Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 107

750G.00/8–2451: Telegram

Leonard Unger , United States Political Adviser to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste ( Winterton ), to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret   priority

Trieste, August 24, 1951—noon.

236. Deptel 136, Aug 4.² Making election postponement conditional on bilateral negotiations provided logical basis for postponement and also gave us means of maintaining some control over situation. If Dept contemplating postponing elections for two months without conditions attached (Deptel 195, Aug 22³), this suggests possible consequences which should be carefully weighed before final decision taken.

What action is contemplated if at end of two months delay there is still no concrete progress toward Italo-Yugo settlement? This eventuality does not seem unlikely especially since admission of Ital weakness implicit in postponement will further strengthen Yugo position. Itals apparently honestly concerned about election outcome and will be, if anything, less inclined to see elections held in Dec than in Oct. Consider it unlikely that they will have used delay constructively to prepare for campaign and believe their “position with electorate will be worse because of admission of weakness. Cannot see that we will have any more reason then than now to refuse postponement since first postponement will not rest on condition that Itals undertake negotiations in interim.

AMG, however, cannot be asked to manufacture administrative reasons for a second postponement. Even first time few persons will be taken in and Independists and Communists will raise clamor about AMG blatantly playing political game for Itals who feared election outcome. Second postponement would inevitably put AMG in position outlined mytel 174, Aug 9.⁴

Obviously, if after two months delay there were concrete evidence of the imminence of a settlement, zone commander could definitely cancel elections on ground that they serve no useful purpose in view impending change in status of zone. If such evidence does not exist, however, believe he will absolutely be obliged proceed with elections.

Brit PolAd and I have discussed foregoing with General Winterton and Brit PolAd cabling FonOff on similar lines.

Unger

1. Repeated priority to Rome, Belgrade, and London.
2. Same as telegram 605 to Rome, Document 101.
3. Same as telegram 1092 to London, Document 105.
4. Document 103.