Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 209

740B.5/2–2351

Memorandum by the Legation in Iceland to the Icelandic Foreign Ministry ¹

top secret

Reykjavik, February 17, 1951.

Security Force for Defense of Iceland

1. The mission of the security force for Iceland consists of two basic responsibilities, namely: a) to protect the principal airfields, communications center and port and petroleum facilities in the Reykjavik and Keflavik areas, insuring the continuity of all military and essential civilian activities and protecting the seat of government; and, b) to prepare facilities which would immediately be required for military purposes in the event of hostilities.

2. The minimum forces needed for these purposes consist of:

a. An aircraft control and warning system for detection of approach of hostile aircraft;

b. A land-based patrol squadron for reconnaissance, detection and defense against hostile submarines and surface vessels (e.g. armed trawlers);

c. An air defense squadron (fighter aircraft) for defense against hostile aircraft;

d. A ground defense force (infantry combat team, augmented), to protect the airfield, communications, port and petroleum facilities;

e. An air base group, augmented, to operate the airport, provide services for the security force and contribute to the defense of the airport;

f. An air rescue flight, to provide rescue service in support of military air forces based in Iceland and to transient military and commercial aircraft;

g. A small headquarters unit.

3. It is recognized that these forces do not meet ideal requirements for the defense of Iceland. Their composition has been determined on the basis of (a) the desirability of causing minimum interference with the economy and civilian life of Iceland, in accordance with the desire of the Icelandic Government; (b) the need for meeting at least minimum requirements for defense in the light of the present world situation; and (c) present limited availability of personnel and equipment for the reasonably near future. Some augmentation of forces may be found necessary and possible during peacetime to meet defense needs or provide for the support of forces which would be immediately required in the event of hostilities, for example, anti-aircraft and weather reconnaissance units. This augmentation for defensive purposes which might include two anti-aircraft battalions, two weather reconnaissance flights, an additional all-weather fighter squadron and appropriate increase in supporting forces, would perhaps double the strength of the security force described in paragraph 2. Except for dispersed locations for anti-aircraft in the Reykjavik and Keflavik areas, practically all of the additional forces would be based in the Keflavik Airport area. No assurance can be given that these additional forces will be available in the near future. It is not intended to station any forces with offensive capabilities in Iceland during peacetime.²

4. The total strength of the security force described in paragraph 2 is estimated at about 3900 military personnel. All of these will be stationed in the Keflavik area except the following:

a. Aircraft control and warning personnel (perhaps 10–15% of the total force) who will be stationed at the several warning stations.

b. Detachments of the ground defense forces necessary to protect communications, port and petroleum facilities (perhaps 10–15% of the total force). These detachments probably would be stationed in the Reykjavik area, some perhaps in the Hvalfjordur area.

c. The headquarters unit (25 to 50 men) might also be stationed in the Reykjavik area if it were found desirable, in the mutual interests of the Icelandic Government and the security force, that headquarters be maintained near the seat of government to facilitate liaison.

5. It should be emphasized that the foregoing strength figures make no allowance for the possibility that qualified Icelandic nationals might undertake some of the defense responsibilities, thus reducing the number of United States troops and personnel required for certain defense purposes.³ Although such participation (particularly in patrolling Reykjavik and Hvalfjordur areas) would be welcomed by the United States, the intentions of the Icelandic Government in this respect are not known.

6. In addition, there will be required initially a survey mission to determine the location of facilities such as air warning stations and subsequently civilian contractors’ construction crews to construct necessary facilities. These crews will be based in the Keflavik area.

7. The exact site and area requirements for the security force can be determined only after the above-mentioned survey and in consultation with the Icelandic Government. Pending a survey, the following general indications can be given:

a. Keflavik Area. It is understood that the government-owned Keflavik Airport area comprises 30 square miles including the airfields formerly designated as Meeks Field and Patterson Field and adjacent facilities such as Camp Geck. Subject to checking the exact size and location of this airport area, it is assumed that this area, with certain outside facilities now being used in connection with airport operations (such as the radio antennae farms and beacons), will be sufficient for the forces based in the Keflavik area.⁴

b. Reykjavik area. Space to station and house the force protecting port and communications facilities. This area, perhaps 10–15 acres, should preferably be outside the city in order to avoid unnecessary interference with civilian life. These forces would need access to port and communications areas.

In addition, space for headquarters may possibly be needed. (See paragraph 4–c, above.)

c. Hvalfjordur area. If it is found necessary to station troops to protect the petroleum tank farm, a small adjacent area (perhaps 5 acres) may be needed to house them.

d. Other areas required for the security force described in paragraph 2:

(1) At least three locations (perhaps 5 acres each) for air control and warning stations and supporting personnel. These locations will probably include one in the northwestern, one in the eastern, and one in the southern part of Iceland. The locations should not be too near any thickly-settled area.

(2) Area for training exercises. This should be remote from towns and in a non-agricultural section. It would probably not be in continual use. It would not be necessary to station troops regularly in this area. The approximate size of the area required is estimated at 6 x 10 miles.

8. The United States recognizes that the small population of Iceland cannot easily adjust to a large influx, and that, having been unarmed for centuries, the people are unfamiliar with military customs and operations. These facts may give rise to problems in reconciling the need for adequate defense of the country with the objective of avoiding undue interference with the life of the people. The United States proposes to cooperate to the fullest degree with the Icelandic Government in avoiding and solving such problems. It has no desire or intention of interfering with or disturbing the economic and cultural life of the country. Iceland’s sovereignty and Government will be fully respected. Every effort will be made to carry out operations insofar as practicable in consultation with the Icelandic authorities and in such a manner as to cause minimum disturbance with the customs and activities of the people. The security force will be instructed accordingly.⁵

1. Lawson transmitted this memorandum as an enclosure to despatch 365, from Reykjavik, February 23. He also enclosed a memorandum of the conversation between Byrns and Hans Andersen, Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office, when Byrns delivered the memorandum to the Foreign Office on February 17. (740B.5/2–2351)

   A copy of this memorandum dated February 16 had a handwritten note at the top which said “This is the first draft as prepared by the military adviser.” Differences between the two copies are indicated in footnotes at the appropriate places.

   The memorandum was prepared in response to the Foreign Minister’s request for additional details regarding the number of troops to be stationed in Iceland and the size and location of the areas they would require.

2. The last section of this paragraph, beginning with the sentence “This augmentation for defensive purposes …” was added to the final draft.
3. The phrase “thus reducing the number of United States troops and personnel required for certain defense purposes” was added to the final draft.
4. The form of this paragraph was different in the first draft, but the substance was similar.
5. This complete paragraph was an addition to the final draft.