762A.0221/10–1951: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn 1
155. (1) Agree Bonn’s 250 Oct 19, rptd London eyes only Gifford 92, Paris eyes only Bruce 100, Frankfort 3642 that Hallstein proposal offers promising solution difficulty re basis for stationing troops in Ger. Our understanding is that phrase “the stationing of armed forces in Ger and the protection of the security of those forces” in Bonn’s 231 Oct 13 rptd London 80, Paris 873 wld be amended by addition phrase “for the defense of the free world, of which Germany is a part” as suggested Bonn’s 249 Oct 19, rptd London 91, Paris 994 or by addition equivalent language as suggested Bonn’s 250.
(2) Our agrmt rests on two conditions. One is that ref in Bonn’s 231 to “rights now held by the three powers, as set forth in international agreements” includes pertinent rights found in Declaration of June 5, 1945. Appreciate reasons for avoiding direct mention of Declaration, but do not wish any misunderstanding to arise between Allies and Gers over fact that it is one of “agrmts” in which Allied rights are expressed.
(3) Second condition concerns point raised Bonn’s 250. Assume HICOM will make clear to Gers that fact mission of troops is solely for purpose of defense does not constitute any limitation whatever either on general right of Allies to protect security of troops or on specific right, in exceptional circumstances agreed by FonMins, to declare emergency for their protection.
(4) According Bonn’s 249 paras 1 and 4 Allies will state explicitly that contractual agrmts will be binding on both sides, in order emphasize “that agreements would not be set aside through unilateral exercise [Page 1564] of Allied reserved powers”. Dept concurs that agrmts will be equally binding on all parties and that Gers shld be fully assured of this. It is not clear to us, however, just what misgivings they expressed at mtg described Bonn’s 249. If they wanted confirmation that all parties to agrmts are on same footing and that in ordinary course of events Allies have no right to set agrmts aside because of supreme auth, then we agree with their interpretation and feel nothing need be added to statements already made. If, on other hand, Gers were asserting that agrmts shld be binding in sense that, for example, Allies could not even suspend their operation during a declared emergency, then their interpretation is contrary to ours, and you shld impress on them that exercise of supreme auth, whether concerning troops, Berlin, or Ger as whole, will not be restricted by provisions of agrmts, but will be superior to them. We had supposed this was obvious and did not require amplification. We hope it will not be necessary to advance such an explanation, since any detailed discussion of supreme auth is likely to make Gers suspicious and lead them to believe it will be exercised more often and more readily than we intend. However, it is essential point be made clear and you shld therefore raise it again, if necessary.
(5) Point Bonn’s 250 re arms and equipment for EDF will be considered separate message.5