Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 210

740B.5/2–2151: Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Lawson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Reykjavik, February 21, 1951—2 p.m.

144. Discussions February 20¹ centered on memorandum to Foreign Minister February 17² giving details troop and area requirements as computed by military advisors who believe initial force of 3900 requires with possible build-up to approximately 7800 by D-day. Foreign Minister says some members his government suspicious repeated increases our troop estimates and although government might accept 1200 or even 3900 any increase to 7800³ would have to be again considered by all members his government. I have reassured him this bare minimum and increased figures result more thorough studies aimed at best defense for Iceland. I believe his objections will be overcome. Military advisors willing proceed with 3900⁴ figure with understanding increases called for by NATO plans may be negotiated without reference to Althing and I am continuing negotiations this basis.

No possibility Iceland will accept agreement for duration NAT and probably not for shorter period such as five years. I am suggesting as proposal for discussion that either government may terminate agreement after consultation period of six months plus a notification period of one year. This proposal made with understanding if Iceland unilaterally terminates agreement US retains title, and may dispose of within reasonable time as it sees fit, all movable and immovable property which it has provided. If agreement runs for length of NAT or if US unilaterally terminates agreement, immovables become Iceland’s property without compensation to US.

Foreign Minister indicates Iceland does not desire Icelanders initially compose part of forces or receive training, but desires agreement to leave this open in event they wish participate later. Foreign Minister gave impression government would accept stationing of small security forces at Reykjavik. He also states first contingent troops should be a sizable one in order impress public adequate defense measures being taken.

Lawson

1. Lawson transmitted a detailed memorandum of his conversation with the Foreign Minister on February 20 in despatch 378, from Reykjavik March 2. (740B.5/3–251)
2. Supra.

3. The actual figure 7,800 does not appear in material in Department of State files. But in paragraph 3c of the memorandum of February 17, supra, the section added in the final draft mentions that “augmentation … would perhaps double the strength of the security force.”

   The memorandum of conversation enclosed in despatch 378 quoted the Foreign Minister as saying that the memorandum of February 17 went further than Icelanders had expected. He said he had been informed in Washington in September that 1,200 troops would be enough, in January the figure had risen to 2,600–3,300, by February 17 the figure was 3,900, and under certain circumstances the United States would like to double that figure.

4. In a memorandum sent to the Minister on February 19, Byrns quoted Lieutenant Colonel Fondren as saying that the memorandum of February 17 covered all the peacetime requirements envisaged for Iceland. (711.56340B/2–1951)