762A.0221/10–2651: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State 1
273. Eyes only for Secretary, Byroade. Yesterday afternoon’s mtg with Chancellor turned primarily on question of state of emergency. Chancellor recognized necessity of protecting security of troops thru declaration of state of emergency in event not only of external attack but serious internal disorders or grave constitutional upheaval. He considered agreement cld be reached that measures to be taken in event of emergency shld be limited to those required to protect security of troops and that emergency wld only arise if Ger auths cld not handle situation. If this were case, he considered only remaining difference of opinion between Gers and Allies was with respect to agency which wld take decision to declare emergency. He argued that Council of Ambs wld be polit in character and since these provisions dealt only with security of troops, SHAPE shld assume responsibility.
[Page 1565]Allied reps pointed out govts must take responsibility and civilian reps wld be in better position to consult with Fed Govt than mil commander outside territory of FedRep. It was our belief that Council of Ambs provided more acceptable guarantee to Gers than decision of mil commander.
After considerable discussion of this point, Chancellor consented to proposal of chairman to leave to three govts determination how reserved right wld be implemented.
Chancellor recognized three powers must act jointly vis-à-vis FedRep in certain cases and also in respect to Berlin but argued this was so obvious that it need not be included in treaty, particularly since mention of tripartite body in treaty wld imply successor to HICOM and thus be politically difficult for Gers to accept. Kirkpatrick suggested that if mention of Council of Ambs were suppressed then para two of Article III of Ministers’ draft shld also be omitted; otherwise, it might imply Ambs wld not act jointly on any matters. We agreed to propose this solution to our govts and to redraft provisions of gen agrmt in this sense for consideration at next mtg. Francois Poncet, while prepared to consider redraft expressed view it might create difficulties in view of Mins’ decision that treaty shld provide for continuance of definite tripartite org.2
It was agreed rapporteurs wld prepare draft of gen convention in light of recent discussions as basis for discussion at next mtg Wednesday, Oct 31. Chancellor is urging completion of gen agrmt in order to meet difficulties of local polit situation and also because he seems to fear resumption of Fr Assembly Nov 7 may bring govt crisis and thus block progress for indefinite future.
He gave me impression that he still considers conclusion of gen agrmt alone is important and that supporting conventions are secondary. My colleagues and I, however, pointed out impossibility of signing any gen agrmt until supporting conventions were agreed and EDF structure complete. At same time, we insisted that it is important to go forward in the three fields as rapidly as possible.
We were privately informed at close of session that Gers are now prepared to accept reservation of Allied right to protect security of troops.
Revised clauses of gen convention as they are prepared in light of these discussions will be sent you as rapidly as possible and will need [Page 1566] prompt consideration on your part. I hope you will find it possible to comment principally on substance as wording may have to be modified from time to time as we receive comments from three capitals.
- Repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.↩
- In a subsequent telegram McCloy reported that the French might be prepared to omit any mention of the Council of Ambassadors in the general agreement if the three Western Governments agreed that matters of common concern affecting Germany should be handled jointly by the Ambassadors, based on some prior understanding among the Governments and on the establishment of some informal tripartite machinery. McCloy recommended acceptance of this compromise, and the Department of State concurred in his recommendation on October 27. Telegrams 280 from Bonn and 165 to Bonn, October 26 and 27, neither printed (762A.0221/10–2651).↩