No. 208

740B.5/2–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister in Iceland (Lawson) 1

top secret

At my request I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs2 this afternoon at 4 o’clock. I called to present to him a copy of the draft of February 2, 1951,3 of the “Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Iceland and the United States of America.”

I started the conversation by telling him of the substance of instructions received from the Department (No. 27, February 7, 1951).4 I made it clear that the Draft Agreement had been drawn up by the Department of Defense and represented the views of that Department as to the scope and substance which a defense agreement between the two countries should contain. I also emphasized that this was a working document with which we would start and was subject to alteration by suggestions from the Government of Iceland as well as from our side. I stated that it in no way represented a complete draft as additional items might be introduced from both sides in the future and, in fact, an additional annex on “Civil Air Operations” was now in preparation and would be transmitted to him as soon as possible.

I also introduced the subject of security in the Foreign Office and suggested that every possible precaution be taken to protect this document as well as additional information and documents which might be developed in the future. He said that their security conditions were not “too good” but they would be careful with the documents involved.

The Foreign Minister then glanced hastily over the draft. On completing the first page of the basic draft agreement, he referred immediately to Paragraph 4 which states that “the agreement will [Page 487] remain in effect for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty.” He said that he was absolutely confident that that article would not be acceptable to the Icelandic Government. I countered by saying that I doubted that the Icelandic viewpoint of its unilateral right to abrogate this agreement would be acceptable to us, although I could make no definite statement on that point. However, I was just as firm in my confidence that a satisfactory agreement on the duration of this agreement, perhaps lying somewhere between the two points of view, could be worked out to our mutual satisfaction. He still seemed to be doubtful on that point, but said he would consider this problem which was basically the most important, and we would discuss it at a later date. He added that he thought we would get nowhere unless it was realized that Iceland, in offering herself as a defense area, would be accepting many things on the basis of faith and confidence in the United States. Therefore, the United States should have confidence enough in the Icelandic Government to feel that it would not request the withdrawal of defense troops and an abrogation of the agreement so long as there was any need for a defense program here. I was quick to assure him there was not the slightest lack of confidence in the present Government of Iceland, and that I did not believe that this particular article stemmed in any way from lack of confidence in the Icelandic Government—he could be sure of that. I commented that the fact that the present Government so recognized the need for defense facilities and armed forces as to be willing to engage in these negotiations showed clearly that it would not be disposed to have the resulting defenses removed so long as the world situation required them in Iceland.

I assured him that we were in complete agreement on the one point, that is, that defense troops should not remain in Iceland when need for a defense program no longer existed. Neither he wanted it nor did we want it. I expressed the hope that he would be able to suggest an article which we could discuss and develop with provisions which would meet the requirements of both countries.

He said that equally basic in character was the necessity for Iceland to know in more specific terms what it must do in connection with the program, i.e., the full extent of its commitments—just what the military authorities would require and what they were going to do with the facilities and areas required. Of course, this is already stated in general terms in the draft and in some instances in rather specific terms. He seemed to be thinking in terms of information he must have in order to present the subject of Iceland’s specific commitments when he had discussed this with his Government and with the Althing. I recognized his needs but explained [Page 488] that it was impossible to anticipate every condition—but some additional information and some ideas of the objectives and intent of the program might be obtained. I informed him that I would be pleased to obtain as much information as possible for him if he would list his desires. Also, the military team which was arriving tomorrow would be available at all times to give their expert advice to me and would discuss this subject with him or with any other persons he might designate. This was, in fact, one of the reasons the military team had been dispatched to Iceland.

The Foreign Minister spoke in a most discouraged tone of the possibilities of working out an agreement on the basis of the initial draft. He repeated several times, “This will be most difficult.” I explained to him again that this was merely a working paper—a starting point—a statement of the military’s conception of the substance of an agreement under which they would operate—and that there would be every opportunity for discussion and consideration of every problem from the viewpoint of the Icelandic Government. I repeated my confidence in our ability to develop an agreement which would be satisfactory to the Icelandic Government and would, at the same time, afford the conditions necessary for the United States to establish an effective defense program. As I left, I again suggested that he not view this matter with so much pessimism, as I was confident our ideas could be effectively coordinated so that a workable agreement would evolve. He agreed to give this matter some attention and was hoping that we might have discussions as early as Thursday, February 15,5 which was the target date set some days ago.

I left having the feeling that the brief, broad and far reaching views of the military, as set forth in the draft, was something of a shock to him as he considered his difficult position of influencing his Cabinet colleagues, the opposition Social-Democratic Party leaders and the Althing to accept them or anything approaching them in character. I also felt that, although the initial reaction of the Foreign Minister was very pessimistic, definite purposes had been served by presenting the draft agreement to him at this time. It promoted immediate serious thinking and time has been saved in obtaining consideration of the principal views of the military. I also had the feeling that considerable effort must be made to keep these discussions on an informal basis for the moment, as to permit them to become formalized before any substantial agreement in approach [Page 489] to the subject has been reached would be very unfortunate. The theme of absolute confidence in our ability to arrive at an effective and satisfactory agreement must be advanced constantly.

  1. A copy was transmitted in despatch 343 from Reykjavik, February 12. (740B.5/2–1251)
  2. Bjarni Benediktsson.
  3. Not printed, but see footnote 2, supra.
  4. Supra.
  5. Lawson and Benediktsson met again on February 15, together with other members of the Icelandic Government and Byrns of the Department of State. The Minister transmitted a memorandum of that conversation in despatch 369, from Reykjavik, February 27. (740B.5/2–2751)