460.509/7–651: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
15. Fol is brief summary report of McCloy–Adenauer meeting July 5 and executive session HICOM Council July 6:
I. In a two and a half hour meeting with Chancellor last night I gave him a report of my trip home, stressing opinion re Germany, confirmation of our general policy and Germany’s defense contribution.
[Here follow discussions of controls on East-West trade and reorganization of the German steel industry.]
As regards Germany’s military contribution I emphasized importance attached by US to necessity for speed and our disappointment at lack of progress on both sides of Rhine. In US it was clearly recognized that no defense of Western Europe was possible without German contribution. Defense east of Rhine must be bolstered by German participation. Petersberg report2 gave basis for hope that further compromises were possible. US prepared sincerely and objectively to support concept of Europe army since:
- (1)
- It is anxious to remove French objections to Ger military contribution;
- (2)
- Concept of European army is in harmony with US long-range policy of closer association for Europe and is akin to Schuman Plan and federation of Europe, which have US support; and
- (3)
- It is evident that no single country has resources to defend itself but that Europe together has the resources adequate for real defense against East.
US is, therefore prepared to support European army provided that practical force can be created and created quickly. I urged therefore that Paris report be concluded without delay and placed before govts so that it could be considered along with Petersberg report. It was essential from US point of view, in view of probable Ministers meeting in Sept,3 that ground be cleared before this meeting, both politically and militarily.
As regards Germany’s future polit status; which US recognizes is one of important elements in bringing about defense contribution, US is prepared to go very far in transfer of sovereignty to Germany. Before reaching its final decision, however, it is important that we shld ascertain Germany’s views regarding extent to which its own interests will be served by complete transfer which wld naturally involve a lessening of Allied and particularly US responsibility. It is particularly important for us to ascertain to what extent we shld reserve possibilities of intervention in event of a coup d’état or similar development beyond powers of FedGovt to control or in event of revival of totalitarianism.
Adenauer then talked at considerable length concerning importance of solving problem of Germany’s military contribution without delay. It was clear that present Russian policy is to bring about neutralization and demilitarization of Germany. This has been confirmed by recent events including activities of Pushkin in Berlin. According to Chancellor only through a solution of defense contribution can Soviet objectives of neutralization and demilitarization of Germany be blocked. Furthermore, Chancellor believed that unsatisfactory NATO preparations are explainable in part because other European countries are convinced that no defense of Europe is possible without Ger contribution. In his opinion psychological situation in Germany had never been more favorable for solution of this problem. SPD, only party that has not taken favorable attitude, has been shaken by attitudes taken in Socialist Congress in Frankfort and Trade Union Congress in Dusseldorf.
If, however, advantage is not taken of present psychological position a sense of discouragement may again slow up progress and the whole system of defense fall apart.
It was clear to Chancellor that, as regards composition of Germany’s future forces, mil rather than polit considerations should prevail. In Petersberg agreement had been reached, but in Paris they do not yet appear to have grappled the most important points. Chancellor then [Page 1489] expressed strong support for concept of Eur army. He pointed out that North Atlantic army is created to answer present requirements, whereas Eur army should be created for long-range requirements. Chancellor believed that it was possible to find solution by adjusting Paris report to the Petersberg. He said he was sending Blank to Paris to see if this could not be done quickly and asked for US support in bringing this about. Although he was discouraged by Fr attitude he thought that if US could support the reasonable elements in France it would be possible to bring Paris negots to an early conclusion. Whereas Eur army is necessary, Germany’s contribution should not be made dependent upon result of Paris meetings if they do not reach an early settlement. In conclusion he again emphasized importance from point of view of US policy to block Russian efforts to neutralize Germany, since if this was brought about there could be no hope for Eur defense.
As regards Germany’s future polit status Adenauer said that in Bundestag foreign affairs comite there had been recent discussion of this problem during course of which he had pointed out that whereas as much as possible of occupation law should be replaced by contractual arrangements, he did not believe it should be eliminated completely, since provisions should be made to take care of Berlin situation, the Eastern question, the Saar and possibilities of unrest. According to Chancellor even SPD members of comite agreed that certain phases of occupation rights should be preserved for Germany’s own protection. Chancellor hoped to be able to send us a formula without delay.
[Here follows a discussion of the so-called Kemritz case.]
I was impressed by Chancellor’s resolve to get ahead with problem of Ger rearmament and his apparent support for concept of a Eur army if such could be worked out practically and promptly. He seemed convinced that this was possible if the US was prepared to continue to give its full support and to intervene actively in bringing about his conclusion.4
II. In Executive session of Council, I reported in considerable detail my Washington visit and discussion with Adenauer reported above.
[Here follow references to the questions of reorganization of the German steel industry and dissolution of the Deutsche Kohle Verein.]
- Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Frankfurt.↩
- Regarding the report on the technical discussions conducted at Bonn concerning the question of a German defense contribution, dated June 6, see footnote 2, p. 1047.↩
- For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington in September, see pp. 1163 ff.↩
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For another account of this conversation, see Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 354–357.
Following his meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, McCloy met with Schumacher to brief him on his trip to Washington. McCloy characterized the meeting: as his “usual unsatisfactory conversation with Schumacher” who “reiterated his old arguments concerning necessity for creating Allied Forces sufficiently strong to insure [that Germany would] not become battlefield of next war.” (Telegram 23 from Bonn, July 7, 762A.00/7–751)
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