762.00/4–2651: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State 1
8679. PEPCO Drew Middleton article New York Times international edition Apr 22, which advances these that Sovs abandoning Ger unity and shifting policy toward Bereitschaften, gives analysis Sov policy and intentions which does not correspond with our info and opinion.
1. Info and emphasis used by Middleton known to have come from Brit sources in Berlin.
2. On balance, we think basic Sov strategy vis-à-vis West Ger remains same as heretofore; that Sov tactics on unity issue have altered somewhat because of inability and unwillingness to accept Fed Rep requirement of free elections as conditions to all-Ger talks of type proposed in Grotewohl initiative (Frankfort’s 6447 and 6448 Feb 4 pouched Paris and London2); and that, altho Praha declaration and Sov proposal for CFM seem originally to have been directed at precluding West Ger rearmament, Sovs may now be more concerned with general European rearmament issue than heretofore because of their assessment of West Ger opposition to rearmament and other [Page 1770] factors delaying implementation of Brussels decisions. Fol Fed Rep’s blunting of Grotewohl initiative (“Germans at one table”), Sov tactical and propaganda emphasis within Ger has shifted to Ger demilitarization but this does not connote policy abandonment of unity issue since Sov all-Ger demilitarization formula as set forth in Praha declaration and carried forward in Sov propaganda envisages some form of unified and demilitarized Ger.
3. Our reasons for believing Sovs have not basically changed their approaches to Ger unity:
- (a)
- Sov strategy has been and remains implementation dual policy of consolidating hold on Sov Zone while pressing all available advantages to isolate West Ger from West through combination subversion, penetration, propaganda and political initiative. This process proceeding full-blast with propaganda in favor all-Ger demilitarization, coupled with proposed remilitarization plebiscite (Frankfort’s 8454, Apr 18, rptd Paris 830, pouched London unn3), and political initiatives such as proposed CFM, World Peace Congress and Big-Five pact.
- (b)
- Sov politico-propaganda initiative in support all-Ger demilitarization is coupled with proposal of all-Ger peace treaty in 1951 and hence integrates unity issue into main current emphasis of Sov strategy and tactics vis-à-vis West Ger. Proposed plebiscite question is “are you against Ger remilitarization and in favor of peace treaty with Ger in 1951?”
- (c)
- Facts available do not, in our opinion warrant conclusion that Sovs will not continue to advance unity proposals, especially if these can be framed to win psychological support of Gers and thus to contribute toward isolation of allied position vis-à-vis Fed Rep. Think, as we have reported previously, it highly unlikely that Sov unity formula wld encompass free elections (unless coupled with conditions of known unacceptability to West) or be proposed in good faith, but these considerations do not qualify conclusion that Sovs have not abandoned Ger unity as fundamental component of their strategic and tactical approach to Ger problem.
4. Doubt in [if] Sov Zone opinion poll of type described in article cld have been conducted without our knowledge and, if conducted under Sov/GDR aegis, cld have reflected honest low-level acceptance indicated in article.
5. Data on Bereitschaften factually correct but know of no shift in policy. There is some evidence that force is being temporarily kept on ice pending negotiations, but primary influence is normal development of cadres involving: (a) Reorganization of Bereitschaften into training cadres, (b) Balancing manpower requirements between five-year plan and Bereitschaften, and (c) State of training.