740.5/10–1251: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1

secret   priority

3155. Eyes only for Secretary, Byroade. In informal discussion with Chancellor last night at which Hallstein and Blankenhorn were present, I again raised question of nature of security guarantee desired by Fed Govt. I reiterated our inability to accept anything as broad as or in the form of the Chancellor’s draft. I put forward as personal suggestion possible alternatives either declaration along lines of Bendetsen memorandum of Sept 132 including reference to stationing [Page 1550] of troops or treaty clauses adapting NATO guarantee to Ger. I emphasized neither of these was definitive US proposal and both would require further consideration as well as consultation with Brit and French.

Chancellor said he had given careful study to this problem as it had been outlined in our recent meetings and had come to conclusion that in place of NATO guarantee he would prefer reaffirmation of 1950 declaration with statement of intention to station troops provided it were accompanied by expression of tripartite support for Ger in NTATO.

During discussion which ensued it emerged that Chancellor looked toward Ger membership in NATO on same basis as other members of European defense community, no more no less. He argued assurances that Ger would be granted equality of treatment as member of EDC implied Ger should be given same status in NATO as other EDC participants since any other arrangement would involve discrimination. Consequently he considered that membership in EDC should mean extending NATO guarantee of protection to Ger which because of Ger’s expressed [exposed?] position he would like to see reinforced by assurances regarding stationing of troops.

This represents modification of his previous position which I understand has been urged by Blank recently returned from Paris. It is apparent that Chancellor now attaches importance to Ger membership in NATO , but he seems prepared to recognize that relationship of EDC to NATO requires further study before definite assurances can be given that Ger membership in one automatically brings about its membership in the other. He would probably accept brief technical delay in completing formalities admitting Ger to NATO once EDC has been set up. He is however, seeking assurances that Ger will not be left out of NATO when it has given its contribution to defense. Assurances would take form of Allied undertaking to support proposal.

I expressed view that Ger membership in NATO could probably only be agreed after relationship of other members of EDC to NATO had been determined but proposed to seek further guidance in this respect. Also pointed out that three-power undertaking to support was far from receiving prompt acceptance and Hays indicated there might be considerable French and Brit reluctance to press promptly for Ger NATO membership. Chancellor said he would have this question of Ger’s relation to NATO as EDF member raised in Paris.3

Since it seems unlikely that other members of EDC will forego individual membership in NATO , we must either be prepared to accept Ger membership on same basis or risk charge that Ger is being discriminated [Page 1551] against with consequent adverse effect upon Ger defense contribution.

Chancellor again emphasized that time was ripe to get ahead with negots, agree on a single relatively brief document and patch up odds and ends later. Widespread contacts with Ger political, press leaders indicate considerable misunderstanding Allied position with no hesitancy on their part to accept reserve rights in fields specified but Chancellor and his advisers seem quite capable of rallying either popular or political support. However believe situation improving (until the next flap).

McCloy
  1. Repeated to London and Paris eyes only for Gifford and Bruce.
  2. In the memorandum under reference Bendetsen had stated that it was “unnecessary and possibly dangerous” to include an unconditional security guarantee in the contractual arrangements, but suggested as an alternative a public pronouncement along the following lines:

    “On September 19, 1950 the foreign ministers of the three allied powers declared that their governments would treat any attack against the German Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves. The establishment of the proposed new relationship between the powers and the German Federal Republic does not alter or diminish the effect of that declaration. On the contrary the three powers consider that the protection of the German Federal Republic and Berlin against attack from any quarter is a most important element of the security and peace of the free world. Consequently, the allied powers each undertake to maintain armed forces within the territory of the German Federal Republic for such time, in the light of the world situation, as may be deemed necessary.” (762A.0221/9–1351)

  3. For further documentation on German membership in NATO , see pp. 755 ff.