Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

740.5/11–1551: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret

Bonn, November 15, 1951—4: p. m.

392. Subject: High Commissioners discussion with Adenauer 14 November on forthcoming FonMins meeting and draft gen agrmt.

I. Preparation for 22 November FM Paris meeting with Adenauer.

I requested indication issues Adenauer wld like to raise Paris 22 November. He cited: (a) Unresolved issues on draft gen agrmt; (b) Pleven plan; and (c) appraisal of Soviet tactics with respect to Ger. In addition, I indicated that FonMins wld welcome his suggestions and comments on draft security guarantee which had been previously transmitted to him and his report on status FedRep voting law (wahlgeseta). FonMins might be prepared preview for him (a) Allied policy re important world problems; (b) western Allied time schedule; and (c) FedRep contribution to western defense (we agreed it wld be better not to raise question of war criminals until we had had opportunity to have further discussions with him at High Commissioners level).

II. Draft gen agrmt.

A. Five hour mtg resulted in agrmt (subject to gen reservation that each element could re-raise for consideration any provision of gen agrmt and subject to specified reservations described in para B below) to draft agrmt on gen relations which cld be examined in Paris on 22 November.

[Here follows a list of drafting changes that were made in the November 9 draft general agreement.]

Text of revised gen agrmt matter harmonization with Ger vision will be airpouched soonest. Allied–FedRep experts instructed to draft preamble. In addition, at my request, Chancellor confirmed agrmt to insert at some appropriate place provision which wld ensure right of allied mil authorities to take certain reasonable defensive measures, e.g., installation explosion chambers in bridges, preparation for obstacles in narrow passes, etc.

Finally, I again impressed on Adenauer necessity to proceed expeditiously with related conventions. He indicated agrmt on FedRep defense contribution shld be reached by mid-December and therefore related conventions wld have to be ready by that date so that entire arrangement could enter into effect.

B. Items on which agrmt was not reached.

There are two major points which will most probably have to be discussed in 22 Nov Paris mtg.

First concerns para 6 of new article V, i.e., FedRep desire for review by some outside agency of Allied declaration of emergency which might be issued after establishment of contractual relationship. Adenauer urged us to inform our govt that although he wld not insist oil establishment of an arbitration tribunal for such review, he felt review by some outside agency was imperative. Otherwise, Allied action wld appear to have aspect of order issued by Mil Govt.

Second point and major portion of today’s discussion concerned definition of “unified Ger” which arose in connection with term as used in new Article VII. Adenauer opened discussion by stating he wanted to ensure that both sides understood implications of phrase “their common aim of a unified Ger”. I interjected that we had discussed this matter previous day with Hallstein and on basis of that discussion, Allies wished to propose adoption of agreed minute to make clear that undertaking in Article VII with respect to unified Ger did not involve any commitment regarding disposition of territory beyond the Oder-Neisse line, or other territories outside the jurisdiction of FedRep or Sov Zone.

In presenting case that Allies shld agree “their common aim of a unified Ger” be interpreted as meaning Allied support for restoration of territories east of Oder/Neisse line, Chancellor made following points, inter alia:

(a) Article II of present draft gives Allies all protection they need with respect to maintenance of Potsdam decisions and their position vis-à-vis the Sovs. Western govts have always maintained that they do not recognize east bloc action concerning Oder-Neisse line, and therefore, any distinction implied in gen agrmt between territory west and east of Oder-Neisse line wld be interpreted as recognition of GDR-Polish border.

(b) In Allied declarations since June 1945, ref has been made to “Germany” as of 1937. Therefore, Allied policy shld be that Ger shld regain territory east of Oder-Neisse line.

(c) Neither Ger public nor Bundestag wld accept any agrmt in which a distinction had been made between territories east and west of Oder-Neisse line. Further, millions of refugees and expellees wld bring pressure to bear on all political parties to reject such an agrmt If contractual relationships were not carried” out, a union of Socialists and neo-Nazi groups might result. This wld mean rejection in Ger of concept of Eur integration, rejection of Schuman and Pleven plans and emergence of a “neutralized Germany”. He labeled any Allied policy designed to save this area for future negotiation with Sovs as “opportunistic”.

(d) In view of what “Ger people have gone through and fact they were now being led astray as a result of promise of German unity,” Ger public wld not agree to provide number of FedRep soldiers now being discussed in Paris if they were told it was not policy of western Allies to restore to Ger territory east of Oder-Neisse and that Allies which to retain a free hand in this matter.

We made following reply to points raised by Adenauer:

(1) Question of final Ger frontier including territories beyond Oder-Neisse line must be reserved for ultimate peace treaty. Perhaps at some future time, Allies wld support Ger claims to such territories but western Allies must retain open position vis-à-vis the Sovs on this point until time of peace settlement. Western Allies must take into account political situation at any given time with respect to this policy particularly concerning Czechs and Poles.

(2) For six years Allies had maintained consistent position re this point, namely frontier questions and territories east of Oder-Neisse can only be settled at time of peace treaty. In past this statement had always found warm response on part Ger public.

(3) Adenauer was not in position to define territories east of Oder-Neisse. Allies wld not be in a position to know what their obligations were in this matter if they agreed to support him on this issue. Furthermore, “1937” ref in Potsdam was used only for defining occupation and not as commitment to restore territory to Ger.

(4) Gers shld be assured by para 2 of Article VII which provides that “peace settlement for whole of Ger, freely negotiated, between Ger and her former enemies, is an essential aim of their common policy.” Western Allies have not recognized any Sov bloc attempt to fix boundary before final peace settlement.

(5) Efforts for integration of Western Eur were designed to achieve benefits for Eur community and to provide Eur force which cld stop Sov aggression. These steps toward unification of Eur and rearming of Ger were not being taken to assure that Ger cld regain her territories. Western Allies were providing soldiers and great effort to protect and extend liberties in Ger. We have asked Ger to contribute to her own defence as well as that of Western Eur. There was always strong hope that some day Ger border could be extended beyond present Sov Zone. That hope was not illusory.

For your info, at mtg with Hallstein on 13 Nov, I raised this point myself and it was thoroughly discussed. He then stated unequivocally he had never had any thought that Allies wld vary their position by this convention in regard to eastern territories and moreover, he understood that we might well require clarification of this language. At our mtg with Adenauer, he simply dissembled as to his earlier position. I am under impression Adenauer was testing us out to see how far we wld go. There was something about his attack which indicated he was not fully sincere in matter but is using this issue for local political purposes so that if later criticized for failure to obtain assurances in regard to Oder-Neisse he can blame Allies. There appears to be no doubt however, that he will press this case again with FonMins in Paris on 22 Nov.

McCloy

1. Repeated to London for Gifford and to Paris for Byroade, Bruce, and Secretary Acheson.