551.001/3–3151
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the President ( Harriman)1
The conversation began with an exchange of amenities in which Auriol explained again his principal purpose of getting people in the United States to appreciate the real vigor of France, and I congratulated him on the value of his visit.
He then said that he wanted to talk to me about the USSR. During the period we were building up our military forces, he considered we should gain time through diplomacy. I told him I agreed in principle, but I assumed that he did not mean appeasement or that we should be deviated from the vigorous steps necessary to build military strength. I explained that I had found that whenever the Soviets violently objected to what we were doing, it usually was the very action that was most important for us to take. I said it seemed clear that in the conversations of the four Deputies, and later at the Foreign Ministers meeting, the principal Soviet objective was to split the Allies, reduce the speed of rearmament, and block the bringing of Germany into the European armies. I felt sure that he understood this danger, and applauded the French for the steps they were taking through the Schuman Plan, and now through their leadership in bringing the Germans into the continental defense arrangements. I suggested, however, that they were being a bit too technical on the military details of these arrangements, and expressed the hope that they would not let rather narrow political concepts interfere with practical military arrangements.
President Auriol then launched into a denunciation of the Germans as strongly nationalistic and revengeful. He explained the history of the 20’s in rather a narrow way and said that the Germans could not be trusted. He said that even the German Socialist Party was strongly nationalistic, particularly Schumacher, and [Page 379] that if we rearm the Germans, they might well bring on war in their desire for a unified Germany.
As David Bruce had warned me this would be his attitude and had suggested that I take the opportunity to discuss the German question with him, I told him that I did not quite agree with his analysis of the 20’s; that there had been mistakes on the part of the Allies. I did believe, however, that the Germans would follow positive action; that with all of the confused pressures on the Germans perhaps the strongest today was the desire to be associated with the West; that if the Western countries brought them into what Churchill called “an honorable association”, this might well become the foundation of German policy. The clear fact was, however, that we had no alternative. We could not suppress the Germans and at the same time present a strong enough front against the Russians. To leave 60 million vigorous people in vacuum was the most dangerous kind of policy. The desire of the Germans for a united Germany will certainly continue, but a close association with the West would provide a basis for controlling their ambitions within the framework of the general Western policy towards Eastern Europe. There would be many other difficulties in the future, such as problems between Poland and Germany. The important thing now was to build a strong unity in the North Atlantic community. If we stuck together, we would then have reasonable hope of working things out. I underlined that the American people would not understand any unreasonable delay in regard to Germany or narrow quibbling over matters which were militarily unsound.
He clearly did not like what I said, so I turned to a question he had asked me the other evening, namely, what the President’s reaction had been to his conference. With the President’s approval, I told him that the President had been much pleased with his personal talks, was interested in the information he had given him and was encouraged by the vigorous manner in which he had described France’s determination to rearm and to defend herself against Soviet aggression. But the President, on his side, hoped that Auriol understood his problems with the Congress and the need for aggressive action on the part of France in rearmament. Auriol said that he respected President Truman greatly for the extraordinarily wise and foresighted steps he had taken. He said that he had known the three great Presidents—Wilson, Roosevelt, and now Truman. Wilson was a wise intellectual, but personally cold. Roosevelt was a man of broad human ideas. President Truman is a man of determination and action. He said that he went home with renewed confidence and would convey that to his people.
- A notation on the source text indicates that this conversation with President Auriol, at which Ambassador Bonnet was present most of the time, was held on March 31 at 4 p.m. at the French Embassy.↩