Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.0221/2–2251: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Berlin, February 22, 1951—midnight.

1070. For Byroade AGSec from Slater. Following is summary report executive session High Commissioners with three western Berlin commandants, held Berlin 22 February 1951, during which following questions were discussed:

[Here follow parts a–c of this telegram, printed page 1897.]

d. Soviet interference inter-zonal waterways:

Council considered commandants paper¹ (being air pouched Department) which described continued Soviet interference on interzonal waterways and which contains conclusions that:

• “(a) Unless there is a change in Soviet methods, water traffic in Berlin would be so reduced and rendered so unreliable that it could not be counted upon to supply any of the essential requirements either for current use or from stockpiling;”
• “(b) Stoppage of Soviet zone water traffic passing through Western Berlin would produce quick and satisfactory transportation at expense of loss of very small tonnage of water transport importations for period of countermeasures and perhaps of additional pinpricking activities”. (Commandants also cite fact that Soviets have already on several occasions refused to negotiate except on unacceptable terms.)

Although Council authorized commandants to impose general stoppage by employing such legal devices as documentation checks, etc., on all Soviet zone barge traffic passing through western sectors, it agreed that commandants would not implement this decision for several days in order to provide an opportunity to determine whether an East German offer to provide additional trains to move present coal backlog was genuine. Dr. Leopold, West German negotiator, reported to HICOG today that East Germans have agreed to provide 45 trains at rate of three trains per day to move coal backlogged by closing Mittelland canal lock. I agreed to delay of commandants’ retaliatory measures even though I recognized that East zone offer is separate issue from larger question of resolving entire Berlin West zone canal problems through program of retaliation. If East German offer proves genuine, Commandants must then decide appropriate steps.² [Slater.]

McCloy

1. The paper under reference here has not been identified further.
2. On February 25 the Berlin Element of HICOG reported that Soviet officials had expressed a willingness to discuss problems relating to the Tetlow Canal, but that at a meeting of Soviet and U.S. representatives on February 26 no success was achieved in lifting Soviet restrictions on barge traffic. A subsequent message on February 27 from the Berlin Element indicated that if Soviet action was not forthcoming counter-measures would be implemented by the three Western Commandants. (Telegrams 1079, February 25 and 1088 February 27 from Berlin, 762A.0221/2–2551 and 962A.50/2–2751)