Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

611.62A/1–551: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Frankfurt, January 5, 1951.

5443. US policy in Germany clearly enters year 1951 facing extremely difficult problems in implementation of Brussels decisions, both re obtaining German defense contribution and negotiation of new partnership status for FedRep vis-à-vis Western occupation powers.² Viewed from standpoint of internal political situation, following factors appear paramount.

It seems clear that neither of the above goals, which together constitute Western Powers’ major current objective in FedRep, can be attained, in any case securely, without SPD participation and approval in addition to that of present coalition government. Main problem here is undoubtedly that of Schumacher’s attitude. Question is whether there are any prospects of his recognizing seriousness of present world situation to extent of abandoning or at least easing his tactics, which in recent months have dominated entire political scene, of “ohne mich” re defense and continuing demands against western powers, with objective of undermining Adenauer Government, coming to power himself and obtaining every possible concession from Allies for Germany.

From this viewpoint, Schumacher’s latest ideas as expressed to US High Commissioner December 23 (Frankfort’s 5247 to Department December 27³) certainly do not appear promising. His private declaration of possible willingness to accept “neutralization” as price for German unification is rather surprising in view of past SPD views this subject. While his December 18 interview carried Bonn Generalanzeiger (mentioned briefly item (b) Bonn’s 417 to Department, December 22³) hinted at such possibility, Department will have noted contrary statement which has evidently meanwhile appeared il Tempo (item (f) Bonn’s 422 to Department December 29³) and, in December 28 conversation with a HICOG representative in Bonn, Schumacher made substantially same point, adding that “neutrality is at present an illusion and there is no need to (even) discuss it.”

Schumacher New Year’s statement (Bonn’s 425 of December 30 to Department³) denounced Grotewohl letter⁴ as Soviet tactic create advantageous conditions for Four-Power talks⁵ with hoped for result Soviet monopolistic control over all Germany. Thus Grotewohl maneuver really obstacle to genuine unification Germany on free basis Schumacher stressed German role in battle for unification as of increasing significance, and need impress on Allies and free world necessity for German unity and freedom precluding further Soviet exploitation and dominance East Zone and as vital for all free Europe and world democracy.⁶

In light this latest emphasis taken in conjunction December 23 talks with U.S. High Commissioner it may be surmised that in Schumacher’s thinking neutrality concept is linked with notion of reunited Germany so strong it can maintain independence of action between East and West. He seems fully aware that neutrality plus weakness would mean quick absorption all Germany in Soviet sphere. He may desire push hard bargain with West in hope of winning further economic and military aid while staving off irrevocable decision on German participation defense until situation of strength securely established. Once this objective is achieved he might hope to push with some prospect of success for a free, united Germany in position exercise some freedom of choice which then would presumably favor West, at least in spirit of benevolent neutrality if not with outright assistance. This line of reasoning, if followed by Schumacher, represents, of course, optimum which he may have little real expectation of attaining under the circumstances.

It seems possible, however, that his new emphasis on unity and neutralization may at this juncture represent just another tactical development in Schumacher’s continuing basic opposition to German defense contribution under present circumstances. In any case, his other remarks made December 23 suggest this conclusion is still justified, i.e., that SPD will continue oppose such contribution until full equality attained both within common defense organization and as regards FedRep’s general political status, until western powers have deployed considerably greater military forces in Western Germany, and at same time plaguing Adenauer coalition with demands for new elections and amendment basic law. It also seems possible that SPD will refuse commit itself at all pending further clarification whether four power conference will in fact be held and if so pending its outcome. Moreover, SPD clearly has its sights on coming lower Saxony Landtag elections, inter alia with view to subsequently increasing its influence in Bundesrat, which might eventually permit it to hamstring Fed government pretty effectively (Frankfort’s 4694 to Department December 5⁷).

On positive side of ledger, available evidence indicates clearly there are forces within SPD which may increasingly rebel against continuing negative and essentially party-political tactics at this critical juncture. Coming SPD Berlin Parteitag may throw some light on possibilities along this line, and strengthen such forces in Western German party organization. Furthermore, Schumacher’s tactics of opposition and criticism are gradually getting him into a position which leaves little in way of practical alternatives, and which seems more and more likely to impress thoughtful Germans as unrealistic and unreasonable.

Problem of developing necessary broad common “foreign policy front” between Government coalition and SPD opposition for coming negotiations with HICOM is closely related to: Continuing rivalry and animosity between two main individuals concerned (Adenauer and Schumacher), and whole question of “grand coalition” prospects. First factor unfortunately continues to have considerable effect on Western German political development and is bound to hamper coming negotiations. And while there is much evidence that sentiment has been growing within ranks of present coalition (and to lesser extent within SPD) in favor of “grand coalition” as only way to solve basic and critical issues now arising, there is still no sign that either Chancellor or Schumacher is as yet prepared to seriously strive for such Government, and in fact each evidently still regards the other as obstacle which precludes possibility of such coalition. Furthermore, Schumacher apparently convinced that time is working for him and he can eventually get much more by not entering any “grand coalition” at this time.

A further but not unimportant factor may, of course, result from Adenauer’s chronic indisposition to consult with members of his Cabinet and Bundestag in matters of vital policy, though HICOM will do everything possible to impress upon him necessity of proceeding more carefully in implementation of Brussels decisions. Recent refusal of Foreign Affairs Committee to approve debt assumption should be a warning signal to Chancellor in this connection.⁸

Besides still-open question of how Federal Government and Parliament will react to defense proposal approved at Brussels (including possibilities for further negotiation re same), attitude of German people towards defense issue will still remain a serious problem. As pointed out Frankfort’s 4157 to Department November 17,⁹ there is still much popular uncertainty, apathy and defeatism, which latest UN” reverses in Korea have certainly not helped (and upon which outcome of battles now pending will have further considerable effect).

Uncertainties connected with Soviet proposal for four power conference and Grotewohl letter have accentuated this state of mind, in particular by inducing sentiment that FedRep should avoid committing itself now, pending outcome of such discussions. As far as can be judged, fears have grown somewhat that German defense decision might provoke all-out Soviet attack, at time when Western military forces still insufficiently developed in general and FedRep inadequately defended. SPD seems to have exploited “Ohne Mich” feeling among masses in reckless fashion without careful consideration of possibility that Schumacher might be unable quickly restore positive popular attitude if and when SPD policy changes. In this connection latest Pub poll (December 19, 20) shows neutrality advocates almost equal in strength (41 percent) proponents of westward orientation (44 percent).

However, German people are still overwhelmingly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, and reaction of Berlin population to challenge presented them in 1948 shows what can be accomplished providing they become convinced, inter alia as result of coming negotiations, that they have: (1) a cause worth fighting for (in terms of free, equal Germany and/or whatever progress can be made towards popular goal of unified Western Europe); and (2) with coming buildup in western powers both in general and in forces stationed within FedRep, a cause which can in fact successfully defend itself against Soviet imperialism. Development of positive opinion on latter score will presumably necessarily take some time.

McCloy

1. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. For documentation on the decisions taken at Brussels, December 18 and 19, 1950, concerning a German defense contribution and a new contractual relationship, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 585 ff., and vol. iv, pp. 65 ff.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. Reference to Grotewohl’s letter to Adenauer, dated November 30, 1950.
5. For documentation on the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris, March 5–June 21, see pp. 1086 ff.
6. For documentation on the question of German unity, see pp. 1747 ff.
7. Not printed.
8. For documentation on the assumption of the debts of the Third Reich by the Federal Republic, see pp. 1410 ff.
9. Not printed.