398.10–GDC/6–3051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt1

secret

108. Points mentioned ur 10702, June 30, rptd London 947, Paris 1069,2 were discussed at length with McCloy in Wash.3 Our present thinking is that it wld be unwise attempt maintain right preserve democratic and federal system in Ger under contractual agreements, either by retaining reserved power to veto amendments to Basic Law, as Fr suggest, or by making the return of auth to FedRep specifically conditional upon contractual commitment to maintain democracy, with intention enforce this condition through Disputes Comm. We do not see how we can retain specific right to control anti-democratic and anti-federal mainfestations in Ger, and at same time give Gers either approx natl equality or “substantial freedom” mentioned at Brussels. We believe that among few reasons for retaining ult sovereignty will be right station troops in Ger which will carry with it implicit right of unilateral action protect security Allied forces from serious threat arising from hostile mil or polit developments outside or inside FedRep. It is our conviction that fol conclusion of contractual agreements we shld fundamentally rely on intention and capability of Gers maintain basic democracy (bearing particularly in mind various internatl factors influencing FedRep towards western community, such as Schuman Plan, presence of NATO troops, and need for collective defense, coupled with “emergency” right to take unilateral action mentioned above.

Requiring Ger Govt to sign contractual arrangements subjecting Ger to outright control to insure democracy wld expose Fed Govt to attacks from extremist groups which wld additionally endanger Ger acceptance of contractual arrangements and wld weaken effectiveness [Page 1487] of Ger Govt. In any event we anticipate that real test of democracy may not arise for 5 to 10 years and do not consider it politically possible to plan to keep Ger Govt under outside controls for so long a period.

In this matter, as in all other aspects of contractual relationships, it is necessary bear in mind comparison which will inevitably be made with Jap treaty, in which there will be no contractual agreement review Jap actions to assure maintenance democratic system.

We also have serious doubts re proposed Disputes Comm, since it wld have power suspend or annul Ger legis and its decisions wld be enforced by unilateral Allied action. See further our paper commenting on HICOG position paper “Methods of Enforcing Contractual Commitments” which was sent to Fkft on McCloy plane.4

Above shld of course be read in context Wash talks with McCloy.

Acheson
  1. This telegram, drafted by Calhoun and Auchincloss and cleared by Lewis, was repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.
  2. Supra.
  3. McCloy had returned to Washington on July 3.
  4. Neither printed.