Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762.00/10–1151: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Paris, October 11, 1951—8 p. m.

2141. Berlin’s 175, Oct 5 (sent Frankfort 632, rptd Dept 543, Bonn 256, London 107, Moscow 120).² We find no indication, in conversations at FonOff working level, of anything other than preoccupation with question of how Sov unity maneuvers can be prevented from interfering with negots on contractual arrangements and integration of Ger defense contribution into European army. It is our belief that if reexamination of French policy with respect to Ger were in progress, traces of this wld have appeared by now as they did in February when to best of our knowledge concept of unification-cum-neutralization was last seriously considered in govt and apparently decisively knocked on the head and thereupon discarded.

This does not mean, however, that French do not believe Sovs may be prepared to go to very great lengths to prevent Bonn conversations from succeeding. FonOff release on latest Grotewohl msg (see separate tel this date³) is adroit move to deflate it in eyes of French public, but thinking inside FonOff is that latest move may well presage substantial acceptance of 14 points. Sauvagnargues, with whom we have had repeated prolonged conversations before his departure for London,⁴ expressed view even at time of first Grotewohl msg (subsequent to our 1749, Sept 19, rptd London 439, Frankfort 204⁵) that it entirely possible Sovs may propose to apply Austrian pattern to Germany, We have, incidentally, conveyed to him intelligence contained in Berlin’s 171, Oct 4 (sent Frankfort 623, rptd Dept 535, Bonn 252, London 104, Moscow unn⁶) which had not previously come to FonOff’s attention.

Because FonOff considers that Sov unification campaign may become more daring and thus more damaging, it has looked with anxiety to Bonn discussions and to Adenauer’s attempt to capitalize on Sov pressure by demanding virtually complete sovereignty. Sauvagnargues has expressed deep gratification to us that High Commissioners maintained united front and immed set Adenauer straight. He voiced belief that bargaining position of West is much stronger than it seems since “Fed Govt must fear nothing more than four power negots on Ger”.

We found extremely interesting also second para of Berlin’s reftel with respect to possible Commie plant upon French of doc on Ger irredentism. This may have already had repercussions on French attitude in unification controversy, as evidence in L’Aube article reported in our 2101, Oct 9 (rptd London 519, Frankfort 238⁷). Altho French are not exactly enthusiastic about reopening of territorial questions by Adenauer, we have impression that they chiefly regret that he did not include sufficiently “unacceptable” conditions in the original 14 points. His general handling of controversy is considered adroit by FonOff and we find no grounds for believing that fear over Ger irredentism in connection with Saar⁸ might blind the French to need for interposing maximum obstacles to Sov unification campaign.

Bruce

1. Repeated to London, Frankfurt, Berlin, and Moscow.
2. Not printed; it reported the Berlin Element’s concern about the possible effect on French policy of the Communist deception campaign concerning German unity. Berlin also had misgivings that the French might believe instructions “purportedly emanating from Bonn Chancellory” directing Germans in former German territories, including the Saar and Alsace-Lorraine, to expect reunification with the German Reich. (762.00/10–551)
3. Telegram 2140, not printed (762A.00/10–451).
4. Sauvagnargues was leaving for London to participate in the work of the Tripartite Group on Germany (TGG); for documentation on this work, see pp. 1647 ff.
5. Not printed; it reported that the French Foreign Office was “not much impressed” by the Grotewohl proposals and that de Courson, the Acting Chief of the Central European Division, considered “that if Sovs were willing to jettison entire GDR in hope of stopping FedRep’s integration into Western defense, they wld have been more explicit and cld have made rejection considerably more difficult.” (762.00/9–1951)
6. Not printed; in it Morgan reported that the rumors about Soviet willingness to sell out the GDR in return for German neutrality had been confirmed by a reliable source as a deliberate Communist plant. (762.00/10–451)
7. Not printed; the article in L’Aube stated that Adenauer’s raising of the Oder-Neisse line question would embarrass the West no less than the East.(762A.00/10–951)
8. For further documentation on the status of the Saar, see pp. 1970 ff.