Conference files, lot 59D95, CF 51
United States Minutes of the Second Meeting Between Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Minister Schuman, Washington, March 30, 1951, 8:45–10 a.m.
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Harriman | |
| Mr. Bruce | |
| Mr. Perkins | |
| Mr. Bonbright | |
| Mr. O’Shaughnessy | |
| Mr. Schuman | |
| Mr. Daridan | |
| Mr. de Juniac |
Proposed CFM
The Secretary began the meeting by saying that our telecon connection with Paris last night had been bad and we had not succeeded in getting through to Mr. Jessup until very late. The latter had, therefore, been unable to see Mr. Parodi and Mr. Davies last night. Mr. Jessup had doubted the possibility of being able to carry out today the suggestion contained in the joint message from Mr. Schuman and Mr. Acheson. He thought that they would reserve the “Parodi formula” for use in case the Western Deputies are not able to get the Soviets to improve their latest proposal.
Mr. Jessup indicated that they would try to get a closed session of the Four Deputies today and if successful we would explore the latest Soviet proposal with a view to trying to bring it more in line with the Western proposal of March 15. Mr. Schuman did not express any objection to the above.
Mr. Schuman inquired whether Mr. Jessup had conveyed to the Secretary any impressions regarding the Russian attitude. The Secretary replied that in Mr. Jessup’s opinion the Soviets had made an effort in our direction in their latest proposal and that the Soviets apparently want a meeting of the Four Ministers. He thought that perhaps the Soviet Delegate would move even further.
Middle East Defense—Malta Talks
Mr. Schuman recalled that some ten days ago the French Government had addressed notes to the U.S. and British Governments which expressed “a certain emotion” regarding the two Malta conferences. He said that while he quite understood the necessity for [Page 370] such talks he believed that the amount of publicity which the matter had received had been most unfortunate. French public opinion, he said, was always slightly suspicious of British policy in Arab countries and when the Malta conversations became public knowledge the French Government felt that it had to send these notes. Mr. Schuman said that he was not complaining about the past but that the French Government would appreciate being reassured regarding the future. It was impossible to organize the defense of the Middle East and of Western European interests in the Middle East without a global use of all our resources and without a common strategic view of the whole theatre of operations which he considered indivisible. Our strategy must be global. The theatre must be considered in its entirety and the Eastern and Western Mediterranean can not be divided. North Africa is there and the Allied Command of the Mediterranean might be based there. Mr. Schuman said that the French have special interests and commitments in the Near East and referred to France’s treaty with Turkey which provided for automatic intervention in the event of aggression as well as their special relations with Syria and Lebanon to whom, with U.S. and British approval, the French furnished arms and other types of military cooperation. It was, therefore, essential that France be represented in any conversations about this area. France’s absence from the Malta talks had already received an unfortunate interpretation in Arab countries. The question was not one of prestige but one of substance. Mr. Schuman recalled that in May 1950 a tripartite declaration was made which had excellent results in the Middle East.
Mr. Schuman said that he did not wish to go into detail in regard to what should be done, but he had always believed that the Standing Group1 would play a preponderant role in the common strategy. Today its activities were juridically limited to the NAT area, but there were already the beginnings of a change in this concept since we have allowed the Standing Group to have contact with the Greek and Turkish General Staffs. Also, he said, the Standing Group took the initiative for a conference at Singapore on the Far East. These were examples of the beginning of an evolution which the French Government would like to see continue. He wished the U.S. Government would study this idea and then, in agreement with the British, let the French Government know what can be done along these lines. The French Government was actively studying the extent to which it could contribute to the defense of the Middle East. It already had naval forces, and bases in North Africa, and the question of bases in Tunisia was soon to be raised.
[Page 371]The French Government believed that discussions regarding a coordinated effort must begin now.
The Secretary replied that we had given the French note close study and discussed the matter fully with the Department of Defense. These were, however, very complex questions. We, of course, regret the publicity surrounding the Malta talks to which Mr. Schuman has alluded and in so far as it is our responsibility we have taken steps which we hope will avoid its repetition.
The Secretary said that he agreed with Mr. Schuman about the necessity of having flexibility in our approach to these problems and that there was room for both multilateral and bilateral approaches to them. There are questions which can best be handled bilaterally as shown by the recent Carney-Lambert talks, the Franco-Italian naval talks, General Hamilton’s meeting with the French Air Force, etc. The Secretary said that one of the most pressing aspects of the problem was the very confused command situation in the Mediterranean and the first effort should be made there and the divergent points of view reconciled. It has occurred to us to have a meeting here in Washington soon between French, British and American officials of the Standing Group, but not meeting as the Standing Group. Associated with these officials could be such other personnel as the governments might wish to include in the talks. This meeting would not be prejudiced by the Malta talks. Inquiries had been made regarding the nature of the Malta talks and Admiral Sherman had told us, after checking with Admiral Carney, that this had been a technical meeting between two Commanders of forces stationed in that area regarding certain problems which might arise in case of an attack. It was necessary to appraise the danger of our forces and consider how best to protect them.
If the meeting which we propose takes place the French participants will be informed of the conclusions of the Malta conversations re dangers in that area. The Secretary continued that we all agree that the first effort of the meeting should be to straighten out the Mediterranean defense command situation. The meeting could then discuss the desirability of conducting further meetings to assure the coordination of military questions in the Mediterranean and military matters in the Middle East. The advisability of holding another such meeting in France in the future could also be considered. This would, of course, pose certain problems as other countries will undoubtedly wish to participate in these meetings, such as Italy, Greece, etc. For this reason we should proceed with caution and avoid confusion. Mr. Schuman expressed his agreement.
[Page 372]With regard to the general situation of Middle East defense the Secretary said that the May 1950 declaration was a helpful beginning but did not create strength in the Middle East. The problem was how to increase strength in the area. There were many divisive factors in the Middle East, i.e., Israeli vs. Arabs, etc. Whatever is done in the Middle East must be satisfactory to the local governments. We have studied this problem at some length but have not come up with any brilliant solution as yet.
Mr. Schuman said that Secretary Acheson’s answer had given him full satisfaction. He did not expect a complete solution and the French too would suggest continuing study and the exercise of great caution. A discreet meeting in Washington, he felt, would be the best way to begin. He would so inform his Government and he knew that the French Government would appreciate the Secretary’s suggestion. He was not surprised to find understanding of the French problem here. What France wanted was to bring effective help to the common cause.
Mr. Perkins suggested that, with regard to the time for holding the meeting, it did not seem feasible to hold it for at least another month or six weeks. Our ideas on the subject were not clear and our military want to give it further study. We must also consider what we will say regarding the meeting because of possible difficulties with other countries. We have discussed in principle with the British what the Secretary had outlined and they agree with us.
Mr. Schuman said that the French were in liaison with the British and that the latter had offered to send someone to Paris to inform them with regard to the outcome of the Malta talks. Mr. Schuman smilingly expressed the hope that more discretion would be practiced at the tripartite meeting than had been shown at the bipartite meeting but was not certain that this was possible. He felt that certain quarters in Paris, including some members of the Government, would like to move faster on closer cooperation but he felt sure that his reply would satisfy these people.
Indochina
Mr. Schuman said he would like to discuss frankly the difficulties which the French had run into in the past weeks with regard to Indochina. General de Lattre’s successes had brought about a great improvement in the military, psychological and political situation in Indochina. The General, however, had asked for reinforcements. The French were already finding it difficult simply to maintain their forces at the present levels owing to heavy losses in cadres in January. In February things had gone better but should the Viet Minh launch an offensive there was a risk of very serious gaps. Cadres, namely, officers and non-coms, were the greatest difficulty. [Page 373] It was a question of trained leadership and not a budgetary matter, nor one of matériel. The problem of cadres existed not only in Indochina but in the European forces as well. An added drain on French cadres was the necessity of using Frenchmen to train the Vietnamese army. In Europe instructors were needed also and everything had to be done at the same time. The problem of replacement of losses in Indochina, the creation of the Vietnamese army and of new divisions in Europe had faced the French Government with the necessity of seeking new legislation regarding military service which would change the present duration of military service from 18 months to two years. The French Assembly would naturally be reluctant to vote such a measure on the eve of elections. The new law would involve not only a prolongation of military service to two years but the use of conscripts, in Indochina as well. Therefore, Mr. Schuman felt the French Government must wait for a new parliament to be elected and there will, therefore, be a delay in the forming of European divisions, the Vietnamese army and the reinforcements of the expeditionary corps in the Far East.
The Secretary asked whether the reinforcements of 12 thousand troops to which President Auriol had alluded meant new military units or whether they represented cadres and additional troops. Mr. Schuman replied that the increase in forces, he believed, consisted of some complete units as well as an increase in cadres. At any rate, General de Lattre seemed satisfied. Mr. Schuman said that he had had a personal conversation with General de Lattre and the latter assured him he would have 25 Vietnamese battalions plus cadres fully equipped and ready to fight by July 1, 1952, and that at that time the 12 battalions sent to Indochina would return to France and be put at the disposal of the NATO command.
Mr. Schuman said that we must have confidence in General de Lattre. He has some 300 thousand men under his orders in Indochina and it was hoped that he would be able to do a great deal to rally the Vietnamese to our side.
Mr. Harriman asked Mr. Schuman whether General de Lattre was satisfied with the present schedule of deliveries of U.S. military equipment to Indochina. Mr. Schuman quoted General de Lattre as saying that there was a delay of some three months according to the original schedule but that shipments were arriving regularly and that he was quite satisfied. The delay had occurred at the beginning of the program but things had improved to General de Lattre’s complete satisfaction.
The Secretary said that we shared the encouragement brought about by General de Lattre’s successes. We recognize the French difficulties regarding the problem of troop replacement. A similar [Page 374] problem faced us in Korea. However, it is a matter for the French Government to decide and he was certain that its decision would be a wise one in both the NATO area and Indochina.
In closing Mr. Schuman said that he felt that there was increased solidarity between us on the questions relating to Indochina. Indochina is just as important as Malaya and Korea. Basically the difficulties were similar and required a similar solution.
- Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.↩