Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 161

Conference files, lot 59D95, CF51

United States Minutes of the Third Meeting Between Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Minister Schuman, Washington, March 30, 1951, 6–7 p.m.

Washington, March 30, 1951, 6 p.m. to 7 p.m.

top secret

Participants:	The Secretary
	Mr. Harriman
	Mr. Bruce
	Mr. Perkins
	Mr. Rusk
	Mr. Bonbright
	Mr. O’Shaughnessy
	Mr. Schuman
	Mr. Daridan
	Mr. de Juniac

The meeting began with a briefing by Mr. Armstrong on the present military situation in Korea. Mr. Schuman expressed keen interest.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Rusk to speak on recent developments.

Mr. Rusk said that powerful forces were still being built up on the enemy side and that there was evidence of preparation in China for a continued effort in Korea. We could look forward to a substantial offensive. Prisoners have referred to it. On the American military side our position seemed precarious because a big battle appeared to be coming. General Ridgway’s mission is strictly a defensive one in spite of the fact that his recent advance may have led to the belief that it was already in a position to start an offensive. In fact he has merely shifted his defensive line further north. The danger is due to the weakness of his reserves, which at the present moment are constituted by a British brigade in the West and a French battalion in the center, and to the unfavorable weather conditions which restrict air operations and complicate the supply problem.

On the political side there was no evidence of any willingness on the part of the Peiping Government to negotiate. The Peiping radio has announced that the UN forces should be driven out and that a military offensive was coming. We do not think that the Chinese will undertake any political action until they see the results of their offensive.

Mr. Rusk described the latest British proposal about a statement on the Korean situation. The British proposal was designed to see whether further military operations could be avoided now that the UN forces were near the 38th parallel. The British felt certain that the Chinese would not cooperate with the Good Offices Committee (GOC) and it therefore should be considered whether the GOC objectives might not be obtained by other means. The British proposal included a statement of policy regarding Korea, agreed to by all countries with forces in Korea, with the possible addition of India and of Sweden and Denmark which have contributed medical services. Mr. Rusk said that he had suggested to the British the addition of such countries as Norway, which had contributed shipping facilities and Colombia which had troops on their way to Korea.

The British proposal comprised: 1) a joint declaration of all nations with forces in Korea, expressing their desire to see an independent unified Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign troops and their readiness to achieve these objectives by negotiation rather than by military means; 2) a simultaneous additional declaration by President Truman in his capacity as Chief Executive of the state providing the Unified Command to make it plain that the military implications of the policy outlined in the declaration were fully accepted by the Unified Command; and 3) after publication of these two statements an approach to the Chinese and perhaps to the Soviets drawing their attention to this joint declaration, expressing our desire for a peaceful settlement and inviting the two governments to express their views as to the best means of bringing this about. The approach to the Soviet Government would be on somewhat different lines from the approach to Peiping and might be made by France, the U.S. and the U.K. The approach to Peiping might be by India and the U.K. The Swedish Government might consent to transmit the message.

Mr. Rusk made the two following comments: 1) this problem was difficult because an immediate cease-fire order might be contrary to the military requirements of the situation, since it would imply, for example, cessation of all UN aerial activity, and this might permit the enemy to build up his ground forces in such a manner as to endanger the very existence of the UN forces; and 2) the démarches in Moscow and Peiping might give an opportunity to those two governments for a maneuver aimed at the breaking up of the unity of the Allies. Mr. Rusk said that the British had told him that their proposal had been made known to the French Government.

Mr. Schuman said that the proposal sounded interesting and deserving of consideration. It would, of course, have to be studied. Mr. Rusk said that we had asked the British for further clarification of their proposal. The Secretary added that he hoped that if Peiping and Moscow were approached they would come up with different answers. Mr. Schuman said that perhaps three different statements might be too many. Mr. Rusk stated that this might all be academic since the Chinese seemed determined to proceed with their military offensive and not take any political action before that. Mr. Schuman inquired whether London was aware of the military situation. Mr. Rusk replied that they perhaps were not completely briefed on the developments of the past three days. The Secretary added that this posed a very difficult problem for President Truman. General MacArthur’s unexpected statement¹ had added to the confusion. President Truman had withheld comment until he had time for consultation with the other powers. Once the various points of view had been coordinated a concerted effort for a peaceful settlement could be made. Mr. Rusk added that keeping in touch with 14 governments is a difficult method of forming policy and does not represent an easy technique. This brought up the question of whether all 14 countries should have to define the policy to be followed. It must be borne in mind, however, that the general policy remains unchanged as it was defined by the UN but due to the fact that the General Assembly is not in session and that the Security Council is paralyzed by the Soviet Union, the 14 governments in question appear to be the group best suited for defining any international action which may be necessitated by the circumstances of the moment. Mr. Schuman asked whether the British did not want to add to the 14 countries. Mr. Rusk replied that they did. Mr. Schuman asked whether the 14 governments should take a position on the basis of the British proposal. The Secretary clarified that in his last remarks. Mr. Rusk referred to the US proposed statement and that it was not suggested that the 14 governments should define a new policy but stated that President Truman as the Chief of State of the country designated as the Unified Command could consult with the 14 countries in order to determine how the policy laid down by the UN could be best complied with and how a specific solution could be best reached. However, in principle, the policy determined by the UN was still being followed.

Mr. Schuman asked whether there was any indication of a disposition on the part of the Chinese to negotiate. The Secretary answered that there was none whatever. Mr. Rusk said that the basic Chinese condition had remained the same for months, namely, withdrawal from Korea and Formosa and a seat in the UN. Their policy was to force the UN troops to evacuate Korea. Mr. Schuman said that this had indeed been announced by Stalin himself.

Proposed CFM

The Secretary said that we had heard from Mr. Jessup who had met with Messrs. Parodi and Davies and had gone over yesterday’s message. The Deputies had agreed that it was not wise to put forward the Parodi proposal at this time. They wished to discuss the Russian proposals but never intended to discuss them on the Russian basis. The Parodi proposal could be kept in reserve and perhaps be used if we could make no progress on the present basis. Gromyko was unwilling to have a closed meeting and had tabled two new items. In these new proposals the first part of the paragraph referring to the investigation of human rights and the freedoms in the countries having signed peace treaties is similar to ours but the Soviets have added Italy to the list of countries. Mr. Schuman said that this did not seem to represent a simplification. The Secretary said that they were trying to get back to Potsdam.

Negotiation Regarding the Formation of a European Army²

The Secretary said that we were following very closely the negotiations in Paris regarding the formation of a European Army. He told Mr. Schuman how sympathetic we were to this idea and how much we desire it to succeed.

Our military advisers, however, think that the French plan is not realistic enough and, therefore, its chances of success are diminished. The general political provisions are not troublesome. The difficulty lies rather in the technical military aspects. We think an area of compromise where national units can be of a workable size is the best solution.

Mr. Schuman said that this was really where the French had started. He said that the German proposal of two weeks ago represented both progress and compromise. These proposals provided for two units of 10,000 men each under a common command as against the French idea of 3 units of 5,000 men each. He added that the French Government had been agreeably surprised by the German proposal made to the five delegates and made officially in the name of the German Government. He believed that the Germans were just as desirous of finding a solution as we were.

1. For documentation relating to General MacArthur’s statement of March 24 proposing a conference between himself and the enemy commander in Korea, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 264 ff.
2. For documentation concerning the U.S. attitude toward the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 755 ff.