740.5/12–1051: Telegram
The Chargé in France ( Bonsal ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
3484. Below is informal translation of Fr memorandum on security controls referred to in Embtel 3464, December 10 (rptd London 917, [Page 1733] Bonn 136)2. Memorandum bears drafting initials of Sauvagnargues, and was signed by Parodi in Schuman’s absence. Shld be read in context with Rome’s Secto 102 (rptd Bonn 18, London 248)3, and related messages. We shall attempt to obtain clarification as to whether memorandum actually represents final govt position, but consider it desirable to explore this only after Schuman and Alphand return from Strasbourg, at which time Monnet may also have become freed from intensive work of last week TCC analysis.
Subject to review by Amb Bruce when he returns from London, we recommend that Fr invitation for tripartite high-level talks on security controls be accepted. Dispatch of memorandum wld seem to force us to take up tripartite talks again, but we will continue nevertheless under instructions of last para Secto 102. Brit Emb is recommending in same sense to its govt. (Further comments, which may be useful in reply to Fr, will go forward in separate msg).
Begin translation. As American and Brit Govts know, it has not been possible for three FonMins at Rome conf to examine thoroughly, nor to solve, the question of prohibitions that shld be maintained in Germany in security field.
At end of those consultations, it was understood that problem wld be taken up again at governmental level, in order that the three HICOMS shld be able discuss with Chancellor Adenauer the convention on security guarantees. In view of fact that next meeting of HICOMS and Chancellor on this subject is to take place in near future, Fr Govt suggests that conversations take place at Paris, at highest possible level, in order to set the allied position down in definitive fashion.
Even before the beginning of those conversations, Fr Govt wld like to inform American and Brit Govts of the grave misgivings which are created in its mind by the divergencies which appear at present in this field between the three powers.
At the Rome conversations, it was indicated that Fr counterproposal of Nov 27, to the American proposal of Nov 21, brought up no new element in comparison with position defined in Wash three months ago. Fr Govt, on its part, did not think that the agreement which had been concluded in consideration of establishment of the European Defense Community, wld be so quickly opened up again. It finds it necessary to underline the fact that proposal in question involved relinquishment of the idea of the organism of inspection that had been envisaged, which was to take the place of Mil Security Board.
By envisaging in this manner a European solution to the problem of how to apply the security restrictions, Fr Govt considers that it made an important concession.
It must state, on other hand, that the American proposal of Nov 21 seems hardly acceptable. It eliminates all restrictions in the field of heavy arms which is the very field that possesses a particular political importance in the eyes of French public opinion. That proposal also gives a provisional character to the Convention on Security Controls, [Page 1734] which amounts to saying that all contractual limitations upon German industrial armament activities wld disappear quickly, and that the same wld be the case in field of scientific research that is oriented toward military purposes.
Fr Govt feels it necessary to call attention of Brit and American Govts to the very grave repercussions which may result from such a position.
It is certain that public opinion and French parliament wld be less likely to accept the sacrifices which are involved by establishment of the European Defense Community if that creation were to have consequence of eliminating all kinds of restrictions upon mil production.
One can certainly understand perfectly well that the three powers shld be concerned to accommodate as much as possible the German sensibilities, in order to facilitate the acceptance of the contractual agreements by Federal parliament. It must not be concealed, however, that, by going too far in this direction, the three powers run risk of creating difficulties in France that are at least as great.
French Govt finds it difficult to believe, moreover, that the American and Brit Govts, given the special position of Western Germany, wld be ready to envisage the eventual abandonment of all restrictions in the field of atomic energy, of biological and chemical weapons, of aviation and naval construction.
From the political point of view, it appears appropriate to appraise, on the other hand, the consequences that wld arise in the general field of East-West relations, if there were a decision to terminate all restrictions in field of armament. In the course of work on the general agreement between Federal Republic and the Allies,4 the three govts have been constantly concerned lest the eventual resumption of conversations with the Soviet Union be rendered impossible. The Fr Govt, to be sure, has no illusions about the chances of success of such negotiations, but it continues to be concerned that no situation shld be created from which there wld be no way out except through application of force.
Chancellor Adenauer has declared that he wld like to settle the problem of prohibitions exclusively within the framework of the convention on the creation of a European Defense Community, which is being worked out in Paris.
The Fr Govt on its part wld have been disposed to accept this proposal if it were capable of practical application. That is unfortunately not the case.
While it is, indeed, desirable to give a European solution to the problem of the implementation (mise en oeuvre) of these prohibitions, it is not possible to have the prohibitions themselves enter in the framework of the European Defense Community which is founded, as the Chancellor himself recalls, on the principle of non-discrimination. If such restrictions were to be written into the treaty on the European Defense Community, they wld be automatically applicable to all the member states. On the other hand, in the absence of precise stipulations that are laid down in a document outside of the treaty, it wld be evidently impossible for the European Defense Commissioner to Justify that certain orders cld not be placed in Germany.
[Page 1735]Meanwhile, and if it is objected that it will be very difficult to have the German Govt accept restrictions of this kind, it may be sufficient to recall that that govt, through the person of its representative Mr. Blank, had spontaneously proposed, in the course of the Petersberg conversations,5 that it wld refrain from all armament production, except such as might be specifically asked for by France.
The commitment that we wld ask the Federal Govt to assume at this time, within the framework of the contractual arrangements, wld be of a much more limited scope and wld correspond to the legitimate desire of the three powers to see a substantial German contribution to the defense effort of the western nations, even while respecting the safeguards whose maintenance is required by the general situations.
End translation.
- Repeated to London and Bonn.↩
- Not printed; it reported, inter alia, that the French Foreign Office had transmitted a lengthy memorandum on security controls. (740.5/12–1051)↩
- Printed as telegram 18, November 29, p. 1729.↩
- For documentation on the General Convention between the Federal Republic and the Western Allies, see pp. 1446 ff.↩
- For documentation on the talks at Bonn, January 4–June 6, concerning a German contribution to Western defense, see pp. 1647 ff.↩