Bonn Mission files, lot 311, D(51) 771
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)
Dear Hank: This is in reply to your two letters of May 15,1 and 21,2 dealing with the Declaration of Intention and Interim Agreement. Subsequent consideration has led us to the conclusion that any debate now over a choice between the two is fruitless because a defense contribution will not be obtained until definite understanding has been reached on the terms of such a contribution and of most of the contractual agreements. Let me analyze the situation step by step.
1. It seems perfectly evident that the Germans are not going to make a defense contribution until they know what it is to be and what limitations will be imposed on them by NATO. They will have to be satisfied that the forces which they contribute are so organized and supported that they will be militarily effective and they will have to be satisfied of German “equality”. In this second aspect I do not think that they will insist that every limitation upon them be imposed equally upon every other NATO country but they will insist upon similarity of treatment in respect to some major items. The Council is today forwarding the report of the military talks with the Germans.3 They have agreed [to] its terms with the Germans so that an identical report will be made to the Occupation governments and to the Chancellor. The Germans have stated their position very specifically and bluntly. I do not believe that their position is as rigid as their proposed language would suggest and expect that they will subsequently be willing to make compromises but it is quite evident that the NATO position taken last December will not produce a German defense contribution through NATO. The answer to these difficulties may lie in the European Army concept which may provide a better means to reconcile French and German views than revision of the NATO directive.
When I say that we must have an understanding with the German leaders I do not mean that we must have progressed to the point of a final detailed agreement in legal form, but the principles and the major details must be settled. No general representations to them will produce a defense contribution.
2. This defense contribution still will not be forthcoming until we have a definite understanding with the Germans on the scope of the new relationship based on the contractual agreements. The Germans [Page 1483] have insisted on “equality”, which seems to mean to them the exercise of the attributes of sovereignty. Any German action on defense must have a big majority to support it. This means that the SPD has to be brought into camp. To accomplish this our proposals must be sufficiently definite so that the Germans will know what they are being offered. If they are not definite Schumacher will simply raise so many questions about the terms of each proposed agreement that he will confuse the issue and divert attention from the main subject, and there will be no hope of getting the SPD fraction to reverse his course. We will have brought the debate over the terms of the agreement into the Bundestag through the back door before those terms are ready for discussion and will risk the premature establishment of a Bundestag position on the final terms less favorable than we could have reached through orderly negotiation.
3. Although in view of these facts neither an Interim Agreement nor a Declaration of Intention will obtain a German defense contribution, this does not mean that an interim document would not be useful to hasten the process of reaching contractual arrangements. Indeed we have felt all along that the initial purpose of a Declaration of Intention would be to serve as a vehicle, first, to work out more quickly an agreed statement of our own policy including the views of the Defense Department and EUCOM: secondly, as a catalyst to get Tripartite agreement; and third, to get the thinking of the Chancellor. If it attained these ends it would have been useful even if it never became public. One of the difficulties now is that there is no clear framework within which the thirty-nine points fit into their proper places. As a result the perspective for making decisions has been lacking.
4. The first step toward our ultimate goal seems to me clearly such an agreement on U.S. policy. I think HICOG and State Department views are sufficiently near together so that we could get along for awhile without any formal agreed statement but it is clear that EUCOM and the Defense Department have an equal interest in the subject. Basically what is needed therefore is a common concept of the future status of the present occupation forces and if you could reach an agreement on this with the Defense Department and they would issue such new directives to EUCOM as are necessary, it would prove most helpful.
5. If we agree on U.S. policy we then come to the problem of French and British delay. The British have definitely not been anxious to proceed expeditiously, perhaps due to the attitude of the Labor Party’s left wing. The French are in no position to proceed until after the elections and the establishment of a stable government, if that proves possible. If not they will face another election. We face the possibility of weeks and even months of delay before we can expect French or even British agreement to effective action.
[Page 1484]We will try in the meantime to get them to discuss the subjects and reach decisions for future use but even this is not certain. Apparently they are ready for discussions with the Germans on subjects which have no great political significance. On the others it appears that at best they are willing to listen to German statements but not to reply. Under any such procedure, of course, we will not have reached definite understandings with the Germans which are necessary and indeed we will have confirmed the suspicion held by many of the Germans that we are simply stalling and do not intend in good faith to make them substantial equals in the European partnership.
Finally, there is evidence that there may be Tripartite differences which must be settled at governmental level. The French here seem to want to go along with our concept to a substantial degree but it is becoming clearer that influential elements in the Quai D’Orsay place a different interpretation on Brussels than we do and are working more toward another revision of our existing powers than toward a basic change in the occupation status. I call your attention also to Paris’ 7802 of 20 May to the Department (952 to Frankfort)4 indicating the inherent opposition of the Quai D’Orsay to our ideas for progress.
6. We can not afford months of delay. On the one hand the defense contribution itself is urgent; on the other the situation here in Germany is deteriorating. In addition to the cable reports which you have had, I am disturbed over the report of our public opinion survey which shows a marked decrease in the readiness of the West German people to participate in an Atlantic Pact Army. Last October 63% of those polled favored participation with 30% opposed. Today 43% are in favor and 33% opposed. Bonn has recently reported FDP skepticism of our good faith in substituting contractual arrangements for the Occupation Statute. Other straws in the wind point in the same direction.
7. In the light of these factors the question is now, how best to proceed. The first and immediate problem is to get an agreed paper stating U.S. policy and then on the basis of that to seek French and British agreement to that statement of policy. For this purpose I think our Declaration of Intention offers the best starting point, since it is a little more specific than your paper. It must, however, have material revision which we are undertaking in the light of the foregoing and of your comments.
We do not need at this stage to decide whether eventually the paper will take the form of a Declaration of Intention or an Interim Agreement or something entirely different. That can be decided when we [Page 1485] raise the matter with the Chancellor and in the light of circumstances then existing.
I may perhaps already be in the States by the time you receive this but comments which you can send to Frankfurt will be extremely helpful.5
Sincerely yours,
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Supra.↩
- Regarding the report of the technical discussions conducted at Bonn concerning the question of a German Defense Contribution, dated June 6, see footnote 2, p. 1047.↩
- Not printed; in it Bruce reported that the French had objections to and misgivings about the draft declaration of intention which might result in a considerable delay in its consideration. (762A.00/5–2051)↩
- McCloy departed for Washington on June 10 for consultations on Germany.↩