751.00/6–2051
Memorandum Prepared by G. McMurtrie Godley of the Office of Western European Affairs
French Elections
There is attached a table indicating the breakdown of the 1946 and 1951 French national elections.1 These figures are not official [Page 396] but are fairly accurate. The popular vote figures and percentages refer only to Metropolitan France and Algiers, hence minor discrepancies.
Observations
1. Approximately the same number of people voted in 1951 as in 1946 and the number of abstentions was the same.
2. Third Force parties, i.e., Socialists, MRP, Independents (Reynaudists, and miscellaneous rightist groups) and RGR (Radical Socialists and Pleven’s UDSR) were supported by 50.2 percent of the electorate.
3. The Communist’s popular vote fell from 28.5 percent in 1946 to 26.1 percent in 1951, a loss of some 9 percent. They received 474,382 fewer votes than in 1946.
4. The De Gaullist RPF percentage fell from 25.5 percent in the March 1949 cantonal elections to 20.5 percent. (De Gaulle’s RPF did not exist in 1946.)
5. All members of the Queuille Cabinet, except the Secretary for Air, Maroselli, and Secretary of State for Industry and Commerce Guillant were reelected. Among the prominent casualties were Ramadier, Capitant, Phillip and Michelet. All prominent Communists, including Cot, Thorez, Duclos, Tillon and Marty were reelected, as were the more eminent Gaullists, with the exception of Terrenoire and Michelet.
6. The elections have resulted in a rightward movement of the center of political gravity of the Assembly in that the conservative Independents and RPF gained seats at the expense of the Communists and the MRP. The balance of power shared by the RGR and Independents now rests with the Independents.
possible government combinations and development
The present Queuille Government will resign when the officers of the new Assembly are chosen sometime after July 5. President Auriol will then designate a Prime Minister who will undoubtedly endeavor to form a Government of representatives of the Socialist, MRP, RGR and Independent parties. Although it may be difficult to form such a government, this is probably the first coalition which we shall see. Due, however, to the fact that it will have to include not only left-wing Socialists and MRP as well as right-wing Independents it is not anticipated that such a government will be able to deal firmly with serious economic and social problems. At best, it will have to govern by compromise and avoid definitive action.
There are already signs of political maneuvering on the Right with invitations to rapprochements between the RGR, Independents [Page 397] and Gaullists. It is not anticipated that these will be successful at this time, but certainly the possibility of such a future coalition, supported by defection from the right-wing of the MRP must be kept in mind.
results of the election on franco-american relations
The election has confirmed France’s intention to cooperate whole-heartedly with the West and bear her share in its defense. Neutralism was in no case an issue and no non-Communist candidate advocating it was elected. The Communists, arch opponents of all U.S. policies in France, suffered a serious defeat in their representation in the new National Assembly as well as an absolute loss in votes. The election indicated a definite rightist and nationalist trend. De Gaulle in his campaign repeatedly demanded a greater French voice in Western planning and command. He also attacked what he called the weak attitude of the preceding Third Force Governments in dealing with France’s allies and the domination of France by her friends. Although Gaullists will probably not be in the immediate post-election governments, their influence will be felt. Hence we will probably encounter difficulties in dealing with the French on base rights negotiations, colonial questions, and any other problems that may entail a possible limitation of French sovereignty. French nationalism also will be felt in handling the German questions but no clear-cut new policy in this matter can be deduced from the election or electoral campaign. French policy in Indochina was not a non-communist campaign issue and French resolution in the defense of that area will undoubtedly be maintained or possibly increased.
- Not printed.↩