462A.62B31/2–851: Circular airgram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 2
Subject: Berlin and Interzonal Trade.
Department Telegram 3523, November 11, stated our views that we should in general advocate a policy of firmness in interzonal trade negotiations. We recognized, however, that events outside Germany could force a modification of this attitude.
We have reviewed this cable and our attitude in the light of the present Far Eastern situation. U.N. reverses in Korea may increase the likelihood of Soviet aggressive moves in Europe or the Middle East, and of additional harassing tactics, possibly through a blockade imposed by G.D.R. forces. The greatest danger of such moves probably will take place immediately after the four-power discussions with the Soviets, if no agreement is reached in these meetings.3
We do not believe that a “firm” policy alone will provoke a blockade; such a policy appears to be the only possible means of eventually effecting a decrease in the quantity of the strategic shipments to the Soviet Zone and through Berlin and the Soviet Zone to other Soviet areas.
Therefore, the Department reaffirms its stand for firm tactics stated in Department Telegram 3523.
We are, however, very much concerned over the Soviet-inspired threat not to sign the coal and power agreement in order to force approval of the protocol extending the Frankfort Agreement.4 We [Page 1829] understood that the Soviet Zone requirements from the West were so essential that the loss of trade with Western Germany would be risked through a renewed blockade against Berlin only if the blockade were desired by the Soviets in the framework of a larger aggressive policy.
If the above assumption is correct, then the East German threat to stop coal deliveries may have been an empty one. However, if the above assumption is not correct, then the Western position in Berlin is much more tenuous than we had imagined.
We will appreciate your urgent evaluation of the situation. What alternatives do you see for the West to follow on the occasion of the next threat to stop or curtail coal shipments? Do you believe that a satisfactory agreement between the Zones can be concluded in spite of this threat?
- This airgram, drafted by Rogers and cleared by Wiesner and Lewis, was sent to Frankfurt for action and to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow for information.↩
- For documentation on Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris, see pp. 1086 ff.↩
- Shortly after the Berlin blockade was lifted, East and West Germans negotiated a trade agreement to replace the one abrogated by the blockade. The new agreement effective from November 1950 was called the Frankfurt Agreement and provided for interzonal trade from November 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. It was extended on June 30 for 3 months, and two other informal extensions brought the expiration time to March 31, 1951.↩