Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 171

751.5–MAP/6–2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in France ( Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Paris, June 28, 1951—7 p.m.

8170. Pass urgently to Harriman. Toisa—This is combined Emb and ECA Mission message. Visits of Harriman and Gen Bradley² have given increased impetus to internal discussions within French Govt on re-examination of French tentative mil plan as set forth in documents presented to Gen Bradley by Moch. Moch was very anxious to explain consistency of his program to Bradley, and Petsche equally wished to make clear his financial and econ problems during Harriman’s visit. We understand that Petsche also wished to submit new proposal on a personal basis which is reported to be a substantial improvement over his usual position that US shld assume very considerable part of internal financing of increased French mil expenditures. Schuman, however, insisted on having French cabinet review paper and its submission has been delayed. Queuille and Petsche both explained orally to Harriman difficulties which had arisen for them because of admin of US econ and mil assistance and underlined magnitude of problems facing them in planned increases of French mil effort. Petsche also pressed for reply to French Govt note forwarded in Embtel 7355.³

French cabinet re-examination will be continuous process over next few months and French are anxious to begin conversations with Emb–MAAG–ECA team on magnitude of effort they are to undertake in 1952 and particularly on probable framework of US assistance. We doubt whether policies of US Govt in questions related to French rearmament are sufficiently defined to permit us to proceed usefully now in such conversations with French.

During past few days, we have explained our problems to Ambassadors Harriman and Katz on lines of summary set out in part I and part II of this message. A full statement of analysis and of facts on French rearmament is being prepared for Amb Katz at his request for submission of French problem to Wash and to his ECC colleagues together with his comments at that time. Until this document is completed, info in papers given to Gen Bradley by Moch and info forwarded recently by Emb–MAAG–ECA team shld provide adequate background.

Part I.

In our opinion, security interests of the US and NATO require that mil tasks as projected by French be carried out at least in their broad lines. This includes their open-end commitment in Indochina; infrastructure on French soil; placing of 28 divs inactive or immed mobilizable status by summer of 1954; raising the number of men on active status from 850,000 (including 165,000 in Indochina) by the end of 1951, to a million by the end of 1953, with a mobilizable reserve of roughly 2 million men and with constant increase in stocks of material to arm them in event of their mobilization.

It appears to us that various US officials are now fol a number of contradictory policies which prevent using US assistance and influence in a manner which can best contribute to the common security interests of the US and France.

1. Washington has placed feasibility target for French mil budget for calendar 1952 at $3.2 billion in presentation of Mutual Security Bill to Congress. This target seems to have been accepted generally in admin as a real ceiling. A mil budget of this size wld just barely permit France to cover payments on the mil tasks now underway and wld probably mean a delay of 18 to 24 months in their MTD mil program.

2. US agencies are nevertheless aware that French Defense Min estimate of 1952 mil budget needed to carry out French MTDP tasks on schedule as French Def Min defines them is around $4 billion and that Def Min apparently is basing its plans on assumption of Amer assistance considerably beyond amount which is likely to be available. Despite gen recognition by us of a ceiling somewhere in neighborhood of $3.2 billion, some US reps are urging France to undertake further expenditures not even included $4 billion figure.

3. US officials ask France to continue to finance its open-end commitment for mil operations in Indochina. US wants an increase in French expenditures there, particularly in expenditures for the creation and equipment of natl armies. However, even in their $4 billion estimate French have made no provision for any substantial increase in expenditures above present tempo of activities.

4. US urges an increase in infrastructure expenditures in France. We understand US position to be that France, as major staging area, shld assume an initial financial burden for all infrastructure as host country and shld participate on equitable basis in financing balance of infrastructure. It does not seem that $4 billion estimate makes adequate provision for French share of infrastructure costs on this formula.

5. Some officials propose that pay of mil personnel shld be substantially increased in France if combat morale is to be adequate and officers and NCO’s are to be attracted to mil profession. An increase to even 25 percent of level of pay received by mil personnel in US wld probably cost 100 billion francs. No provision for any substantial increase in mil pay has been included in French $4 billion estimate.

6. Some US officials state that, if French forces are to be effective and adequately trained, much larger expenditures must be made for training supplies, stocks, uniforms, etc. The French $4 billion estimate does not seem to provide adequately for higher expenditures for such items.

7. US is pressing France to increase its production of mil equipment. Specific requests have been made by US and by DPB for increased production of jeeps, howitzers, night fighters, tanks, etc. US is also considering informing French that certain end-items previously programmed will probably not be sent from US but shld be produced in France. It is doubtful that the $4 billion estimate carries anything like magnitude of increases requested.

8. Washington informs Emb–MAAG–ECA team that in order to fill MTDP “forces” gap France may be asked to accept a commitment to create two additional infantry divisions as well as an additional 528 planes and 35 naval units by 1954. Obviously no provision is made in $4 billion estimate for necessary 1952 expenditures on such commitments.

9. Furthermore, econ assistance US has scheduled for France in fiscal 1951/52 is only $290 million. This is on basis of a $2.9 billion 1951/52 mil budget. If the $200 million is given to French for second six months of 1951, which they expect as result of Oct talks of last year, US wld have left only $90 million of economic assistance to help French undertake a substantially larger military program beginning in 1952. Note that French received $240 million in first six months of 1951 and impact of increased mil expenditures will be higher in second six months.

10. Moreover, it appears that although US is asking for burden-sharing, it is far from accomplishment, nor do many US officials believe any significant contribution to burden-sharing from other NATO countries is likely. US cld perhaps force burden-sharing through economic assistance—for example, a large part of such assistance cld be set up as a credit to be used for purchases of mil items or for gen imports by France from other NATO countries, or conditional aid cld be given to other NATO countries provided they set up credits which France cld use only for mil items or gen imports. However, the US now insists that all intra-Eur payments apart from so-called structural deficits be unrelated to dol econ assistance. In any case, US econ assistance is scheduled to be used in conjunction with increase in mil efforts in other NATO countries which are now at very low levels. In countries where mil expenditures are disproportionately low in relation to those of France, end-items assistance might be given on a conditional basis. This wld mean basic change in our relations with those countries.

11. Some US officials are urging a number of other related policies regarding France which will also set limits to real resources available for diversion to rearmament.

(a) France shld increase real wages for labor;

(b) France shld increase govt-financed investments in the overseas territories, and at least maintain current levels of investments in metropolitan France;

(c) France shld expand its low-cost housing program.

Part II of this message is in immed fol cable.

Bruce

1. Repeated to London for Spofford.
2. No documentation on the visit of Presidential Adviser W. Averell Harriman to Paris has been found in Department of State files. General Bradley visited Paris June 2–6 for talks with various French and NATO military officials. While in France he declared in a press statement on June 6 that he had been impressed by what he had heard from Defense Minister Moch about French industrial progress which, he thought, would enable France to make a substantial contribution to Western defense on land, sea, and in the air. For further information on Bradley’s trip to France and England, see footnote 1, vol. iii, Part 1, p. 528.
3. Not printed, but see Document 168.