Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.00/5–2151

The Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy), at Frankfurt¹

secret

Washington, May 21, 1951.

Dear McCloy: I have given further thought to the draft Declaration of Intention, which was enclosed with Sam’s letter of May 8.²

I think there is a fundamental difference of approach which I may not have brought out sharply enough in my letter of May 15.³

The Brussels Agreement was deliberately vague in describing the status of “substantial freedom” to be granted to Germany, if the German Government undertook to participate militarily in Western Defense arrangements. This was due partly to the brief time available to the three Governments to bring their respective positions into harmony. It was also due to a belief that the German Government itself should participate in the definition of this status, thus avoiding the impression that we were confronting the German Government with an Allied proposal on a take-it-or-have-it basis.

I am still concerned, however, that the process of working out the new relationship with the British and the French and with the German Government may prove to be far more time-consuming and difficult than we had anticipated. The time-table suggested by the British at Bonn does not reflect the urgency of the situation, particularly when we consider the additional lapse of time that will necessarily follow a decision on the part of the Germans to contribute military forces to a European Army in terms of the actual formation of military units. I also have a feeling that we may be slipping back into the type of negotiations which took place in Berlin and in London from June 1948 until March 1949, which preceded the April 1949 Foreign Ministers Meeting at which agreement was reached on the Occupation Statute.⁴ The paper on “methods of enforcing contractual commitments”⁵ brings to mind the court which it was proposed to establish to permit the Germans to litigate exercises of powers by the Allies, a proposal which was a source, at that time, of long controversy.

In suggesting an agreement along the lines of the proposal I sent to you in my letter of May 15, I had in mind a radical shift in tactics. I propose that we definitely commit ourselves to take a series of steps which would establish Germany on a basis of “substantial freedom”, in return for agreement on the part of the Germans to enter promptly into military association with Western Defense. This would Shift the negotiations from the present discussions of the content of the contractual arrangements to be elaborated to the more fundamental question of what form our ultimate relations with Germany will take. Instead of having this relationship emerge as a sum total of the outcome of negotiations of the 39 separate topics being worked out with the Germans, we would make the question of the form of relationship the main negotiation, and relegate such of the 39 topics as may require contractual agreements to a subsidiary status flowing from the basic agreement.

In following this approach we would hope to accomplish the following results:

1. To give the German Government a basis for promptly agreeing to participate militarily in defense, and to take measures immediately to implement this decision.

2. To reach agreement with the French and British as to the next steps to be taken in Germany, so that we can be confident in discussions with the Soviets that we are in agreement as to our future plans.

3. To provide a framework for working out expeditiously the contractual arrangements which need to be covered.

In providing the German Government with a basis for proceeding promptly with military preparations, I am counting on the fact that in a spelling out of the ultimate relationship which Germany will have with the Allies we are making a substantial step forward toward meeting the wishes of the German Government. I do not believe we should make this commitment unless we get something tangible from the Germans in return. For that reason, I would be reluctant to put our position forward as a unilateral declaration of principles, without receiving a commitment from the Germans in return. I also believe from discussions here on the Hill that this would be a big point with Congress.

Furthermore, I believe that the final negotiation of this document at the level of the Foreign Ministers may give Adenauer sufficient prestige to assist him in obtaining the necessary ratification from the Bundestag.

In regard to my second point, I believe that during the difficult negotiations with the Soviets in which we are already involved, and in which we may become even more deeply involved, it would be useful, and almost essential, to sharpen our common policy with the British and French and agree upon our future course of action. This will give more meaning to the negotiations we may have with the Soviets, and if such negotiations prove fruitless, will permit us rapidly to move ahead after we are disengaged.

In regard to the third point, I believe we cannot prevent the contractual arrangements from proliferating into an unduly complicated and restrictive body of agreements resulting in a less desirable relationship than we originally intended unless we first agree among the four Governments as to the relationship we wish to see ultimately established. Similarly, I believe the contractual arrangements with respect to financial and economic support of the Allied troops can best be negotiated, only after we have arrived at a clear definition of the mission of Allied forces in Germany after contractual arrangements come into effect.

There are two difficulties which attach to my proposal. The first is that the German Government may refuse to commit itself until it is satisfied that the contractual arrangements will be worked out in an acceptable form. If this proves to be the case (which we are inclined to doubt here), we will not be any worse off than we are at the present time. The other difficulty is almost the reverse of the first. It could be felt that in signing an agreement in principle along the lines I have suggested, we will weaken our own position, tactically if not legally, in working out the contractual arrangements, since the Germans would feel that we would be committed to a sharp cut-off of our programs, rather than an orderly phasing out, such as we intend. It seems to me that there is a balance of risks which under the circumstances both the Allies and the Germans must take, and that there must be a measure of confidence on both sides that the contractual arrangements can be worked out fairly and satisfactorily. I feel we would do much better staying entirely away from an enumeration of the subjects to be covered by contractual relations, since once opened up it would seem to me inevitable that we would be maneuvered into a detailed negotiation of each topic before reaching agreement on basic principles.

There are other difficulties which have been brought to my attention in regard to the draft. I will take them up in a separate letter, since I am anxious to bring to your attention the problem of negotiating tactics which I believe may be of paramount importance.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Byroade

1. The letter was drafted by Margolies.

2. No copy of Samuel Reber’s letter has been found in Department of State files. With regard to the enclosed draft Declaration of Intention, Reber had previously transmitted such a document on February 10. Its text read as follows:

   “The conclusion of arrangements for a German contribution to Western defense will create a new situation, as a natural consequence of which the Allies will wish to adjust the relationship between themselves and the Federal Government. They are ready to proceed thereto by contractual arrangements which will be binding on both parties.

   Preliminary studies to this end are under way.” Enclosure 3 to despatch 2609 from Frankfurt, February 10, not printed (762A.0221/2–1051)

3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. For documentation on the meetings of the three Western Foreign Ministers at Washington during April 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 156 ff.
5. Not printed.