Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

662A.00/11–951: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret   priority

Bonn , November 9, 1951—9 p. m.

351. Subject: High Commissioners Discussion with Adenauer 8 November on Draft General Agreement. Reference: Bonn sent Dept 310 and 316 of 3 November.²

1. Little progress was made at five hour session. Major portion of meeting devoted to discussion of:

(i) Article I—allied rights remaining after conclusion of contractual agreements, particularly with respect to stationing of troops in Germany;

(ii) German formulation of Article III, paragraph 1, question of allied right to station troops other than those of three occupation powers in Germany;

(iii) Federal Republic desire to include in Article II allied commitment to consult “Federal Republic in their relations with East bloc states.”

In addition, agreement was reached on Article I, paragraph 4. Adenauer agreed to allied wording which provides that relations with Federal Republic would be conducted “through ambassadors who will act jointly in matters three powers consider of common concern.”

In view importance of differences and in order to give allies opportunity to consult, their govts, particularly with respect to right of stationing of troops, it was agreed that High Commissioners shld postpone further discussion with Chancellor until Wednesday, 14 November. In meantime, allied and Federal Republic representatives were instructed to re-edit draft general agreement (reference telegram) on basis of subject meeting and exchange of drafts and to submit it to 14 November meeting. Will cable re-edited version including latest proposals soonest.³

2. Discussion again turned on difficulties raised by Chancellor concerning statement of existing, allied rights, particularly with respect to stationing of armed forces in Germany. I offered for discussion following new allied version paragraph 2 of Article I:

“In view of international situation, three powers retain rights, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to (a) stationing of armed forces in Germany and protection of their security, (b) Berlin, and (c) Germany as a whole, including reunification of Germany and peace settlement. Federal Republic will cooperate with three powers to facilitate exercise of these rights and to ensure their continued effectiveness.” I stated this proposal was submitted because of allied desire to obtain clear and affirmative statement of Federal Republic’s willingness to cooperate in facilitating allied exercise of these rights and guaranteed these rights would not be attacked or challenged by Federal Republic while general agreement remained in force. I explained my govt took extremely firm position on this issue and in my talk with Secretary he indicated while he had always been prepared to adopt liberal attitudes on other matters, he would insist on clear definition of residual allied rights in order that world understood that allies intended to keep these minimum rights without equivocation.⁴

Therefore, it was of supreme importance that rights to be retained should be expressed in as clear and unambiguous language as possible.

Adenauer replied that phrase “to ensure their continued effectiveness” was unacceptable to him as it was type of clause which opposition could use “to poison public opinion against general agreement in Germany,” because it implied recognition by Federal Republic of allied right to station troops in Germany on basis of capitulation. In course of discussion, Adenauer indicated he had discussed this article with leaders of three coalition parties who indicated question whether agreement would receive a majority in Bundestag depended on wording of this provision. Adenauer stressed repeatedly that while Federal Republic was willing to cooperate with three powers “to facilitate exercise of these rights” wording should in no way imply Federal Republic had recognized these rights as in its view allied right to station troops on basis of unconditional surrender had become extinct and in any event allies never had right to station troops in Germany for “all time” and for purposes which went beyond tasks of occupation. Allies had recognized this fact when they announced their troops were here for defense and not as occupation forces.

I stressed again allies were not asking Federal Republic to recognize rights but merely to ensure that while they were acting under general agreement these rights would not be attacked or challenged.

We asked Adenauer if he would agree to do some wording along following lines: “Federal Republic will refrain from any action prejudicial to these rights and will cooperate with three powers to facilitate their exercise.” Adenauer replied that whereas he could agree not to take action prejudicial to the exercise of the allied rights he would not accept wording which in any way implied recognition of rights. Adenauer stated that if words “exercise of rights” were used throughout, this would preclude any future Federal Govt from questioning or challenging these rights while general agreement remained in force. I pointed out Adenauer’s successors might challenge “allied rights” without necessarily interfering with “exercise of allied right.” Therefore, his wording did not appear to be acceptable; however, it was agreed this matter, including his assurance, would be referred to govts for consideration.

With regard to I(ii) above, Chancellor challenged the interpretation that allied right to station armed forces in Federal Republic by virtue of retained rights included right to station under their command allied contingents such as those of Danes and Norwegians. We explained to Adenauer that these allied troops were here on basis of an existing right. Kirkpatrick stated that Adenauer’s challenge of this right was in direct contradiction to the assurance he had just made to cooperate [and] facilitate the exercise of “existing allied rights.” In reply to Adenauer’s question concerning the origin of this right, Kirkpatrick stated allies had agreed with Soviets that troops which were allied with Big Four during war could be employed under command four-powers for occupation duties. Adenauer replied he would not recognize any “allied right which was based on an agreement with the Soviets” and that he could not tolerate a situation whereby West powers could station at will troops of some thirty odd countries which were at war with Germany. Furthermore, he wanted to examine all of the rights which we maintained we held before he would be in position to sign agreement. He stressed it was his understanding that Article I referred only to troops of three powers. He did add, however, if SHAPE desired troops of other NATO forces in Germany this could be arranged after consultation with Federal Republic and he would be prepared to add a provision to general agreement to that effect. We pointed out to Adenauer that practical problem of basis on which Danes and Norwegians were to remain in Germany after agreement was signed must be explored as well as rights of three powers to bring in under their umbrella contingents of non-NATO forces such as those of South Africa or Australia.

With respect to I(iii) above, Adenauer presented compromise proposal which stated that “three powers will consult with Federal Govt insofar as their policies with respect to states with which Federal Govt maintains no relations, directly affect German political interests.” We pointed out that although this new redraft was less objectionable than original German proposal, it was, nevertheless, unsatisfactory. Further, in our opinion, it gave no further assurances to Federal Republic than did our proposal in which we agreed to consult Federal Republic in all matters affecting exercise of allied rights relating to “Germany, as a whole” Chancellor was most anxious, for political purpose to be able to point to some assurance in the agreement which would indicate that in our dealings with states of the eastern bloc we would consult with the Federal Govt in order not to prejudice German interests. After considerable discussion of the point, we presented following provisional compromise which we explained would have to be cleared with our govt.

“When negotiating with states with which Federal Republic maintains no relations, the three powers will consult with Federal Republic re matters directly involving its political interest.”

McCloy

1. Repeated to Frankfurt and London and to Paris eyes only for Byroade and Secretary Acheson.
2. Ante, pp. 1566 and 1568.
3. A copy, of the revised text of the draft agreement, dated November 9, is in file 662A.00/11–951.
4. On November 5 McCloy had flown to Paris for discussions with Secretary Acheson. No record of their talks has been found in Department of State files.