663.68/8–2351
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia ( Allen ) to the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs ( Barbour ) 1
strictly confidential
Dear Wally : Two days ago Deputy Foreign Minister Vilfan came to see me for a long talk about Trieste. Referring to my conversation with Marshal Tito on August 9,2 he said that following a further talk between the British Ambassador and Tito a few days later, the Yugoslav Government had come to realize that its position regarding Trieste should be clarified to the British and American authorities to avoid any possible misunderstanding. (Comment: It is evident to both Charles Peake and me that Kardelj, Vilfan and the Slovene Government have been after Tito on this matter and feel that his indication of the Yugoslav position to me on August 9 was too generous. While they have not specifically withdrawn what Tito said to me, they now add some further conditions and refinements which give a considerably different picture.)
[Page 237]According to Vilfan, the Yugoslav position remains basically that Zone A should go to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia. Their second alternative would also provide for placing Zone A under Italian sovereignty and Zone B under Yugoslav sovereignty but with provision for autonomous regimes in both zones, with parallel guarantees not only of minority rights but also a considerable measure of local self government. The Yugoslavs feel that this alternative may have certain advantages over their first alternative since it would permit a special status for the Free Territory which could take into consideration its international geographic and economic position. The Yugoslavs feel that every effort should be made to develop the important potentialities of Trieste as an important international port, not only for northeast Italy and northwest Yugoslavia but also for Austria and a considerable amount of goods of central Europe moving to and from the south. (Comment: I myself am impressed by the desirability of doing whatever may be feasible to develop the international geographical position of Trieste and am concerned that the city and harbor, as a mere appendage of Italy, would be likely to become an economically distressed area, leading to possible unrest. Moreover, the more we encourage Austrian trade through Trieste, the less we throw Austria economically, and perhaps politically, into the arms of Germany.)
The third Yugoslav alternative, as now stated, is the worst possible solution, and I have advised the Yugoslavs not to put it forward. They now say that if border rectifications are to take place, the Yugoslavs must insist on all of the predominantly Slovene communes in Zone A, even including those which may lie astride the land route not only from Trieste to Capodistria but also between Trieste and Monfalcone. Thus, while they still offer to give Italy Capodistria, both Capodistria and the City of Trieste itself would become enclaves with communication routes assured to Italy somewhat along the lines of German communication with Danzig across the Polish Corridor. Vilfan readily admitted that this was a highly undesirable solution, which made him hopeful that either the first or second alternatives would be adopted.
This new “explanation” of the Yugoslav position leaves me most pessimistic that any progress in settlement of the Trieste question can be made at the moment. Since this “elucidation” was made in connection with Charles Peake’s conversation with Tito, I am leaving it to him to make the formal report of his talks to London, repeated to Washington, but I am anxious to get off this word to you today. The Yugoslav position will probably be subjected to further refinements and I hope it has not yet entirely crystallized.
Sincerely,