Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762.00/10–1251: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London, October 12, 1951—7 p. m.

1805. Deptel 1980, October 11.² In conversation subsequent to despatch Embtel 1789 today (rptd Frankfort 215, Bonn 28, Paris 690³) Allen gave fol additional Brit view on proposed statement re Ger unity.

Morrison does not want to inject any more fon policy issues into election campaign if possible. Iran and Egypt⁴ have provided his opponents with enough ammunition, and he feels that statement along lines that given in Depreftel might be viewed as attempt by west to preclude possibility Gers themselves reaching any agreement on unity and of lifting issue from Ger to Allied-Sov level. Labor Party itself has always maintained that way must be left open for east-west negots, and Churchill for opposition recently intimated present international tension might not be so serious if his advice (of Feb 1950) for highest level east-west talks had been carried out. Therefore, for domestic polit reasons Morrison will be extremely wary of any declaration which cld be criticized as blocking negots.

When Kirkpatrick was in London this week he urged UK support for Adenauer request re UN commission to FedRep. Although FonOff has not yet reached decision on this Allen admitted it is probably not feasible to turn down request. What he fears is that Sovs wld accept proposal as formulated by Adenauer for UN investigation in FedRep and wld then, with possible help of “neutrals,” confuse issue in such a way that west might be seriously embarrassed. This cld include demand for inspection into Ger security forces as threat to “freedom” of elections and breaking off of HICOM–FedRep talks in order not to “prejudge” results of elections. While west is clear on these matters, certain others in UN (he mentioned India) might well be taken in. Allen thought Sovs might use question of UN investigation as they did Paris talks last spring to slow down process of FedRep integration into west.

Allen considers close consideration will be necessary on part west powers and FedRep to determine whether endorsement of Adenauer request as presently formulated might not prove more disadvantageous than helpful. EmbOff emphasized Dept’s strong feeling that statement shld be made, and, in view of postponement today, wld like SecState do so at his October 16 press conf. Allen promised furnish as soon as possible definitive Brit comments on present statement and, if FonSec changes views on matter, possible suggested changes.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Frankfurt, Berlin, and Bonn.
2. Not printed; it transmitted the text of a revised statement on German unity, updated to take account of Grotewohl’s address on October 10, cleared within the Department of State, and incorporating the substance of the drafts in telegrams 2084, September 27, p. 1789, and 2983, October 5, p. 1793.
3. Not printed; it reported that the British Foreign Office was cabling Franks to request “deferment proposed statement by SecState on German unity” pending further consideration of its implications, and it indicated that Morrison also was concerned about the effect of the statement on the coming British general elections. (762.00/10–1251) A copy of the British aide-mémoire, presented to Lauk-huff by Porter on October 12, in response to the Foreign Office’s cable to Franks, is in file 762A.00/10–1251.
4. For documentation on U.S. interest in British policy toward Iran and Egypt, see volume v .