Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

033.62A11/2–1751: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

secret

Washington, February 23, 1951—7 p. m.

5803. Urtel 6833 Feb 17.² Fol is summary of discussion between Ger Bundestag Delegs and members of Dept, Cong, Defense, ODM, ECA, etc. Memos of conversation with the Secy State, Secy Defense, Dir ODM airpouched to you several days ago. Complete summary all important conversations, incl 3-hour conversation with Byroade last night will be airpouched few days.³

German rearmament

By far most important subj of concern to Gers was subj defense contribution. All members expressed solidarity 98% Ger people with West, said Ger prepared make contribution under fol conditions: (a) Repeal of Occ Stat⁴ giving Gers substantial polit equality including complete “autonomy” in internal affairs; (b) Increase in Allied Military strength in Ger (SPD mentioned 10–15 Divisions) to provide protective screen or umbrella permitting safe development Ger defense plans. Gers, especially Luetkens, expressed view FedRep already making substantial economic contribution to defense by assuming burden of refugees thrust upon them from East.

Secy told Gers he fully understood their problem and determined to do his part to bring about solution. Said US and other free nations trying achieve fol objectives: (a) Do everything in our power prevent another war; (b) Prevent Russians from bringing other parts of free world under their control without war; (c) Building armed strength sufficient to defend free world if Russians attack. Emphasized necessity for all free nations make joint effort and move forward together. Re changed polit status Secy said necessary decisions made by FonMins at New York⁵ and Brussels.⁶ All remained was to implement them. Best way to speed progress was to reach agreement on various concrete issues as we came to them. Secy told Gers we wld work diligently to remove all obstacles to common defense starting with isolationism at home and ending with urging Eur nations to do their full share. Referred to Ger demand for additional military forces as least difficult question raised during conversation, altho some opposition must be overcome before final answer can be given. Gers gratified by hour and quarter visit with Secy altho SPD Delegs thought Secy cautious on questions Ger participation in defense. Ollenhauer drew conclusion Fr position Ger rearmament being given great weight by US to detriment building strong defense with Ger contribution. Also expressed fear we were delaying on Ger participation until we saw what developed in CFM.⁷ Ollenhauer impressions these points fully corrected in subsequent conference with Byroade.

During interview with Secy Marshall group, after reaffirming solidarity with West again advanced idea of protective umbrella at Elbe and inquired where Ger was to procure arms and equip necessary for defense. Marshall ignored statements by Gers re protective umbrella and outlined in some detail our plans for industrial expansion including plans for rapid expansion in event emergency. Said production effort geared to provide as soon as possible equip necessary to meet MAP requirements adding that 5 billion wld be spent for fon mil aid before July and that part of FY 52 budget of $70 billion wld be allocated for same purpose.

In interview with Charles Wilson, latter briefed Gers on problems he faces as Dir ODM. Pointed out that allocation scarce raw material between production end-use items and building up of productive capacity was perhaps most urgent problem. Traced development plans for increasing production all defense items next two years to point where US will have adequate war supplies for major war if necessary. When Wilson inquired about Ger industrial capacity Deleg replied potential Ger contribution to Eur defense severely limited by restrictions placed on industry by Occ Powers. Gers mentioned in particular limitation on steel capacity, prohibition Aluminum production, and controls on shipbuilding. Wilson ackd lack of info about polit aspects of Ger situation but stated from production angle he agreed restrictions not absolutely necessary for security reasons shld be lifted to allow max Ger contribution.

In similar conversations with House FonAffs and SenFonRel Comites Gers rptd assurance of solidarity with West and stressed necessity for abolishing Occ Stat and replacing it with contractual relationship between Ger and 3-Powers if essential psychological conditions were to be created.⁸ Gers said it might take 2 years before Ger cld make max contribution since Ger now completely demilitarized. Added that cadres upon which to build even small force not available and no money cld be appropriated to speed their formation until Occ Stat withdrawn. Expressed no desire to build up Ger army of old nationalistic type with politically-minded gen staff. Insisted Ger entry into Atlantic Pact or Eur army must be on basis complete self-respect and equality. Sen Connally summed up remarks of each of Sens in FonRel Oomite by stating they cld feel assured of US friendliness and cld count on our support with understanding this wld be forthcoming only so long as we felt Ger people doing utmost defend and help selves and contributing strength and gen welfare of Eur.

In 3-hour mtg with group yesterday Byroade recapitulated thinking in US re Ger rearmament, explaining divergence of views on subj. Advised Gers unfortunate they had advanced certain preconditions to participation which placed us in position having to buy Ger participation. When questioned whether contractual arrangements wld have to be completed in detail before Ger participation Ollenhauer replied he wld be satisfied with Allied statement of basic principle announcing changed relationship with details to be worked out later. Byroade replied such a statement issued at Brussels and referred to subjs cited urdespatch 2609 Feb 10⁹ to be advanced as basis for discussion. Byroade expressed view Gers wanted unilateral action on part of Allies without making any commitments themselves. He urged Gers to get together among selves so that complete will of Ger people can be marshalled for defense effort.

Contractual relations

Main line of Ger thinking this subj outlined in above discussion of Ger participation Eur defense. In discussions re new polit relationship at Georgetown Univ all Bundestag members agreed new status must be created and that US must take lead in pushing other two Occ powers toward this objective. All agreed peace treaty at this time undesirable. Some difference apparent between Govt Coalition Members and SPD over extent Occ powers shld relinquish auth. As expected SPD felt relinquishment of Allied auth shld be more sweeping, but even they recognized need for special Allied auth. All members urged Gers be given complete control of internal affairs. Agreed that FonAffrs and military matters presented special considerations which cld be covered by contractual agreements. Generally, Gers felt new polit relationship cld be established by simple act and seemed to show little understanding of complexity of problems involved in establishing new relationship. Later in conversation with Byroade Luetkens and Brentano stated Gers cld not profitably negotiate with 3 HICOMS because of well known differences among them. Ollenhauer rptd request for statement of principle on new polit relationship at this time which he felt wld strengthen hand of 3 Powers in forthcoming 4 Power Mtg if conference materializes. Gers apparently feel that Brussels decision may be outdated by prospects of different solution to Ger problem in CFM. Also for personal polit reasons may wish to return to Ger with claim they have obtained new concessions from US of vital import to interests of Ger people. Byroade indicated no change in Brussels decision and dispelled idea that Ger might become bargaining point in CFM. Said we look upon CFM mtg from standpoint of keeping in step with Gers and expect to consult them constantly where their interests are involved.

Schuman Plan and Eur Integration¹⁰

This subj brought up nr of conversations. Secy expressed strong hope that Schuman Plan wld soon become a reality. Stressed importance reaching early agreement on remaining issues. When functioning Plan wld do much to further Eur integration and understanding. Brentano said he was for Schuman Plan but preferred constitutional rather than functional approach to bring about Eur integration. Expressed conviction people of Western Eur ready to go much farther toward polit integration than their Govts. Feeling still strong but fears it will languish if not translated into action. Euler in discussion with Lewis said Gers must be allowed to retain DKV at least for period of time after Schuman Plan goes into operation. Said absolutely necessary to have allocation agency to insure equitable allocation when coal in short supply. Stated Fr already have such an agency since their mines under Govt controls. After 2–3 years operation Schuman Plan Euler believed possible to abolish DKV. Lewis replied we recognized necessity for some machinery for allocation in times short supply, but thought this machinery shld not be in hands of producers as wld be case if DKV continued to operate. Lewis expressed view all necessary machinery provided in high auth of Schuman Plan. Lewis concluded discussion this subj with statement stressing great importance of quick initialing Plan as indication to all the world that Fr and Gers on way to settlement of differences that have divided world so long. In subsequent conversation with Dept officer Luetkens stated SPD had decided to oppose Schuman Plan categorically. Indicated that trade union movement, particularly metal workers and coal miners’ unions, wld swing around to same point of view. Luetkens doubted that Adenauer wld submit Plan to Bundestag where he said it wld be beaten by vote of SPD plus portion FDP representing Ruhr interests opposed to Plan. Luetkens expressed usual arguments that US decartelization and deconcentration policies under Law 27¹¹ were playing directly into hands Fr interests who envisaged Schuman Plan primarily as mechanism insure permanent Fr industrial hegemony over Continent at expense Ger’s heavy industry. In conversation with Congressman Richards, Luetkens said SPD wld continue opposition to Schuman Plan unless (a) Ruhr auth abolished (b) PLI restrictions removed (c) DKV retained and (d) Saar as industrial area became part of Ger regional area.¹² In final discussions subj here Byroade expressed view steel interests were attempting to hold on to coking coal and coal supplies sufficient for any eventuality. If attitude contd Plan doomed to failure. Byroade said need for successful conclusion to Plan too important to argue about few percentages of coal one way or other. Admonished Gers to think long and hard before they shld let Schuman Plan fail.

Other Topics of Conversation

Believe above represent really important issues discussed by Gers during US visit. Other subjs of conversation such as codetermination, refugee problem, Berlin,¹³ Communist strength in Ger, comparative SovZone and Fed Rep living standards, Landsberg decisions,¹⁴ isolationism in US, visits to Ford, Gen Motors plants and UN, and discussions with US Labor leaders fol by pouch. Gers departed NY City PanAm flight 122, 10 a m Friday. Arriving Fkft 11:45 a m Feb 24. Pabsch departing TWA flight 962, 3 p m Feb 28, arriving Fkft noon Mar 1. Pabsch did outstanding job, working day and night entire visit. Deserves high commendation.

Fkft pass Bonn.

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Hay and cleared by Lewis.
2. Not printed; it asked for specific details on the positions taken by the members of the Bundestag during their visit to the United States (033.62A11/2–1751).
3. The following members of the Bundestag visited the United States from February 8 to 23; Erich Ollenhauer, Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Party; Gerhard Luetkens, National Secretary of the Social Democratic Party; Heinrich von Brentano, member of the Executive of the Christian Democratic Union; Hermann Puender, member of the Christian Democratic Union; Hans Muehlenfeld, caucus leader of the Deutsche Party; and August Euler, caucus leader of the Free Democratic Party. During their stay in the United States the members on the delegation visited Detroit, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington. An itinerary of their visit and memoranda of their conversations with various governmental officers are in file 762A.00/2–1251.
4. For documentation concerning the revision of the Occupation Statute for Germany, see pp. 1410 ff.
5. For documentation on the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France at New York, September 12–19, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1108 ff.
6. For documentation on the decisions reached at Brussels, December 18 and 19, 1950, see ibid., pp. 585 ff. and vol. iv, pp. 65 ff.
7. For documentation on the Four-Power Exploratory talks at Paris, March 5–June 21, see pp. 1086 ff.
8. For documentation on the negotiations for a new contractual relationship between the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic, see pp. 1446 ff.
9. Not printed.
10. For documentation on the Schuman Plan and European integration, see volume iv .
11. For the text of Allied High Commission Law No. 27, “Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries,” dated May 16, 1950, and the schedules and regulations thereto, see Laws, Regulations, Directives and Decisions, vol. i, pp. 155 ff.
12. For documentation on U.S. interest in the status of the Saar, see pp. 1970 ff.
13. For further documentation on Berlin, see pp. 1828 ff.
14. “For a brief account of the decision by McCloy on January 31 concerning the review of the sentences of the German War Criminals in Landsberg prison, in which seven death sentences were not commuted, see Sixth Quarterly Report on Germany, January 1–March 31, 1951, pp. 40–53.