with Yugoslavia would be essential. He said that it would be impossible to achieve success unless the negotiations began without preconceived conditions. He said he had been stressing with the British that they must help persuade the Yugoslavs to negotiate. Ambassador Dunn, when asked by the Secretary for his view, said that he agreed with the Secretary that the only hope and possibility for a solution would rest on the willingness of both sides to consult on the principle of an ethnic line. The Prime Minister then pointed out that the Yugoslavs would unquestionably speak about Slav minorities elsewhere in Italy than in Zone B. He pointed out that Italy has already lost under the Treaty some 180,000 Italians in the Istrian Peninsula. Already suffering from this previous loss, the Italian people would hardly be in the mood to receive such claims. Therefore, unless the discussions were limited at the outset it could only lead to failure which would make the general situation worse, rather than better. The March 20 Declaration therefore must be a point of departure in the conversations.

It was essential that the conversations should be within that framework and must begin with discussions on Zone B. He recognized that in order to make a solution acceptable for Yugoslavia there might have to be concessions in Zone A and he would be willing to do this as he had indicated, always within the very strict limits of his possibilities. The Secretary pointed out that he had emphasized to the Yugoslavs that their wish to begin negotiations from a rigid position was impossible and likewise he felt that an entry into discussion stipulated on the March 20 Declaration as a point of departure was not possible.

Mr. Perkins pointed out that Yugoslavia also had a public opinion and in their present difficult situation it was most important for the Yugoslav Government to keep their hold on their people. Count Zoppi inquired whether the United States would not help in bringing the two governments together and Mr. Perkins agreed that it might be possible to call in Ambassador Popovic again and urge the Yugoslavs to facilitate a start. The Prime Minister insisted that first of all we must prepare a new atmosphere which would not involve in the beginning of any negotiations reference to Zone A. He reiterated that even now all the lawyers in Italy were protesting about the issue of the Court of Cassation in Zone A. He emphasized that in 1949 when he was in Trieste and spoke before a crowd of 200,000 people, he gave his own person as a hostage for the good faith of the United States, United Kingdom, and France when they made the March 20 Declaration. His whole Government was committed to that understanding and he could not renounce it in a public statement. He said that if a solution of the Trieste question were to be imposed on Italy on some such basis as that demanded by the Yugoslavs, he would be ready to leave office if a successor could be found who cound accept it, but he did not believe there was any one in Italy who could obtain the support of the Italian people for a solution which placed Italians under Yugoslav rule.

The possibility was mentioned of discussing this matter with Ambassador Velebit, who had now been assigned to Rome and was presently in the United States, with a view a exploring the situation with him.

1. According to the cover sheet, these minutes were circulated as IPM MIN–5 on October 5. Although not included in the list of those present, Count Zoppi also participated.
2. For a summary of this conversation, see telegram Secto 20 from Ottawa, Document 307.
3. For the Tripartite Declaration of March 20, 1948, which favored the return of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, p. 517.
4. For documentation concerning the Morgan Agreement, whereby zones A and B were separated as established in the Belgrade agreement of 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 1189–1191.