Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 108

750G.00/8–2851

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs ( Byington ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Perkins ) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State ( Bonbright ) for European Affairs¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 28, 1951.

Subject: Italo-Yugoslav Conversations Regarding Trieste²

Mr. Luciolli said that the Foreign Office had become concerned that the British were under the impression that conversations between Italy and Yugoslavia were being made impossible because of Italian obstructionism and that, in fact, Italy did not want to negotiate with Yugoslavia. The Foreign Office had accordingly instructed the Italian Embassy in London to inform the British Government in strictest confidence with regard to the following:

Recently Count Sforza had authorized an unnamed Italian representative, acting in a private capacity, to converse with an unnamed Yugoslav representative, also acting in a private capacity, with regard to possibility of direct negotiations between the two governments in order to reach a compromise solution regarding Trieste. It was understood furthermore that if there were any leak to the press, the conversations would be denied by both Italy and Yugoslavia. The two representatives met and had a full and frank exchange of views. From this exchange it developed that Italy was anxious to reach a solution based on ethnic lines which would include some concessions in Zone A in return for the Italian coastal portion of Zone B. The Yugoslav representative stated with complete sincerity that the only basis upon which Yugoslavia could negotiate would be on minor rectifications of the present demarkation line betweenZones A and B plus return to Yugoslavia of certain Slovene areas in Zone A. The Foreign Office found that the changes in the demarkation line were insignificant and it was mutually decided between the representatives that there was no basis to justify further conversations. The conversations were accordingly dropped and nothing further has developed.

Mr. Luciolli had been instructed to inform us in strictest confidence of this Italian communication to the British Government.

1. Also sent to Reinhardt of EE and the Embassy in Italy.
2. For information concerning these secret conversations in London during July 1951, see chapter 16 of Carlo Sforza’s book Cinque Anni A Palazzo Chigi (Rome, Atlante, 1952).